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ANNOUNCEMENT
Contemporary Strategy and Landpower Essay Award
The annual Contemporary Strategy and Landpower Essay Award, formerly the Elihu Root
Prize, recognizes and rewards authors outside the US Army War College for the most
significant contributions on contemporary strategy and landpower in a volume of the US
Army War College Quarterly, Parameters. The journal’s editorial board selects winners based upon
the article’s analytical depth and rigor. The Contemporary Strategy and Landpower Essay
Award is made possible by the generous support of the US Army War College Foundation.
The award winners for Volume 50 of the journal will be announced in the Summer 2021 issue.
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From the Commandant
With the publication of this issue, The US Army War College
Quarterly, Parameters celebrates 50 years of successfully presenting
cutting-edge scholarly research in a format useful to military and policy
practitioners. For five decades, Parameters has served as the US Army’s
flagship strategy journal, bringing crucial strategic issues to the attention
of not only the Army’s senior leaders but the entire Joint community as
well. As the archives show, the name Parameters was chosen because it
represents the responsible framing of defense matters—from the nature
of war to the character of civil-military relations—for discussion and
debate, and ultimately for action.
Fifty years ago, Major General George S. Eckhardt, then
Commandant of the US Army War College, described Parameters’ chief
objective as the promotion of a broader and deeper understanding of the
“goals, the power, and the policies of the United States, as well as those
of allies, neutrals, or potential enemies.” As I look back at all the journal
has accomplished since then, I am pleased to report Parameters has more
than met that objective. The Army’s flagship strategy journal not only
promotes a deeper understanding of the “goals, power, and policies” of
the United States, it also leans forward—anticipating and, in important
ways, shaping those goals through the insights of its contributors as well
as the open-mindedness of its readers.
Since its inception, Parameters has published more than 1,200 different
authors and 1,500 articles. Among its authors are notable personalities
such as Omar Bradley, Michael Walzer, Barbara Tuchman, George
Will, Milton Friedman, John Keegan, David Petraeus, Isaac Singer,
Tom Wolfe, Stephen Ambrose, James H. Baker, Charles S. Robb, Saxby
Chambliss, Robert Gates, James Mattis, and Michael Chertoff. Likewise,
the articles these authors have written for the journal cover such topics
as new vistas for American foreign policy, innovations in professional
military education, emerging technologies, strategic theories for the
contemporary world, the moral impact of racial and gender inequalities,
and measures to reduce the incidence of suicide within our ranks.
Yet, just as our nation is greater than the sum of its parts, and the
more diverse those parts the better, so too Parameters is more than the
sum of its authors and its articles, eminent though they may be. The
journal’s success stems immensely from you, the reader, and your active
participation. To underscore that point, let me echo something Major
General Eckhardt noted five decades ago that still rings true today:
Parameters’ success lies less in its contributors or its content than in the
benefits its readers derive from it. We provide you a forum for scholarly
research, but you ensure the content is relevant, timely, and accessible
by engaging with it.

David C. Hill
Major General, US Army
Acting Commandant
US Army War College
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From the Editor in Chief
This is a special issue of Parameters. It celebrates half a century of
publishing first-rate strategic analyses designed to help US civilian and
military policymakers decide how best to address the always present and
always varying challenges to America’s security.
When Parameters made its debut as a strategy journal in March 1971,
the United States was still engaged in the Vietnam conflict with more
than 300,000 troops in the country. The terrorist group known as the
Weather Underground exploded a bomb in the US Capitol Building that
same month to protest the expansion of the war into Laos. Large-scale
antiwar protests and sit-ins took place in the nation’s capital in May 1971.
One month later, in June of 1971, the “Pentagon Papers” were released,
raising troubling questions about the motives for, and sustainability
of, America’s involvement in the war. National Public Radio (NPR)
made its inaugural broadcast in 1971 as well, adding a public-funded
broadcasting agency as an alternative to commercial networks.
But national morale was low. Martin Luther King Jr. and Robert
Kennedy were assassinated in April and June of 1968 respectively, and
riots in America’s major metropolitan centers continued throughout the
remainder of that year. Apollo 11’s successful landing on the moon on
July 20, 1969, (and Apollo 12 four months later) was offset by Apollo
13’s aborted lunar mission in April 1970. And the May 4, 1970, massacre
at Kent State University, in which four students were killed, was not
yet one year old. All of these events were in the rearview mirror, but
only just.
In 1971, America’s population was 211 million people and climbing.
The United States was experiencing an economic recession with inflation
reaching nearly 6 percent the year before, the highest rate since the
Korean War; unemployment hovered just over 6 percent, and real percapita income amounted to $18,000; a gallon of gas cost only 40 cents,
while the average price of a new house was $25,000.1 In the summer
of 1971, the country’s voting age was lowered to 18 to align it with the
draft age, which had been 18 since the Second World War. Ironically that
shift came at a time when the country had begun to move away from
conscription toward a volunteer force—which in turn raised far-ranging
questions about US civil-military relations and military professionalism.
This celebratory issue consists of two parts. Part I, Prospectives
2021, offers three forums discussing ways ahead for America’s Strategic
Landpower, its Civil-Military Relations, and its National Security. Part II,
Retrospectives 1971, assesses the contributions made to the inaugural issue
of Parameters. We have arranged the contributions to Part II thematically,
to aid readers, rather than presenting them in their original order.
Part I’s first forum, US Strategic Landpower, opens with an article
by Carol Evans, “Providing Stability and Deterrence: The US Army
in INDOPACOM.” She argues the US Army’s long-range, precisionstrike capabilities offer powerful means to improve deterrence in the
1. In 2016 dollars (inflation adjusted).

TOC

8

Parameters 51(1) Spring 2021

Indo-Pacific region by means of a “Ring of Fires” concept; furthermore,
the Army’s capacity for building military-to-military relationships
provides an exceptional mechanism for enhancing the Quadrilateral
Security Dialogue, and with it regional stability. Nora Bensahel’s
“Transforming the US Army for the Twenty-First Century” follows
Evans’s contribution, arguing the US Army must make four major
shifts in its operational concepts and postures: from a supported to a
supporting force, from a focus on maneuvers to a focus on fires, from
expeditionary to homeland defense capabilities, and from a culture that
sees the active component as “first among equals” to one that considers
all components equal.
In the next forum, US Civil-Military Relations, Rosa Brooks asks “Are
US Civil-Military Relations in Crisis?” To answer that question she
examines, rigorously, five popular claims all of which seemingly point
to an affirmative response—namely, US citizens do not know their
military, fewer than 1 percent of Americans serve, the US military is
too different culturally from civilian society, active and retired senior
officers have assumed positions of influence within the US government,
and the military has become too political. But she finds each of these
claims wanting. Focusing on whether such a crisis exists, she adds, comes
at the risk of diverting attention from other more dangerous threats to
American democracy. Risa Brooks’s “Beyond Huntington: US Military
Professionalism Today” suggests Huntington’s model of an apolitical
military, to the extent it was ever adopted, has outlived its usefulness.
America’s military professionals now need a new model, one that both
reaffirms their commitment to the state and its political infrastructure
but allows for flexible interpretation in fluid circumstances.
The third forum, US National Security Strateg y, offers two macroperspectives concerning where American foreign policy ought to be
heading. In “Seeing in Stereo,” Anne-Marie Slaughter contends the
traditional habit of viewing situations dichotomously, as generally
exclusive categories, will not avail in the contemporary security
environment. She argues instead for establishing a new tradition, one
that permits us to see an overlap in categorical opposites, such as “many”
and “one” or “global issues” and “great power competition.” The ability
to see such categories “in stereo,” that is, not as mutually exclusive,
she contends, will help us resolve national security dilemmas more
profitably. In “Charting a Different Course,” however, Nadia Schadlow
sends a different message. She reprises her earlier argument about liberal
internationalism’s failure to set a sound strategic course for promoting
US security interests. The unipolar moment is over, she maintains,
and America’s military supremacy is being challenged in various and
sometimes discreet ways. Accordingly, America needs to sweep away the
myths that have underpinned its national security perspectives to this
point and chart a more realistic way ahead based on a sober appreciation
of the strengths of its rivals balanced against its own limitations.
Part II’s opening forum, Strategic Organization, features two articles. In
“Managerial Aspects of Command,” John Kem and James Breckenridge
TOC
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analyze the article “Some Managerial Aspects of Command” by
Harold Lamp. Lamp attempted to move beyond the debate, then
gathering momentum, regarding which skills were more important
to senior leaders—those related to command or those pertaining to
management—by finding common ground between them. Kem and
Breckenridge agree with Lamp’s approach and discuss some of his more
enduring insights. The second contribution to this forum, “The Joint
Force and Lessons from 1971,” by Jonathan Klug assesses the article,
“The Unified Command Structure,” by Duane Smith, which is itself
an assessment. Klug finds Smith’s analysis of America’s requirements
with respect to strategic commands to be accurate and insightful. He
recommends Smith’s article to the military professional, despite its age.
The second forum, (Un)civil Military Relations, in an unorthodox
manner consists of a single article. The topic of civil-military relations,
featured prominently in this issue’s Prospectives 2021, was, and remains,
simply too important not to warrant its own forum. In “Academe and
the Military,” Tony and Julia Pfaff do the topic justice through their
critique of the essay, “Mutual Misperceptions: The Academic and the
Soldier in Contemporary America,” by Donald Bletz. They find Bletz’s
argument, that civil-military relations in the United States had become
dysfunctional, to be regrettably accurate for 1971. They also ponder to
what extent Bletz’s assessment holds true in 2021.
Our third forum, Regional Challenges, evaluates the merits of two
regionally focused articles. In the first of these, “Soviet Economic
Reform—Surprisingly Prescient,” Robert Hamilton examines John
Hardt’s “Breshnev’s Economic Choice: More Weapons and Control
or Economic Modernization.” While Hardt correctly perceived the
better choice the Kremlin should make, as Hamilton reminds us,
Soviet leaders would not be able to overcome bureaucratic inertia or the
military’s intransigence to bring it to fruition. Hamilton compliments
Hardt’s article for its prescience—its success at standing at an historical
inflection point, and the author’s realization of this fact. It has stood
the test of time rather well, he concludes. In the second assessment,
“Moscow in the Middle East,” Andrew Terrill critiques John Thomas’s
“The Dilemmas of Soviet Policy in the Middle East.” Thomas’s analysis
has been eclipsed by historical events, as Terrill points out. Soviet
interest in the Middle East has changed with the times: rather than being
motivated primarily by ideological interests, as it was in 1971 during the
Cold War, the Kremlin is now involved in the region mainly through
economic relationships and efforts to mitigate terrorist threats to the
Russian homeland.
This issue’s last forum, Learning from the Past, is hardly its least.
Drawing lessons or insights from the past, however difficult or
problematic it might be to do so, was a popular exercise for professional
military educational institutions at the time. The US Army War College
was no exception to that rule. J. P. Clark’s “US Army Reforms in the
Progressive Era” critiques F. Gunther Eyck’s “Secretary Stimson and
the Army Reforms, 1911-1913.” Clark places Eyck’s article within its own
TOC
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historical context and explicates both what the essay says about the US
Army’s reforms in the Progressive Era, as well as what the contribution
itself reveals about the period in which it was written. Michael Neiberg’s
“Coalition Warfare—Echoes from the Past” evaluates James Agnew’s
“Coalition Warfare.” Agnew’s article drew, or attempted to draw, lessons
regarding the difficulties of developing organizational relationships to
manage alliances and coalitions during the First World War. Ultimately,
as President Woodrow Wilson discovered, and as contemporary scholars
and practitioners well know, it can prove difficult to influence any alliance
or coalition partner unless one has “skin in the game.” Even then, the
partners who have lost the most in blood and treasure may have the final
say, whether wise or not, on the most critical of strategic choices.
Overall, Parameters’s inaugural issue was well served by the many
authors who contributed to it. But one might well wonder how closely its
main themes paralleled those of its peer journals—Naval War College Review,
Air University Review, Military Review, the Naval Institute’s Proceedings, and
the Marine Corps Gazette. In the spring of 1971, the Naval War College
Review featured two pieces that dealt with the role of public opinion in
war, one that analyzed the philosophical outlook of the counterculture,
one that explained the military planning process, another that addressed
the military management process, and two historical contributions, one
covering the influence of Alfred Thayer Mahan on European naval
expansion and one discussing Admiral Raymond Spruance and the
Naval War College.2 Each of the first three articles reflects concerns
similar in character to those discussed by Bletz in his contribution to
the inaugural issue of Parameters. The articles dealing with the military
planning and management processes parallel roughly those by Lamp
and Smith and reveal the predilections of an era that employed scientific
processes as safeguards against the human propensity for error; in
Mahan’s day, by comparison, principles played that role.3 The June 1971
issue of the Naval War College Review would offer an article discussing the
Soviet Union and the United States in the Middle East, showing strong
parallels with the contributions by Hardt and Thomas. Indeed, Soviet
and Chinese strategic thought and national cultures would be persistent
themes for all the military journals of the US Armed Forces throughout
the Cold War.
Like Parameters, the Air University Review shaped its content according
to the concerns of its readers. The US military’s transition to an allvolunteer force ranked high among those concerns. Accordingly the
Spring 1971 issue of Air University Review offered two contributions
2. Lloyd A. Free, “Political Beliefs and Public Opinion,” Naval War College Review (NWCR) 23,
no. 7 (March 1971): 4–16; William A. Armbruster, “The Pueblo Crisis and Public Opinion,” NWCR
23, no. 7 (March 1971): 84–110; William F. Averyt, “The Philosophy of the Counterculture,” NWCR
23, no. 7 (March 1971): 17–25; Ronald B. St. John, “European Naval Expansion and Mahan, 18891906,” NWCR 23, no. 7 (March 1971): 74–83; and Thomas B. Buell, “Admiral Raymond Spruance
and the Naval War College: Part I—Preparing for World War II,” NWCR 23, no. 7 (March 1971):
30–51.
3. Charles W. Cullen, “The Military Planning Process: Human Imperfections in Its Application,”
NWCR 23, no. 7 (March 1971): 52–63; and Alexander H. Cornell and James V. Forrestal, “The
Management Process,” NWCR 23, no. 7 (March 1971): 64–73.
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stressing the importance of military professionalism, as well as a
comparison of professional military educational systems abroad.4 It also
featured an analysis of the military decision-making process from the
standpoint of communicating across cultures in addition to an article
describing air power’s utility in psychological operations.5
Until the appearance of Parameters, the US Army’s Military Review
carried not only articles with a tactical focus, but many with a strategic
inclination as well. Alongside tactically oriented essays discussing
distinguishing between murder and killing in combat and the mental
health of frontline soldiers, for instance, were contributions covering
Soviet strategic thinking, the defense policies of western European
states, the Soviet rationale for arms control, and international systems
of recruitment.6 The Naval Institute’s Proceedings remained more
technologically focused. But it did feature articles discussing the future
of the US Navy as well as a study concerning junior officer retention
rates.7 Not to be overlooked, the Marine Corps Gazette provided insights
regarding training concepts, orders, and the civil war in Jordan.8
The pages that follow show just how much the journal’s history
is also America’s history. Since 1971, Parameters has “been there,” with
its authors offering insightful analyses and policy recommendations to
US strategic leaders for matters great and small. Understandably, Cold
War concerns dominated the journal’s pages from its inaugural issue
to the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s. Thereafter,
Parameters gave space to debates over military transformation, the
revolution in military affairs as it was sometimes called, as well as
how US foreign policy might adjust to a new strategic situation that
required recalibrating from state-on-state conflicts to various forms of
irregular warfare. The shock of 9/11 reinforced the importance of the
latter dimension of war, and Parameters responded accordingly. Likewise
the campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq that took place during the first
4. Robert N. Ginsburgh and Pember W. Rocap, “The Changing Role of the Military Profession,”
Air University Review (AUR) 22, no. 3 (March-April 1971): 2–13; William Bruenner, “Military Affairs
Abroad: A Comparison of Professional Military Educational Systems,” AUR 22, no. 3 (March-April
1971): 53–62; and Neal G. Sorensen, “Implications of a Volunteer Force,” AUR 22, no. 3 (MarchApril 1971): 47–52.
5. Russell A. Turner II and Hamid Mowlana, “Factors in Military Decision-Making:
Communication and Cross-Cultural Analysis,” AUR 22, no. 3 (March-April 1971): 24–33; and
Robert L. Gleason, “Psychological Operations and Air Power: Its Hits and Misses,” AUR 22, no. 3
(March-April 1971): 34–46.
6. Robert B. Rigg, “Where Does Killing End and Murder Begin in War?” Military Review (MR)
(March 1971): 3–9; Robert L. Pettera, “Mental Health in Combat,” MR (March 1971): 74–77; Alfred
L. Monks, “Evolution of Soviet Military Thinking,” MR (March 1971): 78–93; Eugene Hinterhoff,
“Spain and NATO,” MR (March 1971): 39–44; Michel Debre, “French Defense Policy,” MR (March
1971): 45–55; George G. Damien, “Arming Through Disarmament,” MR (March 1971): 30–38; and
Albert A. Blum, “Comparative Recruiting Systems,” MR (March 1971): 10–29.
7. Robert H. Smith, “Prize Essay 1971—A United States Navy for the Future,” Proceedings 97,
no. 3 (March 1971); and Malcolm S. Harris, “Junior Officer Retentions, A Lot of Little Things,”
Proceedings 97, no. 3 (March 1971).
8. Nicholas A. Canzona, “A Commander’s Concept of Training,” Marine Corps Gazette 55, no. 3
(March 1971): 15–22; Edgar O’Ballance, “Civil War in Jordan,” Marine Corps Gazette 55, no. 3 (March
1971): 23–26; and M. L. Duke, “A Plea of Superior Orders,” Marine Corps Gazette 55, no. 3 (March
1971): 34–39.
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two decades of the twenty-first century demonstrated the need for the
systematic collection of observations, even “lessons,” of what worked
and what did not, for the United States and its many strategic partners;
again, the US Army’s flagship strategy journal responded. Now as great
power competition has once more attracted public attention, Parameters
has adjusted accordingly. Notwithstanding these important concerns,
Parameters has consistently dedicated multiple forums to essential matters
such as military professionalism, race and gender issues, and strategic
theories and concepts.
On behalf of the Strategic Studies Institute and the US Army War
College Press, it is our pleasure to present Parameters Issue 51, No. 1.
~AJE
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USAWC Quarterly Parameters
1971–1980: Vietnam War – All-Volunteer Force –

1

3

2

4

5

Left to right: 1. The efficacy of ground combat comes under question during
the Vietnam War. 2. Arriving in Beijing on February 21, 1972, US President
Richard Nixon shakes hands with Premier of the People’s Republic of China
Zhou Enlai. The visit led to the re-establishment of diplomatic relations between
the United States and China. 3. US Marines in Vietnam honor lost comrades
killed in action with battlefield crosses—a long-standing tradition begun
during the American Civil War. 4. The United States endures two oil crises—
an oil embargo by OPEC in 1973 (the price of oil rose almost 300 percent)
and an oil shortage in 1979 (the cost of a barrel of oil more than doubled to
$39.50). Both crises cause fuel shortages and long lines at the gas pumps. 5. In
January 1973, Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom enter the European
Economic Community (EEC), the precursor to the European Union (EU).
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Celebrating Fifty Years
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Left to right: 6. Desegregation continues to change the culture and demographics
of families in and out of the military. Public Law 94-106 allows women to enter the
all-male military academies for the first time in history, and in 1976, women join the
freshman class of the US Military Academy, the US Naval Academy, and the US Air
Force Academy. 7. The United States celebrates its bicentennial and the anniversary
of the signing of the Declaration of Independence. 8. An early Apple MacIntosh
computer (1976) and other technologies transform society, making computers more
mainstream and affordable and radically changing military planning and analysis and
the execution of warfare. 9. In September 1978, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat
(left) and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin (right) greet each other for the first
time at Camp David in Maryland. The Camp David Accords lead to a peace treaty
between Egypt and Israel the following year, the first treaty between Israel and any
of its neighboring Arab countries. 10. Lebanese Shiite religious leader Subhi al-Tufayli
addresses a crowd in Beirut in support of the November 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran.
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USAWC Quarterly Parameters
1981–1990: End of the Cold War –

1

3

4

2

5

Left to right: 1. An Afghan mujahideen fighter engages Soviet aircraft with a US-made
Stinger anti-aircraft missile. The CIA program, code named Operation Cyclone, arms
and finances the mujahideen in Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989. 2. In January 1981 newly
freed American hostages arrive at the US Air Force Hospital in Wiesbaden, Germany,
for medical and psychological exams after spending 444 days in Iranian captivity.
3. The United States launches Operation Urgent Fury in Grenada on October 25, 1983,
to protect the lives of US students, restore democratic government, and eradicate Cuban
influence on the island. 4. Artillery personnel from the 82nd Airborne Division load
and fire M102 105-mm howitzers during Operation Urgent Fury. 5. A suicide bomber
destroys the US Embassy in Beirut, Lebanon, on April 18, 1983, killing 63 people.
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Celebrating Fifty Years
Changing US Civil-Military Relations
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Left to right: 6. In 1986 peace activists gather outside Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania,
to protest nuclear weapons. 7. In the Oval Office in 1986, US President Ronald
Reagan discusses his remarks on the Iran-Contra Affair with Secretary of Defense
Caspar Weinberger, Secretary of State George Shultz, Counselor to the President
Edwin Meese, and White House Chief of Staff Donald Regan. 8. US President
Ronald Reagan and General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
Mikhail Gorbachev discuss human rights, regional conflicts in Afghanistan, Central
America and Africa, and arms control during a 1987 White House Summit. The
summit results in the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. 9. In summer
1989 Kristin Baker becomes the first female cadet to serve as first captain at the
US Military Academy. 10. Germans begin dismantling the Berlin Wall near the
Brandenburg Gate on November 9, 1989. In English the sign reads, “Notice! You
are now leaving West Berlin!” The fall of the Berlin Wall initiates the collapse of
the Iron Curtain and communism in Eastern and Central Europe and presages
the end of the Soviet Union. 11. At the Malta Summit in 1989, US President
George H. W. Bush and General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union Mikhail Gorbachev continue peace efforts aboard the Soviet passenger liner
Maxim Gorky in Marsaxlokk Harbor, Malta. In foreground: US Secretary of State
James Baker III and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze. The summit
results in Bush and Gorbachev declaring the end of the Cold War on December
3, 1989. 12. Drug Enforcement Administration officials escort Panamanian dictator
General Manuel Noriega to Miami, Florida, following his surrender to US officials
on January 3, 1990, as part of Operation Just Cause (December 1989–January 1990).
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USAWC Quarterly Parameters
1991–2000: Terrorism at Home and Abroad –
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Left to right: 1. Tanks amass at the Saudi Arabian border in preparation for Operation
Desert Storm, which begins on January 17, 1991. 2. The Patriot surface-to-air missile defense
system dominates air defense efforts in the Middle East during the Gulf War, engaging and
intercepting Scud missiles and contributing to the coalition’s victory in the war. 3-4. The 7th
Engineer Brigade comprised of National Guard Engineer Groups combat, combat-heavy
and divisional engineer battalions; and topographic, bridging, well-drilling, and firefighting units deploys to Saudi Arabia in 1991 to perform a variety of support missions. 5. At
Rhein-Main Air Base, Germany, in November 1992, Lieutenant General Jerry R. Rutherford,
V Corps commander, discusses last-minute details with Lieutenant Colonel Felipe Casso,
executive officer, 212th Mobile Army Surgical Hospital (MASH). The MASH is the first US
Army unit to deploy to Zagreb, Croatia, in support of UN Protection Forces in Operation
Provide Promise, a humanitarian relief operation. When the mission ends in 1996, it becomes
the longest humanitarian airlift operation performed by the Department of Defense.
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Celebrating Fifty Years
Military Transformation in the Information Age
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Left to right. 6. Marines chat with a village elder in Somalia during Operation Restore
Hope in 1992. This Unified Task Force is a US-led, UN-sanctioned multinational force
charged with delivering food and other humanitarian aid to Somalia. 7. A soldier from
the 6th Battalion, 502 Infantry, Berlin, Germany, stands at attention in Macedonia
during Operation Able Sentry, begun in July 1993, to monitor and report activity along
Macedonia’s northern border with Serbia. The peacekeeping mission is the first time US
armed forces are placed under UN command. 8. On February 26, 1993, Ramzi Yousef
and Eyad Ismoil, detonate a truck bomb below the north tower of the World Trade
Center in New York City, killing six people and injuring over 1,000 individuals. 9. The
Pentium processer, released in 1993, revolutionizes computer processing. 10. Domestic
terrorists Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols detonate a truck bomb outside the
Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City on April 19, 1995, killing 168
people. 11. A terrorist truck bomb explodes outside the northern perimeter of the US
portion of the Khobar Towers housing complex in Saudi Arabia on June 25, 1996, killing
19 servicemembers and wounding hundreds more. 12. In July 1999, Major General
Valeri Evtoukovitich (left), commander of Russian Forces in Kosovo, and Brigadier
General John Craddock (second from right), US Army commander of Task Force Falcon
at Camp Bondsteel, Kosovo, discuss relations between Russian and American forces
as part of the Kosovo Forces, the NATO-led international military force performing
peacekeeping missions in support of Operation Joint Guardian, which began in June 1999.
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2001–2010: 9/11 – Global War on Terror –
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Left to right: 1. On September 11, 2001, terrorists fly American Airlines Flight 11 and
United Airlines Flight 175 into the north and south towers of the World Trade Center
in New York City and American Airlines Flight 77 into the Pentagon, initiating the
War on Terrorism. Another hijacked plane, United Airlines Flight 93, crashes into
a field in Somerset, Pennsylvania. 2-4. Conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan cost the
United States in blood and treasure. 2. A CH-47 Chinook lands at Combat Outpost
Kalagush in Nuristan, Afghanistan. 3. Members of the Old Guard conduct a funeral
ceremony at Arlington National Cemetery. 4. The military embraces new technologies,
including the Predator drone, which fires its first missile in combat over Afghanistan
in 2001. 5. The Euro becomes the official currency of Europe on January 1, 2002.
6. The Department of Homeland Security is established in 2002 to prevent attacks and
protect Americans. 7. The United States captures Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein (2003).
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Celebrating Fifty Years
Homeland Security
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Left to right: 8. Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania,
Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia join the EU in 2004. 9-12. Devices such
as the iPod (2001) and social media sites such as LinkedIn (2002), Facebook
(2004), and YouTube (2005) change how people interact with each other and the
world. 13. Soldiers of Company B, Task Force 1-27 Infantry, as part of Operation
Wolfhound Power, conduct a dismounted patrol in Hawija, Iraq, on November
13, 2004. 14-15. Following Hurricane Katrina (2005), the Massachusetts National
Guard and many other units provide civil and medical assistance in New Orleans,
Louisiana, during Task Force Yankee. 16. Cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin (2009)
change the way people think about and invest in currencies and technology and
how the military analyzes economic power. 17. Colonel Dan Stoltz, commander,
Joint Forces Special Operations Component Command – Forward, provides
guidance to Haitians following the January 12, 2010, 7.0-magnitude earthquake.
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USAWC Quarterly Parameters
2011–2020: War in Cyberspace –
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Left to right: 1. Osama bin Laden with his adviser Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri. US Special
Forces raid an al-Qaeda compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan, on May 2, 2011, and kill bin
Laden, the world’s most wanted terrorist. 2. Terrorists detonate two homemade pressure
cooker bombs near the finish line of the Boston Marathon on April 15, 2013. 3. Evolving
technology continues to threaten national security as cyberwarfare efforts grow, requiring
another dimension in strategic analysis and the impact of technology on war and policy.
4. Military efforts in the Indo-Pacific region ramp up. 5. More than 20 years after its
inception in 1991, the World Wide Web continues to influence global dynamics. 6. China’s
growing economic power signals China’s increasing threat to US interests. 7. Satellite image
of Superstorm Sandy over the eastern United States, Tuesday, October 30, 2012. Sandy
killed 75 people and caused $70.2 billion in damage. 8. In 2013 American whistleblower
Edward Snowden leaks highly classified documents from the National Security Agency,
increasing interest in encryption and the safety of cloud technology for the military and
analysis and mitigation of the devastating, long-term impacts of Snowden’s disclosures.
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Celebrating Fifty Years
Great Power Rivalry – Global Pandemics
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Left to right: 9. The Supreme Court rules the Defense of Marriage Act unconstitutional
on June 26, 2013. Same-sex marriage becomes legal in all 50 states on June 26, 2015.
10. A Ukrainian special forces soldier dismounts a US version of an armored assault
vehicle during NATO training exercise Rapid Trident in 2019 in Yavoriv, Ukraine.
11. US President Donald Trump shakes hands with the Supreme Leader of North
Korea Kim Jong-Un on June 30, 2019, at the Korean Demilitarized Zone. 12. The
United Kingdom officially leaves the EU on January 31, 2020. 13. The COVID-19
pandemic locks down the world in 2020, affecting health-carew systems, international
travel, national security, and the global economy. 14. In fall 2020 Parameters adds
the Decisive Point podcast channel to its digital publications lineup. 15. US Marines
(Kilo Company, 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines, attached to the 4th Marine Regiment)
conduct urban warfare training during Service Level Training Exercise 1-21 at
the Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center at Twentynine Palms, California,
on October 7, 2020. 16. The Los Angeles District, US Army Corps of Engineers,
begins site assessments January 1, 2021, at seven Los Angeles County hospitals to
deal with the shortage of hospital beds due to large numbers of COVID-19 patients.
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Providing Stability and Deterrence:
The US Army in INDOPACOM
Carol V. Evans
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ABSTRACT: Regaining the military advantage in the Indo-Pacific
region requires renewed thinking about the US military footprint
there, particularly the role of the US Army. The Army’s deterrence
and partnering capabilities will be best utilized by engaging its longrange and precision-strike capabilities in a regional “Ring of Fires”
concept and further enhanced as part of a broader revitalization and
expansion of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue.

T

he US Department of Defense and its Indo-Pacific Command
(INDOPACOM) are grappling with how to regain military
advantage in the region amid a global pandemic and looming
defense budget cuts. The US Army’s specific challenge centers on
becoming a more effective enabler for the Joint Force, an aim the Army
can best accomplish by combining its special deterrence and relationshipbuilding capacities into a two-pronged action plan. Regarding the
first prong, deterrence, the Army should leverage its long-range and
precision-strike capabilities to form a Ring of Fires that could target
China’s critical land-based and maritime assets. Concerning the second
prong, relationship-building, the Army should work toward augmenting
and operationalizing the multidomain military capabilities of India and
the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue—a strategic-level forum comprised
of the United States, Japan, Australia, and India —along with the support
of key allies, the United Kingdom, and France: a “Quad Plus.”

Introduction

Most experts agree the Indo-Pacific region is the fulcrum for the
future global security order and thus of critical concern for the new US
administration. As the 2018 National Defense Strateg y ominously warned,
“China . . . seeks Indo-Pacific regional hegemony in the near-term
and displacement of the United States to achieve global preeminence
in the future.”1 But the Biden administration faces a revisionist China
rapidly marching toward its intended goals (as outlined in President
Xi Jinping’s “Chinese Dream”) of achieving hegemony in the region
and the unification of Taiwan with China either through coercion
or force.2 Accordingly, US military planners must now provide
1. James N. Mattis, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America:
Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of
Defense (OSD), January 19, 2018), 2, https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018
-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf.
2. “General Secretary Xi Jinping Explicates the ‘Chinese Dream,’ ” Chinese Law and Government
48, no. 6 (November 2016).
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America’s policymakers with bold, visionary strategic thinking and new
operational concepts.
Moreover the United States should supplement its words of
commitment to allies and partners with a plan of action that actively
improves interoperability and military-to-military cooperation. This
article offers just such a strategic and operational roadmap, one that
takes better advantage of the Army’s role in the Indo-Pacific to achieve
greater stability by deterring aggressive activities. This roadmap assumes,
optimistically, the threat posed by the People’s Republic of China (PRC)
will spur greater military cooperation among leading Indo-Pacific
countries, the United States, and other key European countries. But
this roadmap also recognizes the fragile and emergent characteristics of
many of these relationships.
This article examines the threat posed by the PRC’s aggressive
military expansion from the South China Sea to the Indian Ocean and
beyond as well as key PRC military weaknesses that INDOPACOM
and the US Army Pacific Command (USARPAC) should exploit. The
article then details the enabling role the US Army can play vis-à-vis the
Joint Force through a new operational concept called Ring of Fires,
which would see deterrence-oriented Army precision-strike and other
missile capabilities deployed to key locations in the Indo-Pacific region
in an effort to challenge China’s economic survival. Finally, the article
underscores the importance of further relationship building with India
especially, and with the Quad countries, as well as the United Kingdom
and France. Together, the combined military and economic capabilities
of the United States and its allies and strategic partners can create a
formidable security framework for the region.

China’s Military Expansion

American military primacy and its capability to deter aggression and
to maintain a free and open Indo-Pacific have declined. By contrast
China has embarked upon construction of a new security architecture in
the region through huge investments in counterintervention and powerprojection capabilities. Evidence of this expansion includes the PRC’s
unilateral militarization and deployment of anti-access/area-denial (A2/
AD) capabilities to address a Taiwan contingency; its expanded naval
operations in the western Pacific, into the Indian Ocean and the Red
Sea; and the establishment of the first People’s Liberation Army (PLA)
base in Djibouti. Since 2008 the PLA Navy (PLAN) has dispatched 35
naval escort task forces into the Indian Ocean and Gulf of Aden.3
Beijing has buttressed its power-projection capabilities in the region
with a military modernization program that is outpacing the United
States in shipbuilding, land-based conventional ballistic and cruise

3. See James E. Fanell, “China’s Global Navy Eyeing Sea Control by 2030, Superiority
by 2049,” Sunday Guardian Live, June 13, 2020, https://www.sundayguardianlive.com/news
/china-global-navy.

TOC

Prospectives 2021: US Strategic Landpower

Evans

27

missiles, and air defense systems.4 Xi’s geostrategic Belt and Road
Initiative (BRI), especially the Maritime Silk Road (also known as the
String of Pearls), underpins this buildup of the PRC’s power projection
and expeditionary warfare capabilities. The Maritime Silk Road is a
soft power means to build overseas basing and logistics infrastructures
to project and sustain PLA ground force—as well as PLAN, Peoples
Liberation Army Marine Corps, and Peoples Liberation Army Rocket
Force—assets throughout the Indo-Pacific.
Located along key global sea lines of communication (SLOCs)
and choke points, Beijing has secured long-term, dual-use, deep-water
port facilities in Australia, Bangladesh, Kenya, Malaysia, the Maldives,
Mauritius, Myanmar, Pakistan, the Seychelles, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, and
Thailand. Many of these ports are owned and operated under long-term
lease agreements, often extracted to repay debts to the PRC. As former
Secretary of Defense Mark Esper cautioned, China is “gaining strategic
influence, access to key resources, and military footholds around the
world” via the Belt and Road Initiative.5 Indeed the sum of these
developments has led observers to lament the loss of American primacy
in the region; in short, Washington has effectively “ceded [the] strategic
initiative” to Beijing.6

Joint Force Enabler

In December 2020 during a major speech regarding the Pentagon’s
need to realign US defense spending more acutely to address the threat
of Chinese expansion, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General
Mark A. Milley commented, “Look, I’m an Army guy. . . . And I love
the Army . . . but the fundamental defense of the United States and the
ability to project power forward will always be for America naval and air
and space power.” 7 As presaged by Milley’s remarks, the Army has long
endeavored to solve the conundrum of how to redefine its supporting
role to the Joint Force in such a way as to regain the advantage in the
Indo-Pacific region.
Successive policy and strategic documents have outlined a Joint
all-domain strategy for the INDOPACOM area of responsibility. This
strategy entails four lines of effort: increasing Joint Force lethality,
strengthening alliances and partnerships, enhancing design and posture,

4. OSD, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, Annual Report to
Congress (Washington, DC: OSD, 2020), vii.
5. Mark T. Esper, “Secretary of Defense Allies and Partners Remarks at Atlantic Council”
(speech, Atlantic Council, Washington, DC, October 20, 2020), https://www.defense.gov/
Newsroom/Speeches/Speech/Article/2388205/secretary-of-defense-allies-and-partners-remarks
-at-atlantic-council/.
6. Nathan Freier, John Schaus, and William Braun, An Army Transformed: USINDOPACOM
Hypercompetition and US Army Theater Design (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College Press, 2020), 912,
https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/912.
7. Paul McLeary, “CJCS Milley Predicts DoD Budget ‘Bloodletting’ to Fund Navy,” Breaking
Defense, December 3, 2020, https://breakingdefense.com/2020/12/cjcs-milley-predicts-dod
-bloodletting-to-fund-navy-priorities/.
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and exercises and experimentation.8 Within the Joint All-Domain
strategy, the US Army/USARPAC has developed its own multi-domain
operations concept (MDO) which emphasizes Army support to the
Joint Force in the Indo-Pacific region through integrated air defense;
operational maneuver and theater-wide logistics; sustainment, command,
control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (C4ISR); and long-range precision fires.
For the Army, retooling its capabilities and developing novel
applications of land power, particularly in the “Indo” portion of the
Indo-Pacific, while learning to flip the playbook from supporting to
enabling missions, have been challenging tasks. For instance, recent
analyses of US Army theater design in INDOPACOM highlighted
fundamental weaknesses in the Army’s MDO strategy for the region.9
Key among these findings is the fact the Army and the Joint Force are
essentially “out of position” because they are too heavily invested in
northeast Asia. Additionally the Army’s MDO strategy needs tighter
linkages to the broader Joint theater and to the operating concepts of
its sister services.10
Moreover, five essential strategic partners (based on US mutual
defense treaties) make up the focus of the INDOPACOM/USARPAC
area of responsibility: Australia, Japan, the Philippines, South Korea,
and Thailand. Conspicuously absent from the discussion, however, is
India, a designated US Major Defense Partner and the country with the
largest landmass in the Indian Ocean and the second largest army in the
region after China.
Importantly the future deterrence and countervailing power in
the region will rest on two unassailable strategic factors—geography
and alliances. The US Army’s capabilities regarding geography have
been underappreciated. The second factor, alliances, must focus more
deliberately on India and the Quad Plus. Together these factors provide
the essential foundation for a deterrence concept, a Ring of Fires that
would employ Army precision, long-range strike capabilities to target
PRC land and maritime assets and which, in the unlikely event of war,
would cripple China’s economic means of survival.
Contrary to conventional wisdom, the tyranny of distance does not
necessarily favor Chinese over US forces in the Indo-Pacific. In fact the
PRC has significant disadvantages in the maritime domain due to its
long and vulnerable SLOCs. Beijing’s energy, vital natural resources,
manufacturing supply chains, and export trade must pass through the
Indian and Pacific Oceans. Crucially, the PLAN and China’s merchant
8. See US Department of Defense (DoD), The Department of Defense Indo-Pacific Strategy
Report: Preparedness, Partnerships, and Promoting a Networked Region (Washington, DC: DoD, June 1,
2019); US Army Pacific (USARPAC), USARPAC Strategic Guidance: Competing for a Free and Open
Indo-Pacific (Fort Shafter, HI: USARPAC, November 2018); and US Army Training and Doctrine
Command (TRADOC), The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1
(Washington, DC: US Army TRADOC, 2018).
9. Nathan P. Freier and John H. Schaus, “INDOPACOM through 2030,” Parameters 50, no. 2
(Summer 2020): 27–34, https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol50/iss2/5/.
10. Freier, Schaus, and Braun, Army Transformed.
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fleet must transit through the straits of the Indonesian archipelago,
namely, the Malacca, Sunda, and Lombok Straits to the South China
Sea (figure 1). These choke points are critical vulnerabilities, which the
PRC recognizes as such.
When traversing from the Straits of Hormuz, the Gulf of Aden,
and the Cape of Good Hope into the Indian Ocean, Chinese merchant
ships and naval vessels, as well as their military port logistics bases
along the Maritime Silk Road, would be vulnerable to kinetic forms
of attack as well as cyber disruption. Vast geographical distances and
extended SLOCs typically represent vulnerabilities that can be attacked
if insufficiently protected, as witnessed by the campaigns to control
the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans during the Second World War. These
geography-based weaknesses, in combination with recent US Army
modernization efforts and investments in long-range precision strike
and hypersonic missile capabilities, afford the Joint Force a unique and
as yet underutilized means of contributing to a Ring-of-Fires concept
that would support INDOPACOM’s Joint All-Domain operations.

A Ring of Fires

Long-range precision strike capability has traditionally resided
with the US Navy and US Air Force. Yet both the US Army and US
Marine Corps are adding these capabilities to their repertoire.11 The
Army increased its investment in the long-range maritime strike arena
with plans to purchase the Navy’s SM-6 (plus extended range variant)
and Tomahawk, including the Maritime Strike version, and integration
of the Precision Strike Missile (PrSM) long-range, surface-to-surface
missile with a new maritime seeker.12 Also, following its September
2020 exercise, Project Convergence, the Army announced its intention
to include experiments linking Army command and control for
coordinating strikes against maritime targets, as well as anti-ship missile
tests, in its 2021 exercise.13
Similarly the US Navy and Marine Corps have initiated Project
Overmatch to coordinate and link fires from multiple platforms using
automation and artificial intelligence to streamline targeting cycles.
A key issue for INDOPACOM is, how are these parallel precision
strike efforts to be coordinated at the Joint level in the future? In
particular, how can the US Army’s potentially larger, more mobile, and
11. Jake Yeager, “Expeditionary Advanced Maritime Operations: How the Marine Corps Can
Avoid Becoming a Second Land Army in the Pacific,” War on the Rocks, December 26, 2019,
https://warontherocks.com/2019/12/expeditionary-advanced-maritime-operations-how-the
-marine-corps-can-avoid-becoming-a-second-land-army-in-the-pacific/; and David B. Larter,
“Are the US Army and US Marine Corps Competing for Missions in the Pacific?” Defense News,
October 14, 2020, https://www.defensenews.com/digital-show-dailies/ausa/2020/10/14/are-the
-us-army-and-us-marine-corps-competing-for-missions-in-the-pacific/.
12. See Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “Army Picks Tomahawk & SM-6 for Mid-Range
Missiles,” Breaking Defense, November 6, 2020, https://breakingdefense.com/2020/11
/army-picks-tomahawk-sm-6-for-mid-range-missiles/.
13. Steve Trimble and Lee Hudson, “U.S. Army Flexes New Land-Based, Anti-Ship
Capabilities,” Aviation Week, October 20, 2020, https://aviationweek.com/defense-space
/missile-defense-weapons/us-army-flexes-new-land-based-anti-ship-capabilities.
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Figure 1. Army Ring of Fires
(Map by Pete McPhail)
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weapons-capable arrayed strike footprint be best deployed, and under
what future operational construct by the Joint Force?
Notionally the aim of the Ring-of-Fires concept is to target the
China’s SLOCs and choke points for energy and trade, its sea- and
land-based logistics, and PRC resupply and sustainment capabilities. As
depicted in figure 1, the critical Malacca, Lombok, and Sunda Straits
could be controlled by US Army, Marine Corps, and allied missile
batteries and other armaments. Missile capabilities could involve anti-air
and surface maritime attack. These attack vectors are based primarily
on Army precision strike weapons including future hypersonic missiles.
Using Multi-Domain task forces, the Army’s targeting plan
would be maritime attack against PRC surface warships and merchant
shipping. The targeting plan is based on Army missile ranges and missile
warheads for different functions. The ability to put at risk the PLAN
and merchant fleets, to fire on the SLOCs that sustain overseas PLA
expeditionary forces, and to do so while signaling the means to hold the
Chinese economy hostage would credibly demonstrate US commitment,
and that of its allies and strategic partners, to maintaining peace and
stability in the region.
But the concept would require the Army to reposition to a broader
range of firing and logistics positions than it currently occupies. This
repositioning would include the deployment or redeployment of Army
artillery and missile units on support ships or commercial vessels using a
containerized, “guns in a box” approach or mobile missile bases at sea.14
Just as important, this concept would also require an alliance structure
redesign for INDOPACOM. Strengthening relations with key allies and
partners in the Indo-Pacific is essential to providing access, logistics
support, pre-positioning of stocks, and sustainment activities.
Basing will also play a key role in the development of a Ring of Fires.
New bases could be achieved either through new status of forces-type
agreements that permit basing, training, joint exercises, interoperability,
and joint unified command, control, communications, computers,
intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeting (C4ISRT), or
less formal, incremental capacity-building agreements such as those in
place between the United States and India. Secure pre-positioned and
mobile sites for the US Army are critical. These sites must be planned to
ensure minimal detectability. Deception must figure prominently in this
plan as well with constant updates based on intelligence assessments of
PRC surveillance and reconnaissance.
Weapon logistics is another factor along with base survivability.
Deception, camouflage, electronic and cyber warfare, and mobility
will enhance survivability from PRC surprise or short-timeline attacks.
Additionally Army security force assistance brigades could be deployed
to build partner multidomain operations and strike capabilities in the
14. See Captain J. W. “Stretch” Phillips, US Navy (Retired), and Dr. Anthony Wells, “Put the
Guns in a Box,” Proceedings, June 2018, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2018/june
/put-guns-box.
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INDOPACOM region including in Australia, Brunei, India, Indonesia,
Japan, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam.
While some of these countries may be unwilling to countervail China
openly or militarily, the Biden administration must develop a cohesive
political-military-economic framework for the region that includes all of
them, should their inclusion become necessary at a later date.
Command and control for execution of the concept would require
redundant facilities, some fixed, some mobile, and all interoperable.
The NATO model, such as the Joint Warfare facility at Northwood,
United Kingdom, may present initial baseline capabilities for interallied
command, control, and communications. So too, future command and
control solutions may arise from the Joint Staff Bold Quest initiative,
which is examining allied connectivity for All-Domain command and
control operations, as well as from the US Army’s Fires Capabilities
Development and Integration Directorate Battle Lab, which allows allies
to “join and test the compatibility of their own command and control
networks and capabilities with those of the US service and other allies.”15
In sum the Ring-of-Fires concept provides the US Army with a
crucial operational mission tied directly and firmly to enabling the Joint
Force. Strategically it enables the United States to maintain a favorable
military balance sufficient to deter China and to support a free and open
Indo-Pacific theater. Nevertheless this concept cannot succeed without
allies. As noted in the US Department of Defense’s Indo-Pacific Strategy
Report, “the challenges we face in the Indo-Pacific extend beyond what
any single country can address alone.”16

Alliances and Strategic Partnerships

While the current INDOPACOM alliance posture is already
centered on five anchor relationships, one may well argue India is
the most important anchor of all. Not only does India have unique
geographic advantage and increasing military capabilities vis-à-vis its
erstwhile adversary China, but India is also the epicenter of the Quad
Plus. In the closing days of his tenure as US secretary of defense, Mark
Esper reflected, “India will well be the most consequential partner
for us, I think, in the Indo Pacific for sure in this century.”17 The
disconnection between this statement by a US defense secretary and the
lack of a demonstrative focus on India in INDOPACOM and USARPAC
strategy documents is striking.
Although not without its limits for the time being, a strategic
convergence of sorts is emerging between the United States and India,
due largely to the increasing threat environment created by China. That
15. Theresa Hitchens, “ ‘Bold Quest’ to Demo Allied Connectivity for All-Domain Ops,”
Breaking Defense, August, 24, 2020, https://breakingdefense.com/2020/08/bold-quest-to-demo
-allied-connectivity-for-all-domain-ops/.
16. DoD, Indo-Pacific Strategy Report, 16.
17. “India Will Be Most Consequential Partner for U.S. in Indo-Pacific This Century:
Esper,” Hindu, October 21, 2020, https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/india-will-be-most
-consequential-partner-for-us-in-indo-pacific-this-century-esper/article32905679.ece.
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threat environment includes the ongoing Sino-Indo conflict along the
Line of Actual Control (LAC) in eastern Ladakh; the PRC’s military
support of neighboring Pakistan, which has launched successive
terrorist attacks against India; the encirclement of India on land and
at sea via the BRI China-Pakistan Economic Corridor; and the use of
Maritime Silk Road infrastructure investments to usurp India’s role as
a regional net provider with smaller Indian Ocean neighbors.18 These
geostrategic vectors, along with a more proactive foreign policy approach
by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, make it realistic to discuss
ways to strengthen the US-Indo bilateral relationship and leverage the
multilateral capabilities of the Quad Plus.
In fact the burgeoning US-India defense relationship is the
product of four cornerstones.19 The first cornerstone consists of policy
pronouncements, such as the designation in 2016 of India as a Major
Defense Partner (a status unique to India and commensurate with the
relationships shared with only the closest of American allies) and highlevel 2+2 ministerial meetings.20 The second cornerstone is the major
defense logistics and tactical intelligence-sharing protocols between
the United States and India, including the 2002 General Security
of Military Information Agreement, the 2016 Logistics Exchange
Memorandum of Agreement, the 2018 Communications Compatibility
and Security Agreement, the Basic Exchange and Cooperation
Agreement for Geospatial Intelligence, and the Maritime Information
Sharing Technical Agreement, the latter two of which were signed in
October 2020.21
The third cornerstone consists of defense sales and trade and
technology cooperation, especially the recent sale of Poseidon P-8I
aircraft and expected exports of armed Predator-B UAVs. The fourth
cornerstone—or foundation stone—lies in the military relationship that
exists between the two countries. Evidence for this relationship can be
found in training exercises such as the annual Malabar naval exercise,
Army and Special Forces exercises Yudh Abhyas and Vajra Prahar,
respectively, and the first tri-service Tiger Triumph amphibious exercise.
To be sure military cooperation between the United States and
India has been more robust between the two navies. That cooperation
has centered on augmenting India’s maritime domain awareness and
anti-submarine warfare capabilities to help countervail the PLAN’s
growing expeditionary and undersea presence in the Indo-Pacific. By
18. See Darshana M. Baruah, “India in the Indo-Pacific: New Delhi’s Theater of Opportunity”
(Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2020).
19. See Sumit Ganguly and M. Chris Mason, An Unnatural Partnership? The Future of U.S.-India
Strategic Cooperation (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press, May 2019),
https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/924/.pdf.
20. Joint Statement, “The United States and India: Enduring Global Partners in the 21st
Century,” White House (website), June 7, 2016, http://go.usa.gov/x8EFV.
21. Santosh Chaubey, “BECA, MITSA Deals between India-US Will Strengthen Strategic
Alliance, Challenge China’s Growing Military Ambitions,” News 18 India, October 27, 2020,
https://www.news18.com/news/india/beca-mitsa-deals-between-india-us-will-strengthen
-strategic-alliance-challenge-chinas-growing-military-ambitions-3011390.html.
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contrast cooperation between the US Army and the Indian Army has
experienced impediments. Some analysts have pointed to the Indian
Army’s posture which is focused on insurgency, counterterrorism, and
border protection rather than force projection; others have suggested
bilateral army exercises are too small and narrowly structured to be an
effective means of relationship and capacity building; and still other
analysts have noted the lack of interoperability is not helped by an
overreliance on Russian weapon supplies.22
Still, as signaled by the Indian Army vice chief’s visit to
INDOPACOM and USARPAC in fall 2020, there are avenues to enhance
further operational and strategic level collaboration between the two
armies.23 Some immediate opportunities include intelligence sharing
related to border security and counterterrorism, as well as Special Forces
training and professional military education (PME).24 Each of these
areas deserves their own deliberative Army-to-Army formal assessment,
but for brevity’s sake, some key cooperative prospects are highlighted.

Intelligence Sharing

The PLA military incursions along the Sino-Indian border LAC
in May 2020 revealed many intelligence deficiencies for the Indian
Army, including lack of indications and warning over PLA intentions,
insufficient military satellite coverage, and other C4ISR weaknesses.25
Taken together they highlight enormous potential for increased
US-Indian Army intelligence cooperation and assistance. For example
the US Army’s National Ground Intelligence Center in Charlottesville,
Virginia, and US Special Operations Command Intelligence Division
could work with their Indian counterparts to assist in border protection
and counterterrorist intelligence operations. The US Army could
provide technical know-how to develop a C4ISRT system designed to
meet India’s specific needs along the borders.
A common operating picture would enable an intelligence-based,
real-time indications and warning system. This C4ISRT system could
alert to threats pertaining to border incursions, terrorist plans and
movements, and any major nuclear posture changes or actions by either
China or Pakistan, or both, that may threaten Indian and US interests
22. See C. Christine Fair, “US-Indian Army-to-Army Relations: Prospects for Future Coalition
Operations,” Asian Security 1, no. 2 (April 2005): 157–73; and M. Chris Mason, “Less Than Meets
the Eye: A Critical Assessment of the Military-to-Military Dimension of the U.S.-India Security
Partnership,” in The Future of U.S.-India Security Cooperation, ed. Šumit Ganguly and M. Chris Mason
(Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, forthcoming).
23. Huma Siddiqui, “Deeper Military Cooperation between India and the US: Vice Chief of
Indian Army Visiting America,” Financial Express, October 16, 2020, https://www.financialexpress
.com/lifestyle/health/deeper-military-cooperation-between-india-and-the-us-vice-chief-of-indian
-army-visiting-america/2107121/.
24. See Carol V. Evans, “A Vision for Future U.S.-India Intelligence Cooperation,” in The Future
of US-India Security Cooperation, ed. Šumit Ganguly and M. Chris Mason (Manchester, UK: University
of Manchester Press, forthcoming).
25. Sameer Lalwani, “Revelations and Opportunities: What the United States Can Learn from
the Sino-Indian Crisis,” War on the Rocks, July 10, 2020, https://warontherocks.com/2020/07
/revelations-and-opportunities-what-the-united-states-can-learn-from-the-sino-indian-crisis/; and
Evans, “Vision for Future.”

TOC

Prospectives 2021: US Strategic Landpower

Evans

35

and stability in the region. Additionally the United States could assist
India by supplementing the current Poseidon P-8I surveillance mission
with deployments of, for example, Joint Stars, Rivet Joint aircraft, or
Global Hawk UAVs.26

Training and Professional Military Education

The Indian military has identified the need to improve its special
forces.27 These forces remain limited in number and are not considered
intelligence collection assets in ways that the US Special Forces operate.
In this regard US Army Special Operations Forces can assist with
training, data exchanges, and operational planning support with Indian
forces, in concert with regular exercises and personnel exchanges in
both the United States and India. Part of this process can include special
penetration and exfiltration operations, deception, counterterrorism
training, network penetration, and psychological warfare. The US
Army, through US Special Operations Command and with the
assistance of INDOPACOM, can help create a similar integrated special
operations command initially designated for Indian border protection,
counterterrorism, and infiltration missions.
With regard to US-Indian PME engagement, the current footprint
is too small and could be greatly expanded. India’s own professional
military education establishment has come under fire for its military
insularity, lack of civilian participation, and emphasis on training
over education.28 Critics have suggested India’s PME system needs
to be revamped along the US and UK models.29 These factors and
a lack of jointness within the Indian military establishment point to
areas for US-Indian PME cooperation, especially given China’s recent
restructuring of the PLA into a force capable of managing and conducting
joint operations. In the near-term, the US Army’s professional military
education institutions could collaborate more, for example, with India’s
relatively new National Defense University.

Quad Plus

With the US military posture weighted in the western Pacific,
Washington has increasingly leaned on New Delhi to be the
countervailing power in the Indo-Pacific, leading to high expectations
and pressures on the bilateral relationship on the part of the United
States. Fortunately the Quad has been resurrected from its somewhat
26. Mansij Asthana, “What Is US’ Deadliest Submarine Killer – The P-8 Poseidon Doing at
15,000 Feet on India-China Border?” Eurasian Times, November 27, 2020, https://eurasiantimes
.com/what-is-us-most-lethal-submarine-killer-the-p-8-poseidon-doing-on-india-china-border-at
-15000-feet/.
27. Saikat Datta, “India Tries and Fails to Improve Its Special Operations Forces,” Asia Times,
May 31, 2019, https://www.asiatimes.com/2019/05/article/india-tries-to-improve-its-special
-ops-capability/.
28. Prakash Menon, “Military Education in India: Missing the Forest for the Trees,” Journal
of Defence Studies 9, no. 4 (October–December 2015): 49–69, https://idsa.in/system/files/jds
/jds_9_4_2015_MilitaryEducationIndia.pdf.
29. See Anit Mukherjee, The Absent Dialogue: Politicians, Bureaucrats, and the Military in India (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2020).
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moribund state due to members’ converging concerns regarding China’s
increasingly assertive and coercive military and economic behavior in
the region.30 The Quad foreign ministers’ in-person meeting in Tokyo
in October 2020 and Australia’s participation for the first time since
2007 in the November 2020 Quad-based, Indian-hosted Malabar
exercise were important signaling measures demonstrating the potential
countervailing capabilities of these strategic partners against China.
That RIMPAC-like exercise was conducted in November 2020 with
the four Quad navies (US Navy, Japan Maritime Self Defense Force,
Royal Australian Navy, and Indian Navy) conducting joint operations
centered on the Indian Vikramaditya carrier battle group and the US
Nimitz carrier strike group.31
The two “Plus” regional players are the United Kingdom and
France. The United Kingdom provides the geostrategic base in Diego
Garcia and has just deployed the HMS Queen Elizabeth aircraft carrier
(on its maiden voyage) and its carrier strike group to the Indian Ocean
and South China Sea. France’s naval bases in Djibouti and the Reunion
Islands already provide logistical support for India’s mission-based
deployments in the Indian Ocean, Gulf of Aden, and the Persian Gulf.
Furthermore expanding the Quad into a Quad Plus would leverage
the capacities of individual members to mount and conduct joint
operations but without engaging in a formal military alliance structure
such as NATO. Accordingly INDOPACOM and USARPAC could
work to expand the current focus of the Quad, which is maritime/
naval-centric, to assist in building multidomain, interoperable military
competencies across the land, air, space, and cyber domains. This
expansion can be achieved through greater intelligence sharing and
collaboration, including those of the “Five Eyes” alliance. Intelligence
sharing is an essential step in operationalizing the Quad alliance.
Additionally the numerous bilateral logistical agreements among
the Quad Plus members could be networked to provide the grid for
launching a larger allied Ring of Fires for basing and pre-positioning
of supplies and other logistics support for distributed All-Domain
operations. Refocusing INDOPACOM’s exercises and those among
the Quad Plus members on the environment for allied multidomain
interoperability and joint operations is another component as well. Just
as we have seen the establishment of combined Joint task forces in the
Horn of Africa and in the Middle East, task forces could be established
in the Indo-Pacific as a further means of providing the persistent
forward presence necessary to deter and moderate PRC behavior, and, if
necessary, defeat any Chinese aggression across all domains of warfare.

30. Tanvi Madan, “The Rise, Fall, and Rebirth of the ‘Quad,’ ” War on the Rocks, November 16,
2017, https://warontherocks.com/2017/11/rise-fall-rebirth-quad/.
31. Express News Service, “Malabar Exercise Concludes in Arabian Sea,” Indian Express,
November 21, 2020, https://indianexpress.com/article/india/malabar-exercise-concludes-in
-arabian-sea-7059693/.
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Concluding Recommendations

Regaining and maintaining US strategic advantages in the
Indo-Pacific will be vital for protecting American interests in the region.
America’s window of vulnerability is open, but that window also offers
opportunities to recast US military strategies, capabilities, and alliances.
With a forward-looking roadmap the US Army can become an even more
important enabler to the Joint Force in INDOPACOM. At the core of its
efforts to do so should be an emphasis on leveraging its investments in
precision strike capabilities to operationalize the Ring-of-Fires concept
and strengthening its relations with the Indian Army and the Quad
Plus militaries.
As an immediate first step, INDOPACOM must develop a proof of
concept for the Ring of Fires with Australia, India, and Japan. Using war
games and discrete military exercises among these Quad stakeholders,
the Ring of Fires could be tested, refined, and operationalized.
Second, INDOPACOM must focus on incremental alliance building
with smaller states and in support of India’s many regional initiatives.
Finally, INDOPACOM must also coordinate with the Department of
State and other interagency players, such as the Commerce and Treasury
Departments, to bring to bear the full panoply of US diplomatic, political,
and economic instruments to demonstrate a renewed US commitment
to the region, a commitment aimed not only at countering the inroads
China has made via the Belt and Road Initiative but also building the
foundation for continued peace and stability.
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ABSTRACT: In an era of great power competition centered on
warfighting domains other than land, the US Army faces difficult
and likely painful choices. This reality, coupled with looming budget
cuts, means the Army must reconsider its approach to capabilities
and total force structure, its role in homeland security, and the
relationship between its active and reserve components.

W

hen the editors of Parameters gather a new generation of
authors to celebrate the 75th or even the 100th anniversary
of the journal, how will they view the articles that compose
this special 50th anniversary issue? Only time will tell, of course, but
certain themes already seem clear. Those authors of the future will very
likely look back upon the current era as a major strategic inflection point,
much like those following the end of the Second World War, the end of
the Cold War, and the 9/11 terrorist attacks.
This strategic inflection point involves major changes in the types of
wars the United States plans to fight, as the irregular wars that dominated
the first two decades of the twenty-first century give way to a renewed
era of great power competition and, potentially, conflict. The world is
experiencing deep changes in the character of war, as the exponential
growth of advanced technologies transforms how people fight as well as
how they live. And Americans are asking fundamental questions about
the definition of national security as the coronavirus pandemic raging
through the country has already claimed more US lives than the Second
World War did. In February 2021 projections estimated that COVID-19
would kill more than 610,000 Americans by June 2021.1
These changes in the strategic environment will pose serious
challenges for each of the US military services, but they will challenge
the Army most of all. As the Department of Defense increasingly
focuses on China and as defense budgets decline, the Army will be at a
disadvantage in the strategic and budgetary fights to come.
Yet the Army has a long history of reshaping itself to address the
changing needs of the nation. The service was posted on the frontiers of
the growing nation in the nineteenth century, and in the early twentieth
1. David A. Blum and Nese F. DeBruyne, American War and Military Operations Casualties: Lists
and Statistics, Congressional Research Service (CRS) RL32492 (Washington, DC: CRS, July 29, 2020),
2; Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation, “COVID-19 Projections,” accessed February 12,
2021, https://covid19.healthdata.org/united-states-of-america; and Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention, “COVID Data Tracker,” accessed February 18, 2021, https://covid.cdc.gov
/covid-data-tracker/#datatracker-home.
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century, it fought guerillas in the Philippines and guarded the Mexican
border against marauding bandits. The Army quickly expanded to 4
million soldiers during the First World War, demobilized the vast
majority of them afterwards, and then suddenly grew to more than 11.2
million soldiers during the Second World War.2 Following another
comprehensive demobilization, the Army expanded again for the wars
in Korea and Vietnam and remained a large standing force during the
Cold War. In the 1990s the Army focused primarily on peacekeeping
and peace-enforcement operations, and following the terrorist attacks of
September 2001, it slowly reinvented itself as a counterinsurgency force
for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Now the Army must transform itself once again, this time to adapt
to an environment where the nation’s greatest strategic competitor poses
greater potential threats in the maritime and air domains (and the new
domains of space and cyberspace) than in the land domain. And the
Army will have to do so during a time of declining resources and as
the COVID-19 pandemic is making many Americans revisit their basic
assumptions about what constitutes a national security threat. This
transformation will not be easy and will likely be painful. Yet the sooner
the Army embraces these challenges, the better prepared it will be to
continue protecting the nation in this new and evolving era.

Changing Strategic Environment

The United States is currently at a strategic inflection point: the
irregular wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are drawing to a close and a new
era of great power competition is beginning. Yet many of the dynamics
of this new era are still emerging, creating tremendous uncertainty about
the path ahead. While the US strategic environment is transforming in
at least four different ways, none of them are on a clear and predictable
trajectory and may interact and affect each other in ways impossible
to foresee.3
Strategic uncertainty has been increasing during the past several years and shows
no sign of abating. Russia’s annexation of Crimea and China’s increasingly
aggressive behavior in the South China Sea have ushered in a new era
of great power competition, which became the cornerstone of the 2018
National Defense Strateg y.4 Yet at the same time, unpredictable regional
actors with both conventional and nuclear capabilities, including North
Korea and Iran, pose persistent threats to the United States and its allies.
Violent extremist groups continue to spread around the globe, aided by
state sponsors in some cases but also including small cells inspired by
al-Qaeda, ISIS, and their ever-proliferating progeny. And several global
trends are interacting in ways that increase global instability, including
2. Blum and DeBruyne, American War, 2.
3. David Barno and Nora Bensahel, Adaptation Under Fire: How Militaries Change in Wartime (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2020), chap. 9.
4. James N. Mattis, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America:
Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge (Washington, DC: US Department of Defense
(DoD), January 19, 2018).
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climate change, urbanization, refugee flows, demographic shifts, and
growing income inequality.5
The number of warfighting domains has increased from three to five, as space
and cyberspace join the traditional domains of land, sea, and air. Although the
US military has utilized space and cyber capabilities in recent decades,
the United States has not fought a war in either domain. But this fact
will almost certainly change in a future war against any reasonably
tech-savvy adversary, which will introduce enormous complexity and
unexpected challenges.
While outer space somewhat resembles the traditional warfare
domains in being defined by physical boundaries, the cyber domain
is markedly different from all the others. Cyber may quickly become
the most important warfighting domain because it critically enables
warfighting in the geographic domains and could therefore pose a
massive vulnerability for the US military. Moreover, hostile cyber actions
raise fundamental questions about the very definition of warfare, as a
growing number of state and nonstate actors can directly target the US
homeland without ever having to encounter the formidable warfighting
capabilities of the US military.6
The current scale and speed of technological change is already unrivaled in
human history and will continue to grow exponentially. Klaus Schwab argues
we are at the brink of the Fourth Industrial Revolution, a massive
global transformation where the boundaries between the “physical,
digital, and biological” realms interact and overlap.7 This revolution will
profoundly reshape every aspect of society, business, government, and,
of course, the military. A new generation of high-tech weapons such
as hypersonics and directed-energy weapons will transform the range,
speed, and destructive power of conventional arms.8
But artificial intelligence, big data, and robotics will also accelerate
the development of autonomous weapons systems, which make
decisions at the speed of light instead of the much slower speed
of human cognition. (Unfortunately this development will reward
adversaries who delegate lethal decision-making authority to these
weapons with the fewest constraints, making it even harder for the
United States and other democracies to impose any ethical or moral
restrictions on their use.) Mass will become increasingly important as
smaller and cheaper technologies proliferate around the world, enabling
5. National Intelligence Council (NIC), Global Trends: Paradox of Progress, NIC 2017-001,
(Washington, DC: NIC, January 2017).
6. See David Barno and Nora Bensahel, “The Irrelevance of Traditional Warfare?” War on
the Rocks, January 27, 2015, https://warontherocks.com/2015/01/the-irrelevance-of-traditional
-warfare/; and Barno and Bensahel, “A New Generation of Unrestricted Warfare,” War on the Rocks,
April 19, 2016, https://warontherocks.com/2016/04/a-new-generation-of-unrestricted-warfare.
7. Klaus Schwab, The Fourth Industrial Revolution (New York: Crown Business, 2016), 8.
8. Paul Scharre, Army of None: Autonomous Weapons and the Future of War (New York: W. W.
Norton & Company, 2018); and T. X. Hammes, “Technological Change and the Fourth Industrial
Revolution,” in Beyond Disruption: Technology’s Challenge to Governance, ed. George P. Shultz, Jim
Hoagland, and James Timbie (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 2018), 37–73.
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even nonstate actors to employ drone swarms that can effectively
counter US offensive advantages.9
The ways in which most Americans define national security may be shifting as
a result of the COVID-19 pandemic.10 For decades the United States has
invested hundreds of billions of dollars each year in the Department of
Defense in order to defend itself against threats from overseas. Yet as
of this writing, over 28 million Americans have contracted the virus,
and 506,834 of them have died from it.11 With so many individuals and
families directly affected by the pandemic—and millions more suffering
from unemployment, social isolation, and other indirect effects—many
Americans will conclude US national security needs to focus far more on
myriad threats from within the homeland than on threats from abroad.
Moreover, Americans will recognize the Department of Defense,
whose over $700 billion annual budget constitutes approximately 15
percent of the entire federal budget, did very little to protect them from
the pandemic and played only a minor role in responding to it.12 A poll
conducted in February 2020, several weeks before lockdowns across the
nation began, found 31 percent of those surveyed thought the United
States spent too much on defense.13 That number is likely to rise in the
coming months and years as Americans increasingly prioritize internal
threats over external ones.
And even if public support for the defense budget remains strong, the
massive economic crisis caused by COVID-19 means the United States
may not be able to afford continued high levels of defense spending.
In January 2020 the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projected
the federal budget deficit for fiscal year (FY) 2020 would be about $1
trillion and would average $1.3 trillion a year for the next decade.14 By
June, however, CBO projected the combination of pandemic relief and
declining government revenue meant the FY 2020 deficit would be $3.7
trillion and an additional $2.1 trillion in FY 2021.15
Even after adjusting for inflation these figures constitute the largest
deficit in US history—even greater than the deficit during all the years
9. See Scharre, Army of None; Hammes, “Technological Change,”; and David Barno and Nora
Bensahel, “War in the Fourth Industrial Revolution,” War on the Rocks, June 19, 2018, https://war
ontherocks.com/2018/06/war-in-the-fourth-industrial-revolution/.
10. See David Barno and Nora Bensahel, “After the Pandemic: America and National Security
in a Changed World,” War on the Rocks, March 31, 2020, https://warontherocks.com/2020/03
/after-the-pandemic-america-and-national-security-in-a-changed-world/.
11. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “COVID Data Tracker,” accessed February
27, 2021.
12. “Policy Basics: Introduction to the Federal Budget,” Center on Budget and Policy Priorities
(website), updated April 2, 2020, https://www.cbpp.org/research/policy-basics-introduction-to-the
-federal-budget-process.
13. “Military and National Defense,” Gallup (website), https://news.gallup.com/poll/1666
/Military-National-Defense.aspx.
14. Congressional Budget Office (CBO), The Budget and Economic Outlook: 2020 to 2030
(Washington, DC: CBO, January 28, 2020).
15. Phillip L. Swagel, “Budgetary Effects of the 2020 Coronavirus Pandemic,” letter to
Senator Rick Scott, June 5, 2020, https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2020-06/56388-CBO-Scott
-Letter.pdf.
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of the Second World War combined.16 And the actual deficit in FY 2021
is likely to be higher than the CBO projection because the pandemic
continued unabated in late 2020 and early 2021, with infection rates
that dwarfed those of spring 2020. Current and future pandemic relief
measures will place upward pressure on an already debilitating deficit.
Deficit spending adds to the national debt of course. In late April
2020, economist Brian Riedl estimated the total costs of the pandemic
would add more than $8 trillion to the national debt over the next
decade. The debt was already projected to almost double during that
period, but this added load led Reidl to estimate it would grow from
$17.9 trillion in 2019 to $41 trillion by 2030.17 And that is almost certainly
a low estimate since Riedl assumed most of the economy would reopen
by the summer of 2020—which did not happen in large parts of the
country—and the number of infections would continue to decrease,
when they rapidly escalated instead. This rising debt will significantly
increase the amount of interest the United States must pay—already
$375 billion in 2019—further consuming government revenue and
pressuring discretionary spending downward.18
Furthermore the political dynamics surrounding the new Biden
administration also suggest the defense budget is about to shrink, and the
cuts could be as large, if not larger, than those of the sequestration era.
Though President Biden and his advisers are committed internationalists
who believe in a strong leadership role for the United States, his highest
priority will remain dealing with the pandemic and its aftermath. He
has already proposed an additional $1.9 trillion in pandemic relief, and
though Congress may not adopt this proposal in full, the legislation
will substantially increase the deficit and the debt.19 He will also need
to adopt some policies that satisfy the more progressive wing of the
Democratic party, which will continue to urge cuts to the defense budget.
In July 2020, for example, 93 members of the House and 23 members
of the Senate voted for a proposal by the Congressional Progressive
Caucus to cut defense spending by 10 percent and redirect those funds
to coronavirus relief and other domestic priorities.20
With the Democrats now controlling the Senate, members of that
party who support cutting the defense budget for any reason may find
16. Todd Harrison and Seamus P. Daniels, Analysis of the FY 2021 Defense Budget and Its
Implications for FY 2021 and Beyond (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies,
February 2020), 57.
17. Brian Riedl, “Coronavirus Budget Projections: Escalating Deficits and Debt,”
Manhattan Institute, April 29, 2020, https://www.manhattan-institute.org/coronavirus-cbo-budget
-deficit-projection.
18. Christine Bogusz et al., “The Federal Budget in 2019: An Infographic,” CBO (Washington,
DC: CBO, April 2020), https://www.cbo.gov/publication/56324.
19. Jim Tankersley and Michael Crowley, “Biden Outlines $1.9 Trillion Spending Package
to Combat Virus and Downturn,” New York Times, January 14, 2021, https://www.nytimes
.com/2021/01/14/business/economy/biden-economy.html.
20. Alex Emmons, “Progressives Plan to Push Big Cuts to Defense Spending, Citing
Coronavirus Crisis,” Intercept, June 24, 2020, https://theintercept.com/2020/06/24/defense
-spending-coronavirus-bernie-sanders/; and John Nichols, “We Can No Longer Afford the
Military-Industrial Complex,” Nation, July 22, 2020, https://www.thenation.com/article/politics
/house-senate-defense-spending/.
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more support for such a move. Moreover, as Biden begins his presidency,
congressional Republicans may find their best opposition strategy
involves embracing fiscal conservatism once again. That strategy worked
fairly effectively after 2008 when a new Democratic president took
office during the economic crisis now known as the Great Recession.
The Budget Control Act of 2011, which contained the much-hated
sequestration mechanism, was originally passed under pressure from
Republicans who opposed President Barack Obama and the escalating
national debt.
Now after the 2020 election, a new Democratic president has once
again taken office during an enormous economic crisis rivaling the early
years of the Great Depression.21 Republicans may well determine the
best way to oppose Biden—and improve their election prospects over
the next four years—involves sounding the alarm on the escalating
national debt. Taken together, these dynamics mean defense spending is
about to decline; the only question is by how much. And this reality will
make it even more challenging for the US military to prepare effectively
for seismic changes in the strategic environment.

Challenges Facing the Army

All the services will find it difficult to adapt to this new environment
amidst declining budgets, which will force them to make hard choices
about force structure, end strength, and acquisition programs. Yet the
Army faces more challenges than the other services as the growing
threat from China means the Indo-Pacific is now the US military’s most
important theater of operations. Unfortunately for the Army that shift
suggests land will no longer be the most critical or most decisive domain
of warfare for the United States.
A future war with China will be defined by the air and sea domains
together with the new domains of space and cyber. As a result the
Army has a tremendous disadvantage in the strategic arguments and in
upcoming budget fights. In order to adapt successfully to this enormous
shift, the Army will have to address the following four challenges:
focusing on the nation’s secondary theater; the increasing relevance of
fires over maneuver; the new demands of homeland defense; and the
growing importance of the reserve component.22

A Supporting Service

Although the 2018 National Defense Strateg y prioritized great power
competition with China and Russia, the Department of Defense has
now explicitly prioritized competition with China.23 Toward the end of
21. David C. Wheelock, “Comparing the COVID-19 Recession with the Great Depression,”
Economic Synopses 39 (2020), https://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/economic-synopses/2020
/08/12/comparing-the-covid-19-recession-with-the-great-depression.
22. David Barno and Nora Bensahel, “The Headwinds Looming for the U.S. Army,” War on the
Rocks, October 27, 2020, https://warontherocks.com/2020/10/the-headwinds-looming-for-the-u
-s-army/; and Barno and Bensahel, The Future of the Army: Today, Tomorrow, and the Day after Tomorrow
(Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, September 2016).
23. Mattis, 2018 National Defense Strategy.
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his term Secretary of Defense Mark Esper clearly stated his goal was
“to focus the Department on China,” because China was “the pacing
threat” for which the US military must prepare.24 To do so he directed
the development of a new “joint warfighting concept,” and instructed
the National War College to focus half of its coursework on China.25
The Biden administration has signaled it will provide stronger
support for Europe and NATO Allies and partners and has affirmed
the prioritization of China as our “most serious competitor.”26 In
2018, for example, two of the most senior China experts in the Obama
administration conceded many US assumptions about China had been
wrong and called for a new strategic approach.27 Biden’s team will face
the simple and sobering fact that only a rising China has the enormous
economic power, the cutting-edge technologies, and the advanced
military capabilities that could match or exceed those of the US armed
forces—and potentially defeat them.
This shift has significant implications for the Army. For decades it
has effectively been the first among equals of the US military services.
During the Cold War the Army provided most of the NATO forces
postured to deter or defeat a Soviet invasion of Western Europe. It also
provided most of the forces that fought in Korea, Vietnam, the 1991
Gulf War, Iraq, and Afghanistan. In all of these conflicts the Army was
the supported service. Yet the explicit focus on China over Russia means
this traditional relationship is about to flip. The Army will primarily be
a supporting service in any potential conflict with China, enabling the
other services to operate in the vast air and maritime domains of the
western Pacific.
This seismic shift means the Army will no longer conduct the
primary type of military operations against the nation’s biggest strategic
threat, fundamentally upending the key warfighting roles and missions
it has focused on for the past 75 years. Its ground combat forces will
remain essential for deterrence and, if necessary, warfighting on the
Korean peninsula, but otherwise the Army’s role in the vast Indo-Pacific
theater will remain limited.
The Army does not seem to have fully absorbed the implications of
this shift, however, as it continues to push for a combat role in the Pacific.
It is still planning, for example, to conduct littoral operations throughout
24. Mark T. Esper, “Secretary of Defense Mark T. Esper Message to the Force on
Accomplishments in the Implementation of the National Defense Strategy,” July 7, 2020,
https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/2266872/secretary
-of-defense-mark-t-esper-message-to-the-force-on-accomplishments-in-im/; and Jim Garamone,
“Esper Discusses Moves Needed to Counter China’s Malign Strategy,” DoD News, August 27,
2020, https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article 2326863/esper-discusses-moves
-needed-to-counter-chinas-malign-strategy/.
25. Garamone, “Esper Discusses Moves.”
26. Joseph Biden, “Remarks by President Biden on America’s Place in the World,” (speech,
US Department of State, February 4, 2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room
/speeches-remarks/2021/02/04/remarks-by-president-biden-on-americas-place-in-the-world/.
27. Kurt M. Campbell and Ely Ratner, “The China Reckoning: How Beijing Defied American
Expectations,” Foreign Affairs 97, no. 2 (March/April 2018): 60–70, https://www.foreignaffairs.com
/articles/china/2018-02-13/china-reckoning.
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the region even as the Commandant of the Marine Corps General
David Berger reshapes his service to focus on this specific mission.28
As defense budgets, end strength, and force structure all decline,
the Army needs to focus instead on its unique and essential mission of
providing critical enablers to the rest of the Joint Force in the Pacific.
These include vital capabilities like expanded land-based air and missile
defense, theaterwide logistics and engineering, electronic warfare, and
possibly long-range precision fires.29 Sustainment and protection will be
critical vulnerabilities for US forces in the Pacific, and it is far from clear
whether the Army can provide them effectively against a high-capability
adversary. As resources decline, the Army needs to shift its time, energy,
and thinking away from conducting combat operations in the Pacific
and into these less glamorous but absolutely crucial responsibilities.
The Army’s traditional ground combat forces will still be required
in Europe. Russia remains the most capable and dangerous threat to the
United States in the land domain, and Army forces will still need to deter
Russian aggression and bolster NATO’s defenses. But those missions,
which were the highest US strategic priority for many decades, are now
lower national defense priorities than deterring, and possibly defending
against, Chinese aggression in the Pacific. The fact the land domain—
the Army’s primary warfighting domain—is now of limited importance
against the nation’s preeminent threat will pose enormous cultural and
practical challenges for the service in the years ahead. The Army will
almost certainly see cuts to its force structure and end strength and will
likely accept a higher degree of risk in the European theater.

Fires Over Maneuver
The Army is also facing challenges from the changing relationship
between fires and maneuver as weapons technology advances and longrange fires become an increasingly vital component of warfighting.
Traditionally the Army has devoted a significant part of its force structure
to maneuver units—the infantry, armor, and cavalry units that assault
the enemy and seize and hold terrain—and has used fires from rockets
and artillery to support them. Yet the advent of precision long-range
fires is inverting this relationship, especially in the Pacific. Traditional
artillery generally could hit targets within a range of 15 to 25 miles.
Today, land-based precision rockets and missiles are being developed

28. David H. Berger, Commandant’s Planning Guidance (Washington, DC: Headquarters, United
States Marine Corps (USMC), 2019); and Berger, Force Design 2030 (Washington, DC: Headquarters,
USMC, March 2020).
29. Sean Kimmons, “Army to Build Three Multi-Domain Task Forces Using Lessons from
Pilot,” Army News Service, October 15, 2019, https://www.army.mil/article/228393/army_to
_build_three_multi_domain_task_forces_using_lessons_from_pilot; and Sean Kimmons, “Army
Aims to Further Refine MDO with Indo-Pacific Partners,” Army News Service, June 1, 2020,
https://www.ar my.mil/article/236120/ar my_aims_to_further_refine_mdo_with_indo
_pacific_partners.
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that will strike beyond 1,000 miles, and hypersonic weapons are being
developed that will have vastly greater ranges.30
This unprecedented technological advance is inverting the
traditional relationship between maneuver and fires, which poses a
significant cultural problem for the Army. For the first time, land forces
will be able to strike adversaries at strategic ranges without having to
resort to nuclear weapons, which means they may be able to deliver
strategic effects. The Army may soon be able to use such long-range
fires to destroy adversary units, command and control networks, and
vulnerable logistics supplies. The best way for the Army to contribute
to a future war in the Pacific could involve using these powerful new
capabilities to strike a wide range of targets on land and at sea, utilizing
few, if any, maneuver forces.
This reality suggests the Army is now overinvested in brigade
combat teams. Such maneuver forces will probably not play a significant
role in any conflict against the nation’s primary strategic threat, and
their large footprints and substantial electronic signatures make them
increasingly vulnerable to an adversary’s long-range strikes. As a result,
the Army may need to cut sharply the number of brigade combat teams
in its force structure, especially as defense budgets decline and the
services are required to use their more limited resources wisely. The
Army should prioritize cuts to infantry brigade combat teams, which
lack the mobile firepower and robust protection needed to ensure
survivability during any high-intensity conflict. The service should then
reinvest some of the resources freed by these cuts into more long-range
fires and other enabling capabilities for the Pacific (especially in missile
defense and logistics units).

Homeland Defense
As noted above, the pandemic has demonstrated the United States
is more prepared to address overseas threats than to protect its citizens
from threats within the homeland. Yet for all the human suffering
the pandemic has caused, the origins of COVID-19 were benign—a
natural, if lethal, variant of a coronavirus. A malevolent attack on the
US homeland, however, could be far more disastrous. During the
pandemic, basic necessities like food, water, and power have remained
widely available (if increasingly unaffordable for too many Americans).
Yet a concerted cyberattack on the United States could far too easily
disrupt supply chains that provide these and other essential goods. And
a deliberate attack against US space assets could disrupt or destroy vital
military and civilian communications capabilities that enable GPS and
other critical infrastructures.

30. Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “Army Tests New A2/AD Tools: Howitzers, Missiles & 1,000mile Supergun,” Breaking Defense, May 1, 2020, https://breakingdefense.com/2020/05/army-tests
-new-a2-ad-tools-howitzers-missiles-1000-mile-supergun/; and Kris Osborn, “The U.S. Army Wants
a 1,000 Mile Range Cannon,” National Interest blog, September 15, 2020, https://nationalinterest
.org/blog/buzz/us-army-wants-1000-mile-range-cannon-168967.
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Any future conflicts with a major foreign adversary will almost
certainly spill over into the homeland, with potentially disastrous
consequences. But such attacks could also occur outside the bounds of
traditional warfare, launched by a state adversary trying to stay below
the threshold of armed conflict or even by a disaffected group of hackers
operating from their basements around the world.31 In either case the
consequences could be devastating.
As direct threats to the homeland continue to grow, the Army will
play a key role in helping prevent such attacks and an even greater role in
helping to mitigate the consequences. Throughout the nation’s history,
the Army has always been the principal military service responsible for
defending Americans at home. In recent decades its most important
domestic mission has been responding to natural disasters like floods,
earthquakes, hurricanes, and wildfires—a role that will become even
more important as climate change makes these events more frequent
and intense. The Army remains a critical part of the nation’s toolkit in
responding to many domestic emergencies, since it has extraordinarily
capable organizations standing ready to provide a wide range of
logistics, communications, and engineering support to civil authorities
when needed.
Yet active duty Army forces will likely play only a limited role in this
increasingly vital mission. In a conflict that occurs mainly at home, the
Army Reserve and especially the Army National Guard will be far more
important. The National Guard operates day-to-day under the command
of state governors and is the first military responder to civil disruptions
that exceed the capacity of local authorities. During the pandemic,
the Army Reserve joined the National Guard in helping beleaguered
city and state officials provide food, medical care, and specialized
services like mortuary affairs to hard-hit areas, while the active Army
contributed comparatively little.32 In a larger homeland emergency, the
Guard and Reserve could lead even broader missions such as providing
humanitarian assistance, restoring power and water, and preventing civil
disorder. The rising vulnerability of the US homeland will increasingly
require the Army to prioritize domestic emergency response capabilities
in its reserve forces, requiring tough trade-offs with active capabilities
in future constrained budget environments.

The Reserve Component
The Army has always viewed its active forces as the first among
equals within the three elements of the total force. Active Army units
have traditionally been accorded the first priority for scarce resources
and new equipment. Yet growing threats to the homeland combined
with the coming era of fiscal austerity may require reversing this
31. Barno and Bensahel, “Traditional Warfare?”; and Barno and Bensahel, “Restricted Warfare.”
32. Arnold L. Punaro, Improving the Total Force Using the National Guard and Reserves,
Appendix B (Falls Church, VA: Reserve Forces Policy Board, 2020), https://rfpb.defense.gov
/Portals/67/Improving the Total Force using the National Guard and Reserves_1 November 2016.
pdf ?ver=2016-11-17-142718-243.
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traditional relationship. Reserve forces are a wise strategic investment.
They preserve more combat and support force structure at less cost than
active forces, which require much higher investments in readiness to
be able to deploy rapidly around the world. And unlike active forces,
reserve forces provide readily accessible capabilities for both homeland
and overseas operations. Future wartime demands may find these forces
pulled in both directions, but they nevertheless remain a cost-effective
investment across all Army missions.
As the move to a supporting role and declining defense budgets force
the Army to make some painful choices, it must avoid the temptation to
make equal cuts to active, Reserve, and Guard end strength and force
structure simply to share the bureaucratic pain more equally. Instead,
the Army may need to preserve some reserve capabilities at the expense
of some active capabilities. This move would strengthen the total force’s
ability to defend the homeland while simultaneously husbanding critical
warfighting capabilities in the most economical way possible. Some of
these choices would undoubtedly require the Army to accept more risk
in any future European conflict than it would like. But such decisions
would be entirely consistent with the decision US political leaders have
already made, which identifies China as the nation’s top strategic priority.
Shrinking the Army’s active component more than its reserve
component will pose an immense cultural challenge, however. When
defense budgets contracted during the sequestration era, the Army’s
active and reserve components engaged in an all-out bureaucratic war
that can only be characterized as fratricide, leading Congress to charter
an independent commission to referee the fight.33 The Army, and the
country more broadly, cannot afford to repeat that experience.
Current Chief of Staff of the Army General James McConville faces
the daunting task of managing this countercultural change. He must do
so by ensuring active, Reserve, and Guard forces all have an equal seat
at the table when cuts are considered. And after tough decisions have
been made behind closed doors, all Army senior leaders must emerge in
solidarity, emphasizing the needs of the entire Army rather than any of
its individual components. Former Chief of Staff of the Army General
Mark Milley used this approach to heal the Army’s divisions after the
debacle described above (as did former Chief of Staff of the Air Force
General Mark Welsh III after a similar crisis in his service a few years
earlier).34 McConville should learn from their approach as he faces the
even greater challenge of preventing the Army from disintegrating into
factionalism once again.

33. National Commission on the Future of the Army (NCFA), Report to the President and the
Congress of the United States, January 28, 2016 (Washington, DC: NCFA, 2016).
34. National Commission on the Structure of the Air Force (NCSAF), Report to the President and
the Congress of the United States, January 30, 2014 (Arlington, VA: NCSAF, 2014).
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Conclusion

The Army is facing extremely difficult challenges as it transforms
itself for a new era of great power competition. It will have to manage
considerable strategic uncertainty, two new domains of warfare,
exponential leaps in technology, and the increasing importance of
homeland defense—all while defense resources decline and the service
transitions from a supported to supporting role against the nation’s
greatest strategic threat. The Army has successfully redefined itself many
times throughout its history, but this endeavor, like those of the past, will
entail hard, painful choices about many things, including its capabilities
and force structure, the growing mission of homeland security, and
the relationship between Army active and reserve components. Wise
decisions on these matters will help ensure the Army remains a relevant
and vital element of the nation’s military power in the years and decades
to come.
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ABSTRACT: Civil-military relations has been a subject of Parameters’
articles for the life of the journal. Although interest in the topic
waxes and wanes, in recent years it has been the focus of concern
due to the appointment of two recently retired general officers to
the post of Secretary of Defense and the ahistorical proposed use
of the military by a president to address internal unrest. Undue
worry over this issue, however, detracts from other more pressing
problems facing civil society and our democracy today.

C

laims of civil-military crisis are a recurring feature of American
politics, and the current moment is no exception. Some
skepticism, however, is warranted regarding whether we now
truly face a uniquely urgent civil-military crisis. An examination of some
of the most frequently made arguments about the dire state of civilmilitary relations finds the evidence is equivocal. While there is indeed
reason for concern about several aspects of this relationship, we should
be wary of adopting purely formalistic conceptions of civil-military
relations, which can serve to distract us from other, more subtle threats
to American democracy.
The frequency with which claims of civil-military crises are made
should not be a surprise: the American Republic was born out of violent
military and political rebellion, and since the nation’s birth, civil-military
tensions have periodically erupted. Although what is understood as
constituting a civil-military crisis has varied over time, public and
scholarly hand-wringing has accompanied each instance.
In 1783 for example, Continental Army officers, angered by poor
pay and conditions after eight years of war, nearly mutinied against the
Continental Congress.1 In 1818, when General Andrew Jackson attacked
Spanish military posts in Florida in contravention of orders from his
civilian leadership, Secretary of War John C. Calhoun denounced his

1. Douglas V. Johnson II and Steven Metz, American Civil-Military Relations: New Issues, Enduring
Problems (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, April 24, 1995), https://ssi.armywarcollege
.edu/american-civil-military-relations-new-issues-enduring-problems/; and Ugonna Eze, “George
Washington Calms Down the Newburgh Conspiracy,” National Constitution Center, Constitution
Daily (blog), March 16, 2018, https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/george-washington-calms-down
-the-newburgh-conspiracy.
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acts as insubordinate and unconstitutional.2 The American Civil War
was most assuredly a civil-military crisis, among other things. Scores of
US military officers took up arms against the elected civilian leadership
of the United States. President Abraham Lincoln struggled to control
even his own Union generals. Major General John C. Fremont, for
example, famously ignored clear direction from Lincoln and issued a
proclamation emancipating enslaved people in Missouri. Subsequently
Fremont actively sought to prevent Lincoln’s emissaries from delivering
the presidential message relieving him of command.3
Nearly a century later, angst about civil-military relations continued.
In 1951 General Douglas MacArthur’s public defiance of President
Harry Truman led Truman to relieve MacArthur of command. In the
1990s tensions over the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy regarding gay
and lesbian individuals serving in the military led active duty military
members to criticize President Bill Clinton publicly, which in turn
led many, like historian Richard Kohn, to warn of a “crisis in civilmilitary relations.”4
After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, jeremiads about civil-military
relations continued, albeit with a striking shift in tenor. With patriotic
fervor and public esteem for the military running high, concerns over
tensions between military and civilian leaders were replaced by anxiety
about changing military demographics, civilian ignorance about military
issues, and what was widely conceptualized as the “civil-military gap.”5
More recently, the nature of the angst over civil-military relations
has shifted once again. During the administration of President Donald
Trump, persistent worries about the civil-military gap were joined by
growing concerns over the prominent role of retired senior officers in
partisan politics, the high number of current and former senior military
officials in the president’s inner circle, the sidelining of civilian expertise
within the Defense Department, and the use and potential use of the
military for essentially domestic missions including law enforcement

2. Herman von Holst, John C. Calhoun (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1888),
88–93; Roger Wendell Anderson, “Andrew Jackson’s Seminole Campaign of 1818: A Study in
Historiography,” (master’s thesis, Montana State University, 1956), 12, https://scholarworks.umt.
edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2580&context=etd; and Robert P. Wettemann Jr., Privilege vs.
Equality: Civil-Military Relations in the Jacksonian Era, 1815–1845 (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger Security
International, 2009), 25–27.
3. Ronald E. Franklin, “How Abraham Lincoln Fired General John C. Fremont,” Owlcation,
June 17, 2018, https://owlcation.com/humanities/How-Abraham-Lincoln-Fired-General-John-C
-Fremont; and Allen C. Guelzo, Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation: The End of Slavery in America (New
York: Simon & Schuster, 2004), 50.
4. Richard Kohn, “Out of Control: The Crisis in Civil-Military Relations,” National Interest,
March 1, 1994, https://nationalinterest.org/article/out-of-control-the-crisis-in-civil-militaryrelations-343.
5. Jon Rahbek-Clemmensen et al., “Conceptualizing the Civil-Military Gap: A Research
Note,” Armed Forces & Society 38, no. 4 (Fall 2012); and James Fallows, “The Tragedy of the
American Military,” Atlantic 315 (January/February 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine
/archive/2015/01/the-tragedy-of-the-american-military/383516/.
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and election security.6 In recent years, a growing chorus of voices have
suggested (or warned) that military personnel might find, at times, that
honoring their constitutional responsibilities requires disobeying—or at
least politely ignoring—their commander in chief.7 This essay examines
and evaluates some of the most common claims of civil-military crises.

Evidence of a Crisis
Claim 1: The US military is poorly understood by most American civilians.
This claim is surely true. Studies reveal Americans know little about
the military to which, since the 9/11 attacks, they have so eagerly offered
rhetorical support.8 But while the American public’s wholesale ignorance
of the US military may tell us something about America, it highlights
little that is unique to civil-military relations. After all, the list of things
most Americans do not know is distressingly all-encompassing: threequarters of Americans are unable to name all three branches of the federal
government; 37 percent cannot name any of the rights protected by the
First Amendment; most cannot correctly estimate the population of the
United States, and, as of 2014, a whopping 26 percent of Americans
thought the sun revolved around the earth.9
This general lack of knowledge suggests a crisis in American
education and civics in particular. It does not, however, suggest ignorance
about the military is an isolated variable, categorically different from, or
more important than, other gaps in basic civic knowledge. By itself, the
lack of familiarity is no barometer for measuring or predicting good or
bad decisions or healthy relationships among elite decisionmakers on
either the military or the civilian side.
6. Phillip Carter, “The Military Is Not a Political Prop,” Center for a New American Security,
February 12, 2018, https://www.cnas.org/publications/commentary/the-military-is-not-a-political
-prop; Wright Smith, “The President’s Generals,” Harvard Political Review 44, no. 1 (Spring 2017),
https://issuu.com/harvardpoliticalreview/docs/hpr_spring_2017_proofed_2; Loren DeJonge
Schulman, Alice Hunt Friend, and Mara E. Karlin, “Two Cheers for Esper’s Plan to Reassert
Civilian Control of the Pentagon,” Defense One, September 9, 2019, https://www.defenseone.com
/ideas/2019/09/two-cheers-espers-plan-reassert-civilian-control-pentagon/159716/; and Thomas
Gibbons-Neff et al., “Former Commanders Fault Trump’s Use of Troops against Protesters,” New
York Times, June 2, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/02/us/politics/military-national
-guard-trump-protests.html.
7. Anthony Colangelo, “Would the Military Really Have to Obey a Trump Command to
Fire a Nuclear Weapon?” Los Angeles Times, August 4, 2017, http://www.latimes.com/opinion
/op-ed/la-oe-colangelo-duty-nuclear-20170804-story.html; and John Nagl and Paul Yingling,
“ ‘. . . All Enemies, Foreign and Domestic’: An Open Letter to Gen. Milley,” Defense One,
August 11, 2020, https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2020/08/all-enemies-foreign-and-domestic
-open-letter-gen-milley/167625/.
8. Kori N. Schake and Jim Mattis, eds., Warriors and Citizens: American Views of Our Military
(Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 2016).
9. “Americans Are Poorly Informed about Basic Constitutional Provisions,” Annenberg
Public Policy Center (blog), September 12, 2017, https://www.annenbergpublicpolicycenter
.org/americans-are-poorly-informed-about-basic-constitutional-provisions/;
Harry
Alsop,
“Americans Surveyed: Misunderstood, Misrepresented or Ignorant?,” Telegraph, February 15,
2014, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/10640690/Americans
-surveyed-misunderstood-misrepresented-or-ignorant.html; and Brian Resnick and National
Journal, “26 Percent of Americans Say the Sun Revolves around the Earth,” Atlantic,
February 16, 2014, https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/02/26-percent-of
-americans-say-the-sun-revolves-around-the-earth/453834/.
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Claim 2: Less than 1 percent of the American public serves in the military, and
few members of the public have direct contact with military personnel.
This claim is at once true and, in itself, neither here nor there. The
percentage of the US population serving in the military on active duty
is unquestionably far smaller today than during the First and Second
World Wars or the Vietnam era. As a result, far fewer Americans
today have close ties to the military.10 But US wars involving mass
conscription have been historical anomalies. For most of American
history, the US military has been small and relatively isolated from
the broader population. In 1806 the size of the US Army and Navy
combined numbered fewer than 5,000 men, well under 1 percent of the
US population.11
The size of the military ebbed and flowed over the decades as wars
were fought and then ended. In the early 1930s, for instance, after the
demobilization that occurred following the First World War, the size
of the Army and Navy combined hovered around 235,000 out of a
population that exceeded 120 million.12 These small numbers were not
viewed as a civil-military problem but simply as the postwar reversion
to the norm of a small army—something perceived as a civic good for
most of American history.
The small percentage of the US population currently serving in
the military is often cited to explain the public’s ignorance of military
matters. Perhaps, but it is entirely possible a broad survey of, say, Army
personnel about Navy size, budgets, structure, or deployments, might
yield answers nearly as inaccurate as those of the general public. The
scale and complexity of the US military challenges even senior military
officials and scholars who devote their lives to its study.

Claim 3: Those who serve in the military are different from those who do not.
Undoubtedly the all-volunteer military is less geographically diverse
than it was during periods of mass conscription. Today’s armed forces
are more Southern and less urban, and those with a parent or sibling
in the military are far more likely to serve than those without family
links to military service.13 The US military also remains far more male

10. “The Military-Civilian Gap: Fewer Family Connections,” Pew Research Center, Social
& Demographic Trends, November 23, 2011, http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2011/11/23
/the-military-civilian-gap-fewer-family-connections/.
11. “US Navy Personnel Strength, 1775 To Present,” Naval History and Heritage Command,
August 2, 2016, https://www.history.navy.mil/research/library/online-reading-room/title-list
-alphabetically/u/usn-personnel-strength.html; and Marvin A. Kreidberg and Merton G. Henry,
History of Military Mobilization in the United States Army 1775-1945, Department of the Army
Pamphlet 20-212 (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, November 30, 1955),
https://history.army.mil/html/books/104/104-10/CMH_Pub_104-10.pdf.
12. “Between World Wars,” chap. 19 in American Military History, Army Historical Series
(Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United States Army, last modified April 27, 2001),
https://history.army.mil/books/AMH/amh-19.htm.
13. Dave Phillipps and Tim Arango, “Who Signs up to Fight?” New York Times, January 10,
2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/10/us/military-enlistment.html.
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than the overall population (women make up just 16 percent of enlisted
personnel and 18 percent of officers).14
In many other ways, however, the military differs from the civilian
population in that it is more diverse: racial minorities make up 33
percent of the enlisted workforce, compared to a civilian population
benchmark of 23.7 percent, perhaps reflecting the military’s enduring
and largely justified reputation as an institution that allows for meritbased advancement.15 (Numerous studies suggest that despite significant
ongoing concerns about equality, women and minorities within the
military generally view it as a more equitable environment than the
civilian world.)16
In recent decades several studies of military partisan affiliation
have suggested that the military, especially the officer corps, skews
Republican, but evidence for this finding is mixed. An August 2020
Military Times poll found 41 percent of those surveyed said they planned
to vote for Democratic presidential candidate Joe Biden in the 2020
election, while only 36 percent said they planned to vote for Republican
President Donald Trump.17
The more important question, however, is not whether those
who serve in the military are different from those who do not, but
whether those differences make a difference. Many professions differ
in discernable ways from a random cross section of the population.
Lawyers, clergy, doctors, engineers, and bankers all differ from the
overall population in patterned ways, but we rarely label this a problem
much less a crisis. If demographic or partisan affiliation differences
between military personnel and civilians lead reliably to problematic
differences in policy or performance, we might have reason to be
concerned. But thus far, although military personnel in the aggregate
differ from the civilian population in the aggregate, no clear evidence
indicates these differences translate consistently into differences in
policy or performance at the national level.
Certainly there are independent reasons to seek a military that
better reflects the demographics of the United States. Considerations of
fairness argue in favor of a more gender-balanced military and a military
in which both women and minorities are better represented at the
highest ranks and in all branches and military occupational specialties.
Research from other occupations also suggests increasing diversity
(in particular, increasing gender diversity) correlates with improved
14. Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (OUSD-PR),
Population Representation in the Military Services: Fiscal Year 2017 Summary Report (Washington, DC:
OUSD-PR, 2017), 6, https://prhome.defense.gov/Portals/52/Documents/MRA_Docs/MPP/AP
/poprep/2017/Executive%20Summary.pdf.
15. OUSD-PR, Population in the Military Services, 26.
16. Sarah Kliff, “The Most Satisfied Military Employees? Black Women. Least Satisfied?
White Men,” Washington Post, January 23, 2013, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk
/wp/2013/01/23/the-most-satisfied-military-employees-black-women-least-satisfied-white-men/.
17. Leo Shane III, “Trump’s Popularity Slips in Latest Military Times Poll,” Military Times,
August 31, 2020, https://www.militarytimes.com/news/pentagon-congress/2020/08/31/as
-trumps-popularity-slips-in-latest-military-times-poll-more-troops-say-theyll-vote-for-biden/.
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organizational performance, making it reasonable to worry that during
periods in which the military draws from relatively narrower slices of
the population, groupthink may increase and military innovation and
creativity may decrease.18
But without more clarity on which differences make a difference—
and the kind of difference these differences make—it is hard to argue
that demographic divergences between the military and the overall
population should primarily be construed through the lens of civilmilitary relations or seen as a sign of crisis.

Claim 4: Too many current or retired military personnel were given executive
branch leadership positions under Trump.
This claim is difficult to evaluate. Trump’s appointment of several
recently retired generals to his first cabinet triggered concerns his
administration was tilting too far in a military direction. But President
Barack Obama similarly appointed recently retired generals to senior
positions. And President Biden selected retired Army General Lloyd
Austin as his first Secretary of Defense.
How many generals is too many, and why? Some argue that a cabinet
stocked with senior military personnel might bias an administration
toward military rather than political, economic, or diplomatic solutions
to problems, but no clear evidence indicates that senior advisers with
military backgrounds provide advice to presidents in a manner that
differs in predictable ways from the advice of civilian senior advisers.
During the Trump administration, for instance, Secretary of Defense
James Mattis was viewed by many as a counterweight to the often more
hawkish and bellicose views of several of Trump’s civilian advisers,
despite Mattis’s status as a recently retired Marine Corps general.
A different critique suggests that if senior military officials begin to
view political appointments as a natural next step after leaving the military,
they may tailor their actions and comments as active duty officers to
fit the perceived political preferences of their favored political actors.
This hypothesis seems plausible, but it remains untested. Also unknown
is the degree to which senior military officials might already tailor their
decision making in order to garner congressional funding or position
themselves for postretirement positions with defense contractors or on
high-profile boards.
Some unique issues relate to having recently retired generals serve
as Secretary of Defense.19 In 1947 Congress prohibited retired military
personnel from heading the Defense Department without a seven-year
cooling-off period. The cooling-off period was designed to address two
18. David Rock and Heidi Grant, “Why Diverse Teams Are Smarter,” Harvard Business Review,
November 4, 2016, https://hbr.org/2016/11/why-diverse-teams-are-smarter.
19. Rosa Brooks, “Perspective: The Pentagon Needs More Civilian Control over the
Military Now, Not Less,” Washington Post, December 9, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com
/outlook/2020/12/09/lloyd-austin-civil-military-control/; and Jim Golby, “Sorry, Gen. Lloyd
Austin. A Recently Retired General Should Not Be Secretary of Defense.,” New York Times, December
7, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/07/opinion/biden-defense-secretary-dod.html.
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concrete concerns: first, that recently retired military personnel might
be overly loyal to their own service branch, and second, that they would
not yet be sufficiently acculturated to the needs and concerns of civilian
policymakers, rendering them less effective as the primary liaison
between civilian leaders and military officials.
We do not have many data points to evaluate the validity of these
concerns because presidents have nominated recently retired officers—
and requested Congress waive the cooling-off period—on only three
occasions (George C. Marshall in 1950, Mattis in 2017, Austin in
2021). That said, it is troubling that two presidents in a row have asked
Congress to pass legislation exempting specific individuals from a clear
statutory ban. Arguably, however, this trend is concerning more as a
matter of respect for the law than as a civil-military relations matter; a
law respected neither by presidents nor by Congress itself is not much
of a law.

Claim 5: Too many active duty and retired military personnel take partisan
positions in political campaigns and become involved in controversial
domestic political issues.
This concern predates the Trump administration, and here too,
both sides make compelling arguments. Given the high level of public
confidence in the military, it is no surprise political candidates from both
parties have sought to surround themselves with military figures with
stars on their shoulders and relatively broad name recognition. Moreover,
the trend toward seeking military endorsements has accelerated in recent
election cycles.
In June 2020 General Mark Milley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, was much criticized for accompanying then President Trump to a
staged photo opportunity in Lafayette Square after peaceful protesters
were dispersed with tear gas. Milley subsequently described his actions
as a mistake, acknowledging his “presence . . . created a perception of the
military involved in domestic politics.”20 While Milley’s actions triggered
a good deal of dismay about partisanship on the part of military officials,
this did not stop either 2020 major party candidate from reaching out
to retired senior military personnel to speak at campaign events and
offer endorsements.
Trump also contravened long-standing norms against using military
personnel domestically in a politicized manner. While numerous statutory
authorities allow presidents both to federalize National Guard troops
and deploy active duty troops domestically, the assumption has been
presidents will not use such authorities in narrowly partisan ways or to

20. Helene Cooper, Eric Schmitt, and Thomas Gibbons-Neff, “Milley, America’s Top General,
Walks into a Political Battle,” New York Times, June 5, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/05
/us/politics/protests-milley-trump.html; and Helene Cooper, “Milley Apologizes for Role in
Photo Op: ‘I Should Not Have Been There’ ” New York Times, June 11, 2020, https://www.nytimes
.com/2020/06/11/us/politics/trump-milley-military-protests-lafayette-square.html.
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control or suppress Constitutionally protected activities.21 But during
the racial justice protests that followed the killing of George Floyd by
Minneapolis police, the Trump administration was widely condemned
for its overly militarized response, which included the threatened
invocation of the Insurrection Act to enable the deployment of active
duty troops in US cities.22 In the period before and after the 2020
election, President Trump also suggested the military might be used to
“safeguard” or monitor voting and vote counting.23
But do any of these actions bespeak a civil-military crisis or excessive
influence of the military in domestic affairs? Once again it is important
to tease out the different issues at stake. Some argue the growing role
of military endorsements in partisan politics may, like the appointment
of recently retired generals to senior political positions, ultimately
jeopardize the military’s reputation for impartial service or erode public
confidence in the military.24 These are legitimate concerns, but they rest
on the assumption that a high level of public confidence in the military
is an independent good and that it is possible to draw a clear, reliable,
and meaningful distinction between advice that is military in nature
and advice that is merely political.25
Arguably, public confidence in the military is not a good thing
in and of itself. Such confidence is a good thing only if the military
serves the public well. But has the high level of public confidence in
the military since 9/11 been justified by accurate public perceptions of
military professionalism, impartiality, and success? Or is high public
support for the military instead indicative of public anxiety, guilt, or
misinformation? If it is the latter, then an erosion of public confidence
in the military might be a healthy recalibration.
Further, can we say with certainty that we know the difference
between advice that is strictly military in nature and advice tainted by
politics? If war is “politics by other means,” it is politics nonetheless. To
assume military professionals inhabit some pure, politically neutral realm
is to imagine war as something it has never been and never can be. This
is not to say that norms of military professionalism do not matter. Most
Americans believe a clear and critical difference exists between good
21. Mark Nevitt, “The President and the Domestic Deployment of the Military: Answers
to Five Key Questions,” Just Security, June 2, 2020, https://www.justsecurity.org/70482
/the-president-the-military-and-minneapolis-what-you-need-to-know/.
22. Rosa Brooks, “Perspective: Trump Wants to Crush Black Lives Matter with a Law
That Fought Segregation,” Washington Post, June 2, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com
/outlook/2020/06/02/trump-military-insurrection-act/.
23. Deana El-Mallawany, Christina Kwon, and Rachel Homer, “Trump Can’t Lawfully
Use Armed Forces to Sway the Election: Understanding the Legal Boundaries,” Just Security,
September 23, 2020, https://www.justsecurity.org/72500/trump-cant-lawfully-use-armed-forces
-to-sway-the-election-understanding-the-legal-boundaries/.
24. David Barno and Nora Bensahel, “How to Get Generals out of Politics,” War on
the Rocks, September 27, 2016, https://warontherocks.com/2016/09/how-to-get-generals
-out-of-politics/; and Michael A. Robinson, “Danger Close: Military Politicization and Elite
Credibility,” War on the Rocks, August 21, 2018, https://warontherocks.com/2018/08/danger-close
-military-politicization-and-elite-credibility/.
25. James Golby and Mara Karlin, “Why ‘Best Military Advice’ is Bad for the Military—and
Worse for Civilians,” Orbis 62, no. 1 (2018): 139.
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faith disagreements about ends and means and politically motivated lies.
In practice, however, the difference is often more difficult to discern.
Concerns about the danger of military politicization resonate with all
of us—but here too, claims of a civil-military crisis may overstate or
mischaracterize the case.
Similarly a president’s actual or threatened domestic use of the
military to further partisan ends poses urgent issues related to civil
liberties, the rule of law, and the misuse of executive power. It is less
apparent, however, that it makes sense to view these actions through the
lens of civil-military relations. In the case of the racial justice protests
in the summer of 2020, military leaders were quick to reaffirm the
nonpartisan US military is loyal to the Constitution rather than to a
particular president.26
Following the January 6, 2021, breach of the Capitol Building
by armed rioters openly supportive of Trump, Speaker of the House
Nancy Pelosi reportedly took the unprecedented step of asking the
chairman of the Joint Chiefs to ensure safeguards would be in place to
prevent the outgoing president from using his nuclear launch authority
in his last days in office.27 Needless to say, this too presents issues
of civilian control. I and others have argued there might be certain
extreme exigencies in which military disobedience to the commander
in chief’s orders would be the lesser of two evils, even if those orders
were not facially unlawful.28 If, for example, a president embroiled in
circumstances such as those of early January 2021 ordered a unilateral,
offensive nuclear strike against a target the military did not view as an
imminent threat, should ethical officers go along with those orders? Or
should they instead refuse to carry them out, perhaps asserting in such a
context, the order would violate core law-of-war principles?
Even in this case, it is not clear such ethical and legal dilemmas are
evidence of a civil-military crisis. For the United States to have reached
a point at which such exigencies are other than purely theoretical, other
crises must already have erupted.

Obscured by Overstatement

Thus far I have argued that many recent claims of a crisis in
civil-military relations prove, when closely examined, to be somewhat
overstated or to mischaracterize the issues. While there are genuine
reasons for consternation with regard to some matters, the evidence
of crisis is either lacking or ambiguous in others. When it comes to
civil-military relations, perhaps things are not as bad as they seem. Or,
26. Paul Sonne, “Joint Chiefs call Riot a ‘Direct assault’ on the Constitutional Process,
Affirm Biden as Next Commander in Chief,” Washington Post, January 12, 2021, https://www
.washingtonpost.com/national-security/military-statement-biden-commander-in-chief/2021
/01/12/9b722200-551a-11eb-89bc-7f51ceb6bd57_story.html.
27. David E. Sanger and Eric Schmitt, “Pelosi Pressed Pentagon on Safeguards to Prevent
Trump from Ordering Military Action,” New York Times, January 8, 2021, https://www.nytimes
.com/2021/01/08/us/politics/trump-pelosi-nuclear-military.html.
28. John Ford, “When Can a Soldier Disobey an Order?,” War on the Rocks, July 24, 2017,
https://warontherocks.com/2017/07/when-can-a-soldier-disobey-an-order/.
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at any rate, often the things that are bad have less to do with civilmilitary relations than with other challenges—from widespread civic
disengagement to abuses of executive power.
More than anything, our ongoing preoccupation with civil-military
crises may reflect our increasing uncertainty about the overall purpose
of the military and our growing inability to define the role of the armed
forces—or the distinction between the political and military realms—in
any coherent way. Considering today’s complex, hybrid challenges such
as terrorism, epidemic disease, climate change, cyber threats, Russian
information warfare, and expanding Chinese global influence, it is
impossible to draw neat distinctions between the role of the military
and the role of diplomacy, development, and trade policy—or for that
matter, between foreign and domestic issues and threats.29 But with the
lines between war and not war, foreign and domestic, and military and
civilian growing ever blurrier, it is less clear what we mean when we talk
about crises in civil-military affairs.
Of course, the categories we rely upon to structure and give meaning
to our world—war, peace, foreign, domestic, military, civilian, and so
on—are categories we have created. These categories are neither sacred
nor stable, and if they no longer serve a useful analytic purpose—if they
are beginning to obscure more than they clarify—then we must develop
new ways of thinking about power, force, control, and the institutions
and rules we need.
This is an urgent challenge. Indeed, it could be our continued
fondness for civil-military jeremiads risks diverting attention away
from different but just as insidious threats to American democracy—
threats that may have more to do with other forms of state capture and
democratic dysfunction than with a crisis in civil-military relations or
civilian control of the military.
The Founders cared deeply about civil-military relations and civilian
control of the military. But they cared about this relationship for quite
pragmatic reasons—in the late eighteenth century, those who controlled
organized militaries had a unique ability to control the state and its
resources. The founders of the fledgling American republic crafted a
representative democracy in which, they hoped, the will of the people
would always prevail and not be hijacked by force of arms.
The commitment of the framers of the Constitution to civilian
control of the military stemmed from their deep mistrust of concentrated
power. The US Constitution represents a comprehensive effort to break
up concentrations of power, to ensure no one branch of government
can outmuscle the others, and to ensure no one individual, region, party,
faction, or group can permanently capture the state. In 1789 organized
militaries were the sole actors with the ability to cause mass destruction
of life and property; they consequently possessed a unique ability to
capture, coerce, and control other would-be political actors. A general
29. Rosa Brooks, How Everything Became War and the Military Became Everything: Tales from the
Pentagon (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2016).
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commitment to diluting concentrations of power, then, translated into a
specific commitment to ensuring that the military, in particular, would
be subject to multiple checks and balances.
Moreover these Constitutional checks and balances relating to
the use of military force took many different forms. The Constitution
established a system in which the military was subordinated to the
elected representatives of the people, and for good measure they also
divided control over the use of military force between Congress and the
president. The framers’ normative goal was to prevent concentrations of
power that could displace or distort the will of the people, and civilian
control of the military was valued because (and only because) it was one
of several overlapping mechanisms to ensure that the will of the people
would prevail over the will of the powerful.
Today, these core normative goals are as relevant as they were in
1789, for to believe in democracy is to believe that the political legitimacy
of a government derives from the free and informed consent of the
governed. Most of us believe that the choices of the American people—
constrained by our constitutional commitment to individual rights and
due process, but otherwise uncoerced and unmanipulated—should
guide our foreign and domestic policies.
But a formalistic commitment to civilian control of the military no
longer achieves what it promised to achieve more than two centuries
ago. For one thing, the US military today is nothing like the redcoats of
King George III, and nothing like the ragtag militias hastily assembled
under General George Washington. Instead, the US military now has
elaborate internal checks and balances and a deeply ingrained respect for
democracy and the rule of law.30 Most critically, the ability to destroy—
and hence to coerce and control—is no longer in the exclusive possession
of those with military forces and weapons.
Unlike in 1789, nonstate actors—even lone individuals—can now
cause death and destruction on a mass scale, and increasingly both states
and nonstate actors also have a range of nonkinetic means of coercion
at their disposal, from cyberattacks and bioengineered viruses to the
deliberate global spread of disinformation and fake news. All over the
world coercive power has become simultaneously more diffuse and
more concentrated. Individual billionaires, multinational corporations,
hackers, and nonstate terrorist groups can increasingly compete with
state militaries in their ability to control the behavior of both ordinary
people and political actors.31
At the same time, as noted earlier, the lines between military and civilian
tasks have grown increasingly indistinct. In today’s murky world of grayzone conflicts and persistent shaping operations, uniformed military
personnel train judges, eavesdrop on electronic communications,
30. Laura A. Dickinson, “Military Lawyers on the Battlefield: An Empirical Account of
International Law Compliance,” American Journal of International Law 104, no. 1 (2010): 1–28,
https://doi:10.5305/amerjintelaw.104.1.0001.
31. Brooks, Everything Became War.

TOC

62 Parameters 51(1) Spring 2021
vaccinate cows, and develop microfinance programs—and civilian
Intelligence Community employees and contractors conduct raids, plan
drone strikes, and execute offensive cyber operations. Both military and
civilian actors engage in information and influence operations.
In this blurry world, we need to ask ourselves a serious question:
what work, if any, is the concept of civilian control of the military
doing today? When we say it was dangerous for Trump to offer too
many senior administration positions to retired generals, or discourage
President Biden from doing the same, what exactly do we mean? What
specific negative consequences do we imagine would be more likely to
happen if retired generals make up half the president’s cabinet—and
what positive outcomes could result if we keep retired generals out of
a president’s inner circle? When we say we do not want retired military
officials to make partisan statements, why not? Similarly, when we
worry about military involvement in domestic politics, or about military
obedience to civilian commands, we would do well to define the harms
with greater specificity.

Conclusion

The notion of civilian control of the military in America today has
come unmoored from its original purpose and arguably is no longer
an effective means to achieve the normative ends we still rightly
value. Instead it is at risk of becoming a rule of aesthetics, not ethics,
and its invocation is at risk of becoming a soothing ritual without
accomplishing anything of value.
Going further, in today’s world a purely formalistic conception of
civilian control of the military carries with it potential dangers. If we
focus on formalistic rules at the expense of substantive normative ends,
we may persuade ourselves that if we can just keep the generals inside
the Pentagon and away from the campaign trail and the White House,
we will have accomplished something meaningful—even as we blind
ourselves to the frightening new forms of power and coercion that
increasingly distort our democracy and destabilize our world.
Unlike in 1789, both states and nonstate actors have increasingly
found ways to achieve substantial power and control even without the
ability to cause large-scale death and physical destruction. Financial
manipulation, cyberattacks, social media-enabled propaganda, and
disinformation campaigns can demonstrably shift balances of power.
In the future, artificial intelligence and other emerging technologies
will continue to make the use of physical force just one technique
among many.
Humanity continues to wage war the old-fashioned way in many
parts of the globe, with success and failure measured in broken bodies and
terrain lost or gained. But technological changes have both diminished
the ability of states and their organized militaries to monopolize violence
and created numerous nonkinetic means of coercion and control. As a
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result, military power no longer represents the unique potential threat to
American democracy it represented in 1789 (or 1861, 1941, or even 1970).
Should we still worry about the capture of the American state
through non-rights-respecting, nondemocratic means? Certainly. But
today the problem is not solely or fundamentally a civil-military one, if it
ever was. The greatest threats to American democracy stem less from an
out-of-control military than from electoral gerrymandering, information
warfare, and foreign and domestic influence campaigns, complicated by
big data, big money, rising economic inequality, and partisan divisions
distorting our political system.
In an era in which foreign hackers, the superrich, and the purveyors
of fake news can manipulate the American electoral process by sowing
division, mistrust, and violence within the electorate and causing chaos
in the international system, society must find effective ways to prevent
the powerful from distorting or derailing democratic processes. To
focus primarily on the notion the United States is experiencing a civilmilitary crisis, however, risks forgetting our history and ignoring our
present perils.
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ABSTRACT: Norms of the military profession today strongly
reflect the Huntingtonian separation-of-spheres concept in which
the military and civilian elements of policy decision making
interact in particularly prescribed and distinct ways. These norms
can be a detriment to civilian control of the military, the military’s
relationship with broader society, and the success of the country in
armed conflict, undermining healthy civil-military relations and US
national security writ large.

W

hen renowned political scientist Samuel P. Huntington
first published The Soldier and the State in 1957, the book
elicited enormous controversy.1 Huntington advocated the
United States maintain a professional military whose officers would be
isolated from society and wedded to a distinctive apolitical ethic. He
was subsequently accused of glorifying militarism, given his favorable
assessment of Prussian civil-military relations and of advancing a
model of civil-military relations sharply at odds with the Founders’
historical apprehensions about maintaining a standing army.2 Critics also
contended Huntington’s conception of professionalism was unrealistic
and ducked rather than engaged the “really hard political problems of
civil-military relations.”3
Judging by the book’s contemporary influence, one would hardly
know Huntington’s arguments were ever so controversial. Indeed, The
Soldier and the State and especially Huntington’s concept of objective
control have come to define contemporary understandings of military
professionalism in the United States. The model prescribes a separation
be maintained between the civilian sphere of politics and the military’s
domain of managing armed conflict. Huntington posited officers would
consequently develop an aversion to politics and would leave such matters
to the civilians, who in turn would respect the military’s exclusive sphere

1. Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957).
2. Tamar Lewin, “Samuel P. Huntington, 81, Political Scientist, Is Dead,” New York Times,
December 28, 2008, https://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/29/education/29huntington.html; Joe
Holley and Martin Weil, “Political Scientist Samuel P. Huntington,” Washington Post, December 29,
2008; and Walter Millis, “Conflicting Forces; Military Mind,” New York Times, April 28, 1957,
https://www.nytimes.com/1957/04/28/archives/conflicting-forces-military-mind.html.
3. John C. Wahlke, “The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military
Relations. Samuel P. Huntington,” Journal of Politics 20, no. 2 (May 1958): 399.
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of activity. Objective control would thus, in Huntington’s estimation,
both safeguard civilian control and ensure the country’s success in war.
Despite Huntington’s influence, this article explicitly questions his
concept of objective control and considers whether it, in fact, provides
a sound basis for military professionalism in the contemporary era. In
some respects, Huntington’s concept of military professionalism serves
the military well, as detailed below. Yet that approach also contains
shortcomings detrimental in three areas: civilian control of the military,
the military’s relationship to American society, and the military’s role
in ensuring the country’s strategic effectiveness in armed conflict. The
country’s civil-military relations and its national security would be well
served by rethinking professionalism in the military today.

Concept of Professionalism

Before delving into a discussion of Huntington’s approach to
professionalism, it is useful to consider the origins of the concept. The
notion of professionalism originated with social scientists in the late
nineteenth century to describe a distinctive form of organizing work
among those with specialized knowledge such as the law, medicine,
and clergy. Broadly understood, professions are granted autonomy
contingent on maintaining the trust of the society they serve; their
members cultivate expertise and acquire knowledge within a community
of experts who share a commitment to common values and ethical
principles. The concept has been applied to the profession of arms since
the late nineteenth century, although its meaning and usage has varied.
Historically the emergence of professional militaries was often
associated with changes in military organization and recruitment. For
example, the professionalization of European armies commonly refers
to the end of the practice in the late nineteenth century of selecting
and promoting officers based on social class and the purchase of
commissions, in favor of the adoption of meritocratic criteria. The
concept of a professional military is also used to describe one maintained
largely through career military personnel versus one primarily built
of conscripts. Globally the professionalization of militaries may be
associated with improved training and the adoption of technically
sophisticated equipment, standardization of merit-based recruitment
and promotion practices, the routinization of organizational processes,
and increasing specialization within the organization.4
Today, however, military professionalism in the United States
is an encompassing concept comprised of skill and organizational
attributes as well as ideational components. A professional military
acquires expertise and masters a body of knowledge, but it also aspires
to uphold particular values and embody particular principles of action

4. Mehran Kamrava, “Military Professionalization and Civil-Military Relations in the Middle
East,” Political Science Quarterly 115, no. 1 (Spring 2000): 69.
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and standards of behavior.5 As Theo Farrell describes, “organizations in
a [military] field gradually develop understandings of appropriate
form and behavior” and among these are a normative conception of
military professionalism.6
Broadly defined these norms encompass implicit expectations about
what it means to be and act like an officer. They are regulative in that
they proscribe and prescribe particular behaviors; that is, they “assign
a value to an action or way of behaving (e.g., obligation, permissibility,
appropriateness, prohibition) that are recognized in a society or social
group.” 7 They are also constitutive of officer identity in that they
describe what an individual believes makes him or her an officer.8 As
such the norms are broadly shared and generally agreed upon, although
not necessarily explicitly considered; a person may act in conformity
with normative principles, while rarely overtly reflecting upon them.

Norms of Professionalism

While many scholars might agree on the core attributes of military
professionalism, especially the need for ongoing education and
expertise, no single conceptualization of the professional ethic exists;
what constitutes an appropriate normative construct for professionalism
has long been debated by historians and social scientists who study the
military.9 There are different ways of understanding the core principles
to which a military officer should adhere and articulating the essential
elements of professionalism.10
Nonetheless, Huntington’s approach is arguably the dominant one
within the US military today.11 As noted above, according to Huntington
the military and civilian leadership spheres must remain separate.
The military focuses on cultivating its expertise in the management
of violence, free from interference by civilian authority; the military
leadership then abstains from engagement in the civilian world of politics
and policy. Isolated from society and focused on cultivating its expertise,
5. Don M. Snider, “The U.S. Army as Profession,” in The Future of the Army Profession: Revised
and Expanded, 2nd ed., ed. Don M. Snider and Lloyd J. Matthews (Boston: McGraw-Hill Education,
2002), 14; Don M. Snider, “Will Army 2025 Be a Military Profession?” Parameters 45, no. 4 (Winter
2015–16): 39–51; and Nathan K. Finney and Tyrell O. Mayfield, ed., Redefining the Modern Military: The
Intersection of Profession and Ethics (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2018).
6. Theo Farrell, “World Culture and Military Power,” Security Studies 14, no. 3 (2005): 455.
7. Sophie Legros and Beniamino Cislaghi, “Mapping the Social-Norms Literature: An Overview
of Reviews,” Perspectives on Psychological Science 15, no. 1 (2020): 62–80.
8. Theo Farrell and Terry Terriff, “The Sources of Military Change: Culture, Politics,
Technology,” in The Sources of Military Change: Culture, Politics, Technology, ed. Theo Farrell and Terry
Terriff (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner, 2002), 7.
9. Ronald Spector, Professors of War: The Naval War College and the Development of the Naval
Profession (Honolulu, HI: University Press of the Pacific, 2005).
10. Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (New York: Free Press,
1960); and Sam C. Sarkesian and Robert E. Connor Jr., The US Military Profession into the Twenty-First
Century: War, Peace and Politics (London: Frank Cass, 1999).
11. Huntington, Soldier and the State; Risa Brooks, “Paradoxes of Professionalism: Rethinking
Civil-Military Relations in the United States,” International Security 44, no. 4, (Spring 2020): 7–44; and
Risa Brooks, “The Paradoxes of Huntingtonian Professionalism,” in Reconsidering American CivilMilitary Relations: The Military, Society, Politics, and Modern War, ed. Lionel Beehner, Risa Brooks, and
Daniel Maurer (New York: Oxford University Press, 2020).

TOC

68

Parameters 51(1) Spring 2021

Huntington posits the military acquires a strong corporate identity such
that officers have a “sense of organic unity and consciousness” in which
they identify with the military organization as a whole.12 Military officers
meanwhile maintain a sense of responsibility for protecting the security
of society.
In addition, an apolitical ethos emerges rendering the military both
subservient to civilian authority and militarily effective in protecting
national security. In outlining his model of professionalism, Huntington
described how he thought the separation of spheres would shape
military identity and behavior and prescribed a particular ideal to which
officers should aspire. In this respect Huntington defined a normative
framework for military professionalism.
Importantly these ideas about military professionalism did not
originate with Huntington, although he put his particular mark upon
them. Rather he was building on a longer intellectual tradition and
debate about military professionalism that emerged in the nineteenth
century. That debate was subsequently encapsulated by the views
of General Emory Upton and General John McCauley Palmer who
diverged on the merits of maintaining a professional military. Upton
favored a model based on the Prussian military, while Palmer argued an
army comprised of full-time officers—versus a citizen-army—was not
necessary for military effectiveness and would rupture the relationship
between the military and society.13 Upton’s views prevailed within the
officer corps, and Huntington came to embrace them in his academic
work. He explicitly references Upton’s influence on the development of
the “objective control” model.14
Several key assumptions and arguments are central to understanding
these Huntingtonian-inspired norms of professionalism, including the
assumption that clearly discernable spheres of military and political
activity in armed conflict exist, and therefore a division of labor is both
sustainable and desirable.15 This assumption, in turn, informs a particular
conception of decision making about the use of force, allocating
distinctive roles for military and political leaders in authorizing and
implementing such decisions and sharply dividing them into exclusive
domains. Huntington also assumed the military and society should
remain separated—that such a separation was both necessary and
beneficial to society. He posited the existence of a monolithic “military
mind” that ideologically and psychologically distinguished military
personnel from their civilian counterparts.
Especially distinctive, however, to Huntington’s approach was how
he conceptualized the apolitical dimension of professionalism. In his
estimation this apolitical tenet was (and should be) all-encompassing.
12. Huntington, Soldier and the State, 10.
13. Christopher W. Wingate, “Military Professionalism and the Early American Officer Corps,
1789–1796,” master’s thesis (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2013), 26, 30.
14. Huntington, Soldier and the State, 84, 230–36.
15. Eliot A. Cohen, Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime (New York:
Free Press, 2002).
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“The antithesis of objective control is military participation in politics,”
Huntington argued, and civil-military relations are at their best when
the military remains “politically sterile and neutral.”16
Notably, being apolitical entailed abstaining from policy decisions
as well as maintaining intellectual distance from issues bearing on
politics or political thinking.17 Indeed Huntington was quite absolute
in this, deeming it incumbent on an officer to pass any issue requiring
political reflection to a civilian leader for his or her consideration. Many
scholars and practitioners might agree that overtly partisan activities or
forms of political advocacy undertaken by officers are unconstructive
and potentially contrary to civilian control of the military. Nonetheless
Huntington’s proposition was distinctive in that it grouped all forms of
politics and political thinking together and then assessed this activity
incompatible with an officer’s identity and roles.
Even when not always explicitly identified with Huntington,
the concept of military professionalism he favored has been deeply
influential within the contemporary American military. As Eliot Cohen
has written, the separation of spheres and the concept of apolitical
professionalism are so deeply entrenched that they constitute the
“normal theory of civil-military relations.”18 As William Rapp, a former
commandant of West Point and the US Army War College, observed:
“Huntington’s 1957 The Soldier and the State has defined civil-military
relations for generations of military professionals. Soldiers have been
raised on Huntingtonian logic and the separation of spheres of influence
since their time as junior lieutenants.”19 The military’s senior leadership
has also regularly reinforced the apolitical tenet.20
To be sure, these norms have served the military well in several
respects. They provide a baseline appreciation for the importance of
staying out of domestic politics and debates. Hence military officers
are socialized from early in their careers that they should remain
nonpartisan and refrain from political activism that might contravene
civilian authority. The emphasis on cultivating expertise has provided
for military operational and tactical excellence and an unquestioned
sense of responsibility to defend the country. Yet in other respects, those
norms today do not always serve the military, its civilian leadership, or
perhaps the country’s national security, especially well. The following
discussion explores these potential shortcomings.
16. Huntington, Soldier and the State, 83–84.
17. John Binkley, “Clausewitz and Subjective Civilian Control: An Analysis of Clausewitz’s
Views on the Role of the Military Advisor in the Development of National Policy,” Armed Forces
& Society 42, no. 2 (April 2016): 251; and Carsten F. Roennfeldt, “Wider Officer Competence: The
Importance of Politics and Practical Wisdom,” Armed Forces & Society 45, no. 1 (January 2019): 59–77.
18. Cohen, Supreme Command; and Finney and Mayfield, Redefining the Modern Military.
19. William E. Rapp, “Civil-Military Relations: The Role of Military Leaders in Strategy
Making,” Parameters 45, no. 3 (Autumn 2015): 13.
20. Thom Shanker, “Military Chief Warns Troops about Politics,” New York Times, May 26,
2008, https://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/26/us/politics/26military.html; and Martin Dempsey,
“Keep Your Politics Private, My Fellow Generals and Admirals,” Defense One, August 1, 2016,
https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2016/08/keep-your-politics-private-my-fellow-generals
-and-admirals/130404/.
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Civilian Control

Prevailing norms may first have some unconstructive consequences
for military leaders’ relationship to civilian leaders and practices
of civilian control in the United States. To see this point it is helpful
to consider what civilian control encompasses. The concept can be
construed narrowly to refer primarily to the exercise of authority—
to political leaders’ power to make decisions. Consequently by this
definition, as long as civilians are giving orders and military leaders are
following them, civilian control is observed.
Yet while the authority to give orders and have them followed is
an essential feature of civilian control, this decision-making authority
is not sufficient to allow civilian leaders to realize their objectives.
Civil-military relations must be organized in a manner that supports
civilian needs in advisory processes and interactions with military
commanders. This arrangement helps ensure the policy or strategy
preferences held by civilians, who are making these decisions on behalf
of the electorate, prevail.
For civilians to control effectively, or more aptly, shape military
policy and activity in conformity with their larger political objectives,
the structure and character of those processes must conform to their
needs and proclivities in policy making and strategic assessment. As
Janine Davidson cogently argues, civilians may require a nonlinear and
fluid process that simultaneously considers both political goals and
resources; assessing goals may be best accomplished from a civilian
leader’s perspective inductively and in tandem with consideration of
military means.21 That is, when weighing the utility of using the military,
civilians are searching for a theory for how force might (or might not)
advance some acceptable political outcome—an outcome they may not
have arrived at before engaging military leaders in an advisory capacity.
Yet the current norms of professionalism do not prepare officers well
for these demands and roles in strategic assessment. The Huntingtonian
model supports a modal understanding of the military’s role in advisory
processes at odds with an inductive and dialectal process for the
integration of ends and means.22 Rather such a model leads military
officers to expect definitive guidance and then respond in a potentially
iterative but inherently transactional process. That transactional concept,
based on the idea there are inviolable boundaries between military and
political domains, is inherent in Huntingtonian professionalism.
To be sure the fluidity with which civilians may desire military
leaders to speculate on military options may not always be feasible given
the challenges inherent in planning for complex military operations.
Civilian leaders also need to work to understand military constraints
21. Janine Davidson, “The Contemporary Presidency: Civil-Military Friction and Presidential
Decision Making: Explaining the Broken Dialogue,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 43, No. 1 (March
2013): 129–45.
22. Davidson, “Contemporary Presidency.”
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and the functional challenges of military planning.23 Nonetheless, the
obstacles to military adaptation in the advisory process are not merely
functional but are also cultural and result from the mindset of military
officers steeped in the separation-of-spheres concept.24 As Tami Biddle
has argued, military officers may not understand how to engage civilians
effectively in the advisory processes.25
Yet the problem may even be more complicated. Officers who
have deeply internalized the separation-of-spheres concept may resent
adjusting to civilian needs or view them as “inappropriate, unrealistic
or irrelevant.”26 The military may view as dysfunctional civilians’ failure
to conform to the transactional model (instead delineating ex ante clear
guidance) rather than see it as it is—a reflection of the necessary balance
of complex demands and political constraints in the civilian decisionmaking environment.
These norms also can create an aversion to civilian oversight, which
is an institutional expression of civilian control. Huntingtonian norms
can encourage military leaders to view with some resentment, and
perhaps suspicion, the appropriateness of civilian interventions and the
motives and expertise of the political officials undertaking it. Huntington
fosters an idea that the military should oversee itself—that autonomy in
operational and tactical matters is a right and not a prerogative variously
delegated, depending on what civilians deem appropriate and necessary.
Indeed Huntington actually makes the case the military has the right to
resist actively intrusions into military activity it deems a violation of the
separation of spheres.27
While all organizations bristle under outside intervention,
Huntingtonian norms suggest such interventions are inappropriate and
constitute violations of the rightful order of things. Not all definitions
of military professionalism entail such an unreserved grant of autonomy.
Some even question whether the military really constitutes a profession,
given autonomy is incompatible with the need for civilian intervention
to monitor or modify military activity and ensure consistency with
broader political objectives.28
A related and particularly worrisome byproduct of the
Huntingtonian mindset is it encourages disparagement of politics and
its practitioners—civilian leaders. Politics is seen as something beyond
the pure domain of military expertise. Hence politics and the political
23. Tami Davis Biddle, Strategy and Grand Strategy: What Students and Practitioners Need to
Know (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2015), 8, https://press.armywarcollege.edu
/monographs/430.pdf.
24. R. D. Hooker Jr. and Joseph J. Collins, “From the Chairman: An Interview with Martin E.
Dempsey,” Joint Force Quarterly 78, no. 3 (July 2015): 2–13.
25. Tami Davis Biddle, “ ‘Making Sense of the Long Wars’ – Advice to the US Army,” Parameters
46, no. 1 (Spring 2016): 9.
26. Davidson, “Contemporary Presidency,” 131.
27. Huntington, Soldier and the State, 77.
28. Janowitz, The Professional Soldier; and Tony Ingesson, “When the Military Profession Isn’t,”
in Redefining the Modern Military: The Intersection of Profession and Ethics, ed. Nathan K. Finney and
Tyrell O. Mayfield (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2018).
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concerns that in part motivate civilian leaders’ decisions are viewed as
extra-military considerations; constraints on military operations induced
by such concerns, resource limits, timelines and the like, are viewed as
external factors.
The imposition of such constraints by politicians then further
reinforces cynicism about civilian motives in protecting national
security. Surveys reveal, for example, that many in uniform agree with
the statement, “when civilians tell the military what to do, domestic
partisan politics rather than national security requirements are often
the primary motivation.”29 Heidi Urben reports in her 2009 survey that
55 percent of respondents agreed with the statement, compared with
54 percent who agreed with it in Triangle Institute for Security Studies
surveys conducted in the late 1990s.30 This suggests a deep cynicism
about the motives of civilians overseeing military activity, which
magnifies the cultural aversion to oversight the separation-of-spheres
concept may already foster.

Relationship with Society

Huntingtonian norms can also foster dynamics corrosive to the
military’s relationship with American society. Much has been written
about the public’s relationship to society and the emergence of a “civilmilitary gap” between Americans and the military. Americans revere the
military, however, this regard is not accompanied by much knowledge or
insight into the military or efforts to learn about it.31 A superficial “thank
you for your service” mentality prevails in American culture.32
There is also a military side to the civil-military gap, albeit one that
does not get the same attention. Service to society is a deeply embedded
value in military professionalism today. As United States Army doctrine
states, professionalism encompasses a “shared understanding of why
and how we serve the American people [emphasis in original]” among
Army personnel.33
Yet the humility toward society implied by that tenet may be absent
among some military personnel. In the 1990s, journalist Thomas
Ricks wrote about how the Marines with whom he interacted derided
civilian society.34 Surveys of military personnel have since shown many
29. Heidi Urben, “Party, Politics and Deciding What Is Proper: Army Officers’ Attitudes after
Two Long Wars,” Orbis 57, no. 3 (Summer 2013): 360.
30. Urben, “Deciding What Is Proper,” 360.
31. James Fallows, “The Tragedy of the American Military,” Atlantic 315, no. 1 (January/
February 2015): 72–90; Kori N. Schake and Jim Mattis, eds., Warriors & Citizens: American Views of
Our Military (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 2016); and Peter D. Feaver and Richard H.
Kohn, eds., Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil-Military Gap and American National Society (Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press, 2001).
32. Phil Klay, “The Warrior at the Mall,” New York Times, April 14, 2018, https://www.nytimes
.com/2018/04/14/opinion/sunday/the-warrior-at-the-mall.html.
33. Headquarters, US Department of the Army (HQDA), The Army Profession, Army Doctrine
Reference Publication 1 (Washington, DC: HQDA, June 2015), 7-4, https://fas.org/irp/doddir
/army/adrp1.pdf.
34. Thomas E. Ricks, “The Widening Gap between the Military and Society,” Atlantic 280, no. 1
(July 1997): 66–76.
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servicemembers continue to disparage American society.35 Gregory
Foster found many of his students at the National Defense University
perceived the military to be more self-sacrificing, patriotic, and loyal
than their indulgent and self-interested civilian counterparts. Foster
wrote such attitudes “accentuate the deep-seated widespread belief—an
arrogant one, certainly—among military personnel that they are morally
superior to a general public they consider to be in some advanced state
of moral decline.”36
A variety of factors may enable the emergence of such attitudes.
One facilitating factor may be that the military does not mirror
the cleavages and demographic character of American society.
In today’s all-volunteer military, those who self-select to join are
demographically unrepresentative of society; military personnel are
drawn disproportionately from rural and less populated areas, often in
the South and Midwest, while those who choose military services often
come from military families.37 A partisan skew in the military exists,
especially among officers, such that personnel do not mirror ideological
divisions in society.38
Worries about such consequences of maintaining a professional
military are deeply rooted in the American tradition and were in part why
the Founders were concerned about a large standing army.39 Sociologists
such as Morris Janowitz have also expressed concern that without
deliberate efforts to counter such tendencies, military professionalism
would generate distance between society and the military and erode the
latter’s regard for democratic traditions.40
Contemporary norms of professionalism may then turn a military
that operates apart from society to one inclined to see itself as better
than that society. While professionalization may unavoidably create a
military officer class apart from society, Huntington goes further in
encouraging a sense of distinctiveness as normatively appropriate. He
also explicitly argued society should emulate the superior values found
in military culture. In the famous closing section of The Soldier and the
State, Huntington compares the residents of the town abutting West
Point to its cadets, arguing: “historically, the virtues of West Point have
been America’s vices and the vices of the military, America’s virtues.
Yet today America can learn more from West Point than West Point
from America.”41
35. Feaver and Kohn, Soldiers and Civilians; and Schake and Mattis, Warriors and Citizens.
36. Gregory Foster, “Civil-Military Relations on Trial: Through the Eyes of Tomorrow’s US
Military Leaders,” RUSI Journal 161, no. 4 (2016): 34–41.
37. Amy Schafer, “Generations of War: The Rise of the Warrior Caste and the All-Volunteer
Force,” Center for a New American Security, May 8, 2017, https://www.cnas.org/publications
/reports/generations-of-war.
38. Feaver and Kohn, Soldiers and Civilians; and Heidi A. Urben, “Civil-Military Relations in a
Time of War: Party, Politics, and the Profession of Arms,” PhD diss., Georgetown University, 2010.
39. Russell F. Weigley, “The American Military and the Principle of Civilian Control from
McClellan to Powell,” Special issue, Journal of Military History, 57, no. 5 (October 1993).
40. James Burk, “Theories of Democratic Civil-Military Relations,” Armed Forces & Society 29,
no. 1 (October 2002): 7–29.
41. Huntington, Soldier and the State, 465–66.
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Retired Army Lieutenant General David Barno captures the
implications of these dynamics:
Today’s Army—including its leadership—lives in a bubble separate from
society. Not only does it reside in remote fortresses—the world’s most
exclusive gated communities—but in a world apart from the cultural,
intellectual and even geographic spheres that define the kaleidoscopic United
States. This splendid military isolation—set in the midst of a largely adoring
nation—risks fostering a closed culture of superiority and aloofness.42

Hence the process of professionalization combined with the
particular norms of professionalism—in which military service is viewed
as imparting some superior character and values to individuals—may
be contributing to some worrisome dimensions of the societal-military
relationship. These values, while not formally sanctioned, are seemingly
pervasive and in effect characterize a deeply concerning byproduct of
prevailing conceptions of military professionalism.

Military and Strategic Effectiveness

Finally, norms of professionalism may be counterproductive to the
military’s capacity to help ensure the country’s strategic effectiveness in
armed conflict. In part this results from Huntington’s all-encompassing
approach to the apolitical tenet and the notion that engagement in debate
about political considerations and political thinking are antithetical to
the roles and responsibilities of a military professional. This mindset
is potentially averse to healthy strategic assessment—and arguably to
appreciating the political effects and constraints of military activity at
all levels.43
The making of strategy inextricably combines political and military
considerations; strategy sits at the nexus between the operational and
tactical domains on the one hand and policy and political outcomes
on the other. Yet the separation-of-spheres concept mandates military
officers forgo engagement with that which bears on the political. Rather
this separation dictates a retreat to the boundaries of ostensibly pure
military considerations when such issues filter into debate. Consequently
some military officers analytically distance their own thought processes
from political considerations.44 As Sam Sarkesian and Robert Connor
wrote, “it appears to have been an article of faith in the military
profession to erect a wall between the military and ‘politics.’ ”45
42. David Barno, “Dave Barno’s Top 10 Tasks for General Dempsey, the New Army
Chief of Staff,” Foreign Policy, January 21, 2011, https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/01/21
/dave-barnos-top-10-tasks-for-general-dempsey-the-new-army-chief-of-staff/.
43. Celestino Perez Jr., “Errors in Strategic Thinking: Anti-Politics and the Macro Bias,” Joint
Force Quarterly 81, no. 2 (2016): 10–18.
44. See Frank G. Hoffman, “Dereliction of Duty Redux?: Post–Iraq American Civil-Military
Relations,” Orbis 52, no. 2 (2008): 217–35; Mackubin Thomas Owens, “Civil-Military Relations,”
Oxford Research Encyclopedia of International Studies (website), https://oxfordre.com
/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.001.0001/acrefore-9780190846626-e-123, November 30,
2017; Hew Strachan, “Strategy or Alibi? Obama, McChrystal and the Operational Level of War,”
Survival 52, no. 5 (October 2010); and Carnes Lord, “On Military Professionalism and Civilian
Control,” Joint Force Quarterly 78 (3rd Quarter 2015): 70–74.
45. Sarkesian and Connor, US Military Profession, 180.
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This barrier inclines officers to “cognitively stop at the edge of
the military playing field as their culture has encouraged” whereas
they might otherwise see themselves as “concurrently responsible with
civilian leaders and other agencies to achieve strategic policy ends.”46
As Carl Builder captures it, “the difficulty lies in seeing the strategic
side of national security increasingly as the province of politicians and
diplomats while the operational and tactical sides belong to the military,
free from civilian meddling.”47 In turn this operational and tactical
emphasis interacts with the transactional advisory process. “The current
demand by the military for well-defined objectives is eloquent evidence
of how far our thinking has drifted toward the tactical domain.”48
The aforementioned attitudes to civilian oversight fostered by
Huntingtonian-informed norms may also prove counterproductive to
strategic effectiveness. The separation-of-spheres model is premised
on a tacit agreement between political and military leaders such that
civilians violate their obligations when they infringe on the military
domain. Yet civilian oversight may be required to ensure the integration
of operational and tactical activity with strategy and political goals.
Tactical operations have a rhythm and character of their own that
can become disconnected from larger political objectives. A mission may
be militarily efficient in that it uses resources well to achieve a discreet
military objective.49 Yet a mission may not be militarily effective if that
outcome (or the means used to achieve it) yields counterproductive
strategic effects. Certainly many military commanders understand these
tensions and work to mitigate these counterproductive tendencies.
Yet having civilian policymakers, whose role it is to focus upon and
represent these larger political objectives, monitoring military activity
and intervening in decisions in consultation with commanders, is a
pathway for ensuring means-end integration. If interventions in military
activity are viewed as an abrogation of the obligation to respect military
autonomy, however, military personnel may resent and mistrust the
purposes of such oversight. By fostering the idea autonomy is a right and
not a privilege, prevailing norms create a mindset potentially contrary to
political-strategic success in armed conflict.
One final feature of these norms is potentially contrary to strategic
effectiveness: they may undermine military leaders’ sense of responsibility
or ownership over the political effects of military operations. This is an
insidious byproduct of the transactional model. Military leaders proffer
advice; civilians then choose whether to accept the proposed options
for the use of force, ask for modifications, or decline to act. In any
46. Rapp, “Effective Military Voice,” 16.
47. Biddle, Strategy and Grand Strategy; and Carl H. Builder, “Keeping the Strategic Flame,” Joint
Force Quarterly 14 (Winter 1996–97).
48. Builder, “Keeping the Strategic Flame”; and Mackubin Thomas Owens, “Military Officers:
Political without Partisanship,” Strategic Studies Quarterly 9, no. 3 (Fall 2015): 92.
49. Risa Brooks, “Introduction: The Impact of Culture, Society, Institutions, and International
Forces on Military Effectiveness,” in Creating Military Power: The Sources of Military Effectiveness, ed.
Risa A. Brooks and Elizabeth A. Stanley (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007).
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scenario the military’s role in the decision-making process is complete
once options are supplied.
In effect this dynamic absolves the military of taking responsibility
for the outcomes of the decisions politicians make with respect to
military action. If the military’s responsibility is merely to outline
options, the successful implementation of any chosen option becomes
the metric for success, not the larger consideration of whether the
success of that mission or campaign translates into some enduring
political benefit. The assessment of military success devolves into an
evaluation of operational and tactical achievements. The war—to win
or lose—becomes civilians’ responsibility.

Conclusion

If the prevailing conception of military professionalism is flawed,
what should be done? First it would be helpful to reconsider the
way current norms of professionalism conceive of a military officer’s
relationship to politics. The current approach lumps a variety of
phenomena together. Particular forms of political activism or
engagement in partisan activity during elections are problematic and
should be proscribed. But to be a good strategist and participant in
strategic assessment, a military officer must think about and engage in
politics.
Moreover political acumen is required to keep oneself out of partisan
politics. An officer needs to understand him or herself as a (potential)
political actor to know best how to minimize his or her impact on political
outcomes. Sarkesian, writing in 1981, said it well: “Political knowledge,
political interests, and awareness are not the same as political action and
bipartisan politics. Indeed the more of the former, the less likely that
military men [and women] will develop the latter.”50 In other words it
is time to leave behind the reflexive and encompassing call for officers
to remain apolitical for a more constructive understanding of how they
might best engage with politics and political thinking.
Second, it may be helpful to move beyond the separation-of-spheres
conception of civil-military relations. On many levels the notion that
there are clear and constant spheres of political versus military activity
is flawed.51 Rather than seeing their roles and responsibilities as fixed,
officers might be encouraged to view political and military calculations
and roles as fluid—varying with a given situation and as often
intersecting. This is especially important at the strategic level where
politics and military considerations are by their very nature intertwined.
Finally, it may be time to address the military side of the civil-military
gap. More work must be done to address attitudes of disparagement
of civilian society, civilian politics, and civilian leadership. That such
attitudes are apparently pervasive is a troubling feature of the culture of
50. Sam C. Sarkesian, “Military Professionalism and Civil-Military Relations in the West,”
International Political Science Review 2, no. 3 (1981): 293.
51. Cohen, Supreme Command.
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military professionalism today. Addressing the flawed premises of the
military’s relationship to politics might also help in this respect. As we
rethink military professionalism today, Sarkesian, once again, frames
the solution well:
To develop the political dimension of military professionalism . . . does
not lessen the need for professional skills aimed specifically at battlefield
necessities, but what it does demand is that these necessities also be viewed
in terms of their impact beyond the confines of the battlefield. Additionally,
it means that all military men must be socialized into reinforcing their
commitment to the political system and in their understanding of the
political-social dimensions of their role as soldiers. How well this is
accomplished is primarily a function of military professionalism. The
attitudes of the officer corps and their acceptance of a new concept of
professionalism will, in no small measure, determine how well the military
system adopts to the political-social environment.52

52. Sarkesian “Military Professionalism,” 294.
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ABSTRACT: Foreign policy experts often rely on familiar
dichotomies: great power competition versus global issues, foreign
policy versus domestic policy, and a unitary national identity versus
multiculturalism. “Seeing in stereo” means superimposing the two
halves of each dichotomy on top of one another. Learning to see
how great power competition and global issues intertwine, how
foreign and domestic policies increasingly merge, and how the
United States can be both plures and unum is essential to navigating
the complexity of the twenty-first-century world.

T

he complexity of the twenty-first century requires all foreign
policy and national security scholars and practitioners to see in
stereo. We must learn to see two very different groups of actors,
sets of issues, and patterns of behavior at the same time and integrate
them into one picture. Computers that can monitor and integrate
different data streams will make this intellectual multitasking easier, but
humans are the ultimate analysts and advisers, and we must train our eyes
and brains to push back against the luxury of a single worldview.
I propose three broad areas in which we must shift our gaze from
mono to stereo. First is the world itself: we must learn to see behaviors of
international and global actors simultaneously and weight them equally.
Second, we must erase the intellectual divide that scholars, teachers,
and bureaucrats have long imposed between foreign and domestic
issues. Third, with regard to Americans but also to other multiracial,
multiethnic nations: we must learn to be pluribus and unum at the same
time, or, in proper Latin, plures et unum.
Remember that the creation of the nation-state system arising out
of the Treaty of Westphalia took centuries, and international relations
has existed as a recognized discipline for less than a century. The mental
maps we impose on what we think we see are constructed and thus
can be reconstructed. In an age in which we understand the ways tiny
disturbances can lead to great consequences, and change happens so
quickly and continually that we must learn to adapt and respond rather
than predict and plan, learning to look through two lenses simultaneously
rather than one is not so hard, but it is essential.

International and Global

Imagine the pre-Westphalian world in which “international” did not
exist as a concept. Nations of people existed but not as political units
that possessed sovereignty and interacted with one another. Thinking
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about events or affairs between, or inter, nations was thus impossible.
Now think about the world today, which is divided into nation-states—
the only proper subjects, along with international organizations, of
international law. Yet many of those nation-states are far smaller and
less powerful than the world’s great cities, corporations, or religious and
educational institutions. How do we reconcile the two worlds?
In my 2017 book The Chessboard and the Web: Strategies of Connection in
a Networked World, I describe the Westphalian world as a chessboard,
a board on which strategists typically focus on one opponent at time,
imagining how a series of moves by one side will inspire a series of
countermoves by the other.1 It is actually a board on which many games
are played as game theory has formalized: chess, Go, poker, chicken,
stag hunt, and the prisoner’s dilemma. What is common to all these
games is that they divide the world into discreet pieces. Players move in
reaction to the moves of others; they are not directly connected to them,
pulled and changed by a web of invisible strings.
The web world, by contrast, is the global world of millions, perhaps
billions, of networks—nodes connected to one another by countless
electronic and physical links. A network is different from a group. A group
can come together and then disperse without remaining connected. A
network, by definition, is an entity through which communication and
action continue to flow, creating one entity with many parts, each of
which affects the other through their connection. In the web world, we
need strategies of connection. Those strategies must proceed from maps
of what is connected to what and what is not connected or misconnected
to what. They also require an understanding of how different patterns of
connection can achieve or contribute to specific results, such as defense,
resilience, cooperation, coordination, and scale.
So often these different sets of issues are put in the boxes of
international and transnational. Transnational, however, still focuses
primarily on states: it simply means across state borders rather than
between them. Focusing on global issues is much more than semantic;
it means we can picture a world of states and a world of global actors
superimposed on one another. Russia can be planning an information
attack on the United States working through many hidden networks
of semiprivate actors, with diplomatic but also potentially criminal
consequences. That is seeing in stereo.

Foreign and Domestic

Foreign policy expert Heather Hurlburt tells an anecdote about
being asked to help a senator up for reelection in 2018 prepare for a
debate. When she arrived, the staff commented on the relative lack
of foreign policy topics in the news that year. As Hurlburt recounts
the story:
1. Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Chessboard and the Web: Strategies of Connection in a Networked World
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2017).
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And for half an hour I tested and prodded: on immigration, refugees and
security; trade and China; defense spending and jobs; anti-Semitism and
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Eventually, we turned to the more traditional
items: Iran, North Korea, Russia. But I couldn’t resist: “Senator, I hope
you agree that all these topics are foreign policy, too. They’re what foreign
policy is now.”2

Hurlburt argues that for much of the twentieth century the United
States had the wealth and size to conduct its foreign affairs quite
separately from its domestic life, aided by the position of the dollar as
the international reserve currency. Today, however, issues like climate
change, disinformation, global health, anticorruption, political violence,
cybersecurity, democracy, and human rights are not only issues that are
as important to Americans at home as to countries abroad, they are also
comprised of an inextricable mix of foreign and domestic policies.
Trade is a prime example. Reduction of tariffs has always required
national legislation, with the attendant minefield of powerful domestic
commercial and manufacturing interests. Over the last few decades,
however, the focus has shifted almost entirely to nonmarket barriers:
environmental and labor regulations, government subsidies for infant
industries, and tax and competition policy—all domestic policies made
through domestic legislation or regulation.
In the 1950s, the desire to compete with the Soviet Union
and undercut their propaganda about the plight of workers and
African-Americans in the United States contributed to an upsurge of
labor protections and the beginnings of the civil rights movement. In
coming years, issues like gun violence and voter suppression are likely
to tarnish the US global reputation in ways that undermine American
influence abroad and the prestige of some American institutions, such as
universities. On the flip side, the ability to embrace our status as a plurality
nation going forward and to nurture connections and networks forged
by the many Americans who are first-, second-, and third-generation
immigrants to their home countries can be an enormous commercial
and diplomatic advantage.
Seeing in stereo on these issues means learning to work with
domestic policy experts in a different way. Ultimately, it means moving
to a task-force approach to problem solving, putting the right people
together depending on the job at hand, much as a commander would
select the right mixture of specialists and regular troops for a mission.
Without a broad mix of domestic and foreign policy experts at the table
for any given problem, however, the decisionmaker literally will not be
able to see what is at stake nor the full range of options before her.

2. Heather Hurlburt, “Should We Take the ‘Foreign’ Out of Foreign Policy?,” New America,
July 2, 2019, https://www.newamerica.org/political-reform/reports/new-politics-beyond-2020/
should-we-take-the-foreign-out-of-foreign-policy.
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Plures et Unum

The motto of the United States is “E Pluribus Unum,” or “out of
many, one.” The Constitution commits us to “a more perfect union,” a
coming together as one polity. When I was growing up, civics teachers
espoused the melting pot theory: people came to the United States from
all over the world and were fused in the crucible of citizenship to emerge
as Americans, with one language, one culture, and one history.
No longer. The idea of multiculturalism emerged as students, both
men and women, from many different racial and ethnic backgrounds
began to challenge the curriculum of college courses traditionally
described as Western Civilization or Great Books, featuring works
almost entirely written by white men. Over the last several decades, the
vibrant clash of cultures that makes up so much of American urban life,
a phenomenon that has spread to many smaller towns and cities all over
the country, is reshaping curricula, holidays, food, arts, and media.
Many American conservatives and classical liberals are deeply
worried about multiculturalism, an ideology that in their view “seeks to
divide and conquer Americans, making many groups out of one citizenry.”3
This same fear powers broader debates over identity politics—the worry,
as Francis Fukuyama expresses it, that democracies are fracturing into
segments based on ever-narrower identities, threatening the possibility
of deliberation and collective action by society as a whole.4
But why must it be either/or? Why cannot we be plures and unum at
the same time? Why cannot that very duality be our greatest strength?
As Yale psychology professor Jennifer A. Richeson writes in response to
Fukuyama: “Identifying as American does not require the relinquishing
of other identities. In fact, it is possible to leverage those identities to
cultivate and deepen one’s Americanness.”5
Counterintuitively, it is possible to share experiences of being
marginalized, or struggling to find your place in society, in ways that
could actually increase social cohesion across very different groups. Tea
Party Republicans and Bernie Democrats have experiences in common,
as do rural whites and inner-city Blacks. Richeson believes America can
have a “unifying national creed that would allow Americans to embrace
their own identities, encourage them to respect the identities embraced
by others, and affirm shared principles of equality and justice.”6
Stacey Abrams, the first African-American woman to be nominated
for governor by a major political party who came within 55,000 votes
3. Ryan P. Williams, “Defend America—Defeat Multiculturalism,” American Mind, April 23,
2019, https://americanmind.org/memo/defend-america-defeat-multiculturalism/.
4. Francis Fukuyama, “Against Identity Politics: The New Tribalism and the Crisis of
Democracy,” Foreign Affairs, September/October 2018, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles
/americas/2018-08-14/against-identity-politics-tribalism-francis-fukuyama.
5. Jennifer A. Richeson, “A Creedal Identity Is Not Enough,” in “E Pluribus Unum? The
Fight over Identity Politics,” Foreign Affairs, March/April 2019, https://www.foreignaffairs.com
/articles/2019-02-01/stacey-abrams-response-to-francis-fukuyama-identity-politics-article.
6. Richeson, “A Creedal Identity.”
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of being elected as governor of Georgia, put this view into practice.7
She “intentionally and vigorously highlighted communities of color and
other marginalized groups” during her campaign, “not to the exclusion of
others but as a recognition of their specific policy needs [emphasis added].”8 After
all, she writes, “the marginalized did not create identity politics: their
identities have been forced on them by dominant groups . . . .”
Like Richeson, Abrams insists it is possible to embrace “the distinct
histories and identities of groups in a democracy” in ways that enhance
“the complexity and capacity of the whole.” This multiplicity, this
pluralism, can be who we are as Americans in all our glorious intersections.
“By embracing identity and its prickly, uncomfortable contours,” Abrams
writes, “Americans will become more likely to grow as one.”9

Et Tu, Military?

What does seeing in stereo mean for the US military? The Pentagon
has had plenty of experience thinking about global threats in addition
to international ones; indeed, military planners were focused on the
security implications of climate change back in the mid-aughts, well
ahead of most people in the foreign policy community. Networks are
also familiar challenges. Retired Army General Stanley McChrystal
wrote a book about how he reshaped the structure of the Joint Special
Operations Task Force in Iraq to be able to fight al-Qaeda’s evermorphing networks.10 But do these threats live in different bureaus and
boxes? Do strategists and commanders all know how to integrate the
perspectives of the chessboard and the web?
On the question of the dissolution of the foreign/domestic
boundary, the creation of the Department of Homeland Security after
9/11 would seem to insist the military is strictly for foreign wars. Yet if
the United States homeland were to be attacked by a foreign enemy on
the ground, in or from the air, on or from the water, or from space, the
military would mount the primary defense. Where are the lines between
defense and security? And this ambiguity is further complicated by
the other domestic governments with jurisdiction over issues that can
create rising tensions with traditional adversaries or catalyze action by
new ones such as cyberattacks or perceived blasphemy against a foreign
religion. The Pentagon has always been part of the many interagency
processes the National Security Council oversees but can civilian and
military defense officials develop a “spidey-sense” of which domestic
agencies to call, looking at issues always in the round?
7. Mark Niesse, “Georgia Certifies Election Results after Nearly Two Weeks of Drama,” Atlanta
Journal-Constitution, November 30, 2018, https://www.ajc.com/news/state--regional-govt--politics
/georgia-certifies-election-results-after-nearly-two-weeks-drama/VOUIvFPmmzxad39XQFuoPP/.
8. Stacey Y. Abrams, “Identity Politics Strengthens Democracy,” in “E Pluribus Unum? The
Fight over Identity Politics,” Foreign Affairs, March/April 2019, https://www.foreignaffairs.com
/articles/2019-02-01/stacey-abrams-response-to-francis-fukuyama-identity-politics-article.
9. Abrams, “Identity Politics.”
10. General Stanley McChrystal et al., Team of Teams: New Rules of Engagement for a Complex World
(New York: Portfolio/Penguin, 2015).
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The military has long been proficient at forging many disparate
individuals into one unit, one platoon, one brigade, one fighting force.
War movies specialize in showing the soldier, sailor, or airman risking
her or his life to save a buddy, leaving no one behind. Yet as the military
becomes far more diverse—adding women, transgender, and LGBTQ
individuals and increasingly reflecting the plurality nation the United
States is becoming—the training and socialization of students in the
military academies and new recruits in the armed services will have
to change accordingly. Equally important, however, will be inculcating
an understanding of how a spectrum of differences can exist alongside
the unity of the force. In fact, unity will require treating all differences
equally, rather than singling out some individuals for special treatment,
positive or negative.
That is seeing in stereo.
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ABSTRACT: The failure of liberal internationalism in the post–
Cold War period requires the United States to adopt a clear-eyed
approach to competition that promotes regional balances of power,
emphasizes reciprocity, and creates mission-driven coalitions.

W

riting in Foreign Affairs last year, then presidential candidate
Joe Biden promised to “address the world as it is” in his
effort to restore American leadership.1 President Biden’s
team faces an uphill battle as they translate the president’s vision into
policy. The emergence of powerful rivals coupled with the erosion of
US capabilities has led to a decline of American agency in the world.
Ultimately this trend stems from a series of long-standing illusions about
the sources of American power and what it can reasonably accomplish.
Since the end of the Cold War, US policymakers have been beguiled
by a set of illusions about world order. Contrary to the optimistic
predictions made in the wake of the Soviet Union’s collapse, widespread
political liberalization and the growth of transnational organizations
have not tempered rivalries among countries. Likewise globalization
and economic interdependence have not been unalloyed goods; often
they have generated unanticipated inequalities and vulnerabilities.
And although the proliferation of digital technologies has increased
productivity and brought other benefits, it has also eroded the US
military’s advantages and posed challenges to democratic societies.
Given these new realities, Washington cannot simply return to the
comfortable assumptions of the past. The world has moved beyond
the unipolar moment of the post–Cold War period and into an age of
interdependence and competition calling for different policies and tools.
To navigate this new era properly, the United States must let go of old
illusions, move past the myths of liberal internationalism, and reconsider
its views about the nature of the world order.

A Promise Unfulfilled

As the twentieth century drew to a close, waves of global
democratization inspired optimism in the West. Ultimately a consensus
1. This article is adapted from Nadia Schadlow, “The End of American Illusion: Trump and
the World as It Is,” Foreign Affairs, September/October 2020, https://www.foreignaffairs.com
/articles/americas/2020-08-11/end-american-illusion. Joseph R. Biden Jr., “Why America Must
Lead Again: Rescuing U.S. Foreign Policy after Trump,” Foreign Affairs, March/April 2020,
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-01-23/why-america-must-lead-again.
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formed that a convergence on liberal democracy would lead to a stable
international political order. As the Soviet Union withered and the
Cold War ended, US President George H. W. Bush called for a “new
world order,” a “Pax Universalis” founded on liberal values, democratic
governance, and free markets.2 Several years later, US President Bill
Clinton’s 1996 National Security Strategy articulated a policy of
engagement and democratic enlargement that would improve “the
prospects for political stability, peaceful conflict resolution, and greater
dignity and hope for the people of the world.”3
This presumption of liberal convergence motivated the decision to
allow China to join the World Trade Organization in 2001. As Clinton
said at the time, such an opening would have “a profound impact on
human rights and political liberty.”4 The rest of the world would get
access to Chinese markets and cheap imports, and China would get
the chance to bring prosperity to hundreds of millions of its citizens,
which many in Washington believed would improve the prospects for
democratization—a win-win situation.
But China had no intention of converging with the West. The
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) never intended to play by the West’s
rules; it was determined to control markets rather than open them and
did so by keeping its exchange rate artificially low, providing unfair
advantages to state-owned enterprises, and erecting regulatory barriers
against non-Chinese companies. Officials in both the George W. Bush
and the Obama administrations worried about China’s intentions. But
fundamentally they remained convinced the United States needed to
engage with China to strengthen the rules-based international system,
and that China’s economic liberalization would ultimately lead to
political liberalization. Instead, China has taken advantage of economic
interdependence to grow its economy and enhance its military, thereby
ensuring the long-term strength of the CCP.
While China and other actors subverted the liberal convergence
overseas, economic globalization was failing to meet expectations at
home. Proponents of globalization claimed in an economy lubricated
by free trade, consumers would benefit from access to cheaper goods,
lost manufacturing jobs would be replaced by better jobs in the
growing service industry, foreign direct investment would flow to
every sector, and companies everywhere would become more efficient
and innovative. Organizations such as the World Trade Organization,
meanwhile, would help manage this freer and more integrated world
(never mind its 22,000 pages of regulations).
2. Reuters, “MIDEAST DIPLOMACY; Excerpts from Bush’s Address to General Assembly:
For a ‘Pax Universalis,’ ” New York Times, September 24, 1991, https://www.nytimes.com/1991/09
/24/world/mideast-diplomacy-excerpts-bush-s-address-general-assembly-for-pax-universalis.html.
3. William J. Clinton, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement (Washington, DC:
The White House, February 1996), https://fas.org/spp/military/docops/national/1996stra.htm.
4. “Chinese Politics and the WTO: No Change: Hopes of Sparking Political Change Have
Come to Nothing So Far,” Economist, December 10, 2011, https://www.economist.com/asia/2011
/12/10/no-change.
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But the promise that globalization’s rising tide would lift all boats
went unfulfilled: some rose to extreme heights, some stagnated, and
others simply sank. Liberal convergence was not in fact win-win; there
were winners and losers. A populist backlash against this reality caught
elites off guard. This reaction intensified as malfeasance on Wall Street
and the US Federal Reserve’s misguided monetary policies helped bring
about the 2008 global financial crisis. The generous bailouts banks and
financial firms received in its wake convinced many Americans that
corporate and political elites were gaming the system—a theme Donald
Trump would seize on in his 2016 presidential campaign.

Primacy Denied

Although liberal internationalism encouraged interdependence
and multilateralism, it also rested on a faith in Washington’s ability
to maintain indefinitely the uncontested military superiority the
United States enjoyed after the Cold War. Today, however, US military
dominance is challenged in virtually every domain. The United States
is no longer able to operate freely in the traditional spheres of land,
sea, and air, nor in newer ones such as outer space and cyberspace.
The spread of new technologies and weapon systems and the pursuit
of asymmetric strategies by adversaries have limited the ability of the
US military to find and strike targets, supply and safeguard its forces
abroad, freely navigate the seas, control sea lines of communication,
and protect the homeland.
In the 1990s, space and cyberspace emerged as new domains for
strategic competition, and 30 years later the United States finds itself
challenged in both areas. America’s dependence on the domain of space
for its myriad military and intelligence assets make the United States
vulnerable to the potent anti-satellite weapon systems now fielded by
China, Russia, and other states. Likewise in cyberspace, hardware and
software vulnerabilities have emerged across military supply chains,
potentially reducing the effectiveness of important platforms. In 2018,
General David Goldfein, the US Air Force’s chief of staff, described
the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter as “a computer that happens to fly”—and
thus, like all computers, it is vulnerable to cyberattacks.5
At the same time, bureaucratic requirements have made it harder
for the military to innovate. More than 20 years passed from when the
Joint Strike Fighter program was envisioned to when the first combat
squadron of F-35s was declared operational. The military demands
unrealistically high levels of performance, which defense companies,
hungry for contracts, promise to deliver. Former US Defense Secretary
Robert Gates has bemoaned the armed forces’ unwillingness to settle
for solutions that could actually be built and fielded in a reasonable
time frame.
5. Valeria Insinna, “Inside America’s Dysfunctional Trillion-Dollar Fighter-Jet Program,” New
York Times Magazine, August 21, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/21/magazine/f35-joint
-strike-fighter-program.html.
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In addition, America’s adversaries have developed so-called antiaccess/area-denial weapons systems that reduce Washington’s ability to
project power in key regions. China, for example, has developed and
modernized its strategic and tactical nuclear weapons and has invested
heavily in technologies to improve its conventional forces. Russia has
built an array of exotic “doomsday weapons” and low-yield tactical
nuclear weapons, and smaller rivals such as Iran and North Korea
continue to develop and refine their nuclear programs. Despite visions
of a world in which no one could challenge American force, the era of
US military dominance proved to be relatively short.

Orwell’s Nightmare

Misplaced faith in the advantages of new technologies was not
confined to military affairs. As the digital revolution began, policymakers
and business leaders were optimistic these technologies would accelerate
the spread of liberal democratic values—so that “the age of information
can become the age of liberation,” as President George H. W. Bush
put it in 1991.6 A few years later, Clinton predicted in the twenty-first
century “liberty [would] spread by cell phone and cable modem.” 7
Over time, however, it has become clear the same technologies that
connect and empower people can also imperil freedom and openness
and limit the right to be left alone—all elements of a flourishing
democracy. Authoritarian countries have deployed digital technologies
to control their citizens. The CCP has developed the most sophisticated
surveillance system in the world, using facial and voice recognition
technologies and DNA sequencing to create a social credit system that
monitors China’s 1.4 billion people and rewards or punishes them based
on their perceived loyalty to the party-state.
These practices are not limited to authoritarian governments,
partially because Huawei, the Chinese telecommunications giant, has
exported surveillance tools that use artificial intelligence (AI) to 49
other countries.8 But democracies have also adopted these technologies
without Chinese assistance; according to the Carnegie Endowment’s
AI Global Surveillance Index, virtually all the countries in the G-20
have deployed AI-enabled surveillance technology, including facial
recognition programs.9 Meanwhile, even as the CCP banned Twitter
6. George H. W. Bush, “Address to the United Nations General Assembly by President
George H. W. Bush” (address, UN General Assembly, New York City, September 23, 1991),
https://2009-2017.state.gov/p/io/potusunga/207269.htm.
7. “Clinton’s Words on China: Trade Is the Smart Thing,” New York Times, March 9, 2000,
https://www.nytimes.com/2000/03/09/world/clinton-s-words-on-china-trade-is-the-smart
-thing.html.
8. Ross Anderson, “The Panopticon Is Already Here: Xi Jinping Is Using Artificial Intelligence
to Enhance His Government’s Totalitarian Control—and He’s Exporting This Technology to
Regimes around the Globe,” Atlantic, September 2020, https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine
/archive/2020/09/china-ai-surveillance/614197/.
9. Steven Feldstein, “The Global Expansion of AI Surveillance,” Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, September 17, 2019, https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/09/17/global
-expansion-of-ai-surveillance-pub-79847.
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in its own country, Beijing uses the platform to conduct disinformation
campaigns abroad aimed at weakening democracies from within.

Global Governance

A final illusion that absorbed US policymakers was the idea
Washington could depend on international organizations to help
it confront major challenges and that these institutions, with the
aid of American leadership, would provide for the emergence of
global governance.
This view presumed since other countries were progressing
inexorably toward liberal democracy, they would share many of
Washington’s goals and would play by Washington’s rules. This belief
tended to minimize the importance of national sovereignty and the fact
countries differ in how they organize their own communities. Even
among democracies, there exists a high degree of variation when it
comes to cultural, institutional, and political values.
Nevertheless, international institutions grew more expansive and
ambitious. In 1992, UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s
An Agenda for Peace envisioned a world in which the United Nations
would maintain world peace, protect human rights, and promote social
progress through expanding peacekeeping missions. Between 1989 and
1994, the organization authorized 20 peacekeeping missions—more
than the total number of missions it had carried out during the previous
four decades.
Mission creep extended to individual agencies as well. The World
Health Organization (WHO)—created in 1948 to prevent the spread
of infectious diseases—pioneered great accomplishments such as the
eradication of smallpox. But over the years its scope grew dramatically.
By 2000 the World Health Organization had begun to issue warnings
on everything from food safety to cellular phone usage to air quality.
This tendency spread staff and resources too thin, crippling the
organization’s ability to respond to genuine crises such as the ongoing
COVID-19 pandemic. The institution’s robust defense of China’s
response to the pandemic also demonstrated the CCP had used its clout
to co-opt the WHO rather than support its missions.

Looking Ahead

Over the past four years these assumptions, long cherished in
Washington, have been shown to be faulty. America has left behind
the halcyon days of liberal internationalism and the unipolar moment
and entered an era of strategic rivalry. As President Biden crafts his
policy agenda, it would be a mistake to return to the flawed premises of
a bygone era. Great power competition will remain a central feature of
the international environment for the foreseeable future, and economic
interdependence does not obviate this reality. Whatever the term of art—
academics and pundits love to debate terms and definitions—several key
features of great power competition will endure. States with sufficient
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power and resources will remain at the core of the international system,
and states field military forces, provide economic aid, and emit carbon.
Great power competition will determine how we live domestically and
internationally, because the more powerful states—those that can exert
their influence more effectively—are able to set the rules of the road.
And we will be directly affected by those who determine those rules.
Today’s multidimensional rivalries will not end in conventional
victories. More broadly, policymakers and strategists need to move past
their emphases on achieving particular end states, since that springs
from a mechanistic and ahistorical view of how politics works. In reality
as the historian Michael Howard argued, human acts create new sets
of circumstances that, in turn, require new judgments and decisions.10
Competition persists because geopolitics is eternal. A main objective
of US strategy, therefore, should be to prevent the accumulation of
activities and trends that harm US interests and values rather than to
pursue grand projects such as dictating how China or other countries
should govern themselves. This strategy requires the United States
craft policies that aim to maintain regional balances of power and deter
aggression by revisionist powers.
Those who favor restraint or retrenchment will be reluctant to
embrace the idea of constant competition because they tend to discount
the aspirations of other powers. If the United States is restrained, the
argument goes, then others will follow suit. But the patterns of history
suggest otherwise. Others will be reluctant to accept the idea of a
rolling end state because they remain convinced the arc of history is
progressing toward a liberal convergence, and they view the push and
pull of a competitive world as overly aggressive and likely to lead to war.
Recognizing the centrality of competition does not mean favoring
the militarization of US foreign policy nor does it mean a drive to war.
A wider acceptance of the competitive nature of geopolitics requires
a foundation of military power, but this acceptance also accentuates
the need for diplomatic and economic tools of statecraft. Precisely
because so much of today’s international competition happens below
the threshold of military conflict, civilian agencies need to take the lead
in maintaining order and shaping a landscape favorable to US interests
and values. But civilian agencies can only adopt this leadership role once
the mindset and culture of all US government agencies change to allow
for a broader recognition of the competition now underway.
Going forward, US foreign policy success will hinge on a cleareyed approach to cooperation. Rather than viewing cooperation with
other countries as an end in itself, policymakers should recognize it as a
means to crafting a stronger competitive strategy. Genuine cooperation
requires reciprocity. Reciprocity means urging other powers to take
more responsibility for their own security and contribute more to the
strength of the US-led order. As a result of the Trump administration’s
10. Michael Howard, The Invention of Peace: Reflections on War and International Order (New Haven,
CT: Yale University Press, 2000).
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pressure on NATO allies, between 2016 and 2018, defense spending
by other member states increased by $43 billion, and NATO Secretary
General Jens Stoltenberg has predicted by 2024 such spending will
increase by another $400 billion.11
In the economic domain reciprocity also means preventing other
countries from taking advantage of American goodwill, including
the requirement that China and other countries open their markets
to US products and services to maintain access to American markets.
Reciprocity also entails no longer tolerating Beijing’s unfair practices,
such as forced technology transfer and intellectual property theft.
Experts estimate that since 2013, the United States has suffered over
$1.2 trillion in economic damage as a result of these abuses—the
“greatest transfer of wealth in history.”12 Margrethe Vestager, executive
vice president of the European Commission for a Europe Fit for the
Digital Age, perhaps put it best when she expressed the essence of
reciprocity in 2020: “ ‛Where I grew up in the Western part of Denmark,
if you invite people over and they don’t invite you back, eventually you
stop’ inviting them.”13
In addition Washington needs to accept that global problems are
not necessarily best solved by global institutions. This viewpoint will
not be popular over the next four years. But as the WHO’s failure to
combat COVID-19 demonstrates, international organizations are
accountable primarily to internal bureaucracies and nation-state clients,
rather than to external constituencies. Such institutions can play useful
roles as conveners and centers for information sharing, but they lack
the operational capacity to act at scale; bureaucratic complexity prevents
them from accomplishing broader missions.
Reconsidering global governance does not require rejecting liberal
principles or abandoning an order based on them. But because only a
handful of countries are committed to those principles, the goal should
be to foster what the scholar Paul Miller has described as a “smaller,
deeper liberal order” of industrialized democracies that would defend
liberal values and serve strategic and economic purposes.14 The focus
might be on creating mission-driven coalitions—as Biden’s team
has suggested—that could construct redundant supply chains, fund
research in emerging technologies, promote fair and reciprocal trade,
and cooperate on security issues. Such coalitions would be open to new
members provided they shared US interests and values and could bring
capabilities to bear on key problems.
11. “NATO Secretary General Announces Increased Defence Spending by Allies,” NATO,
November 29, 2019, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_171458.htm.
12. Josh Rogin, “NSA Chief: Cybercrime Constitutes the ‘Greatest Transfer of Wealth in
History,’ ” The Cable, Foreign Policy, July 9, 2012, https://foreignpolicy.com/2012/07/09/nsa-chief
-cybercrime-constitutes-the-greatest-transfer-of-wealth-in-history/.
13. Ryan Heath, “EU Pushing Ahead with Digital Tax Despite U.S. Resistance, Top Official
Says,” POLITICO, June 23, 2020, https://www.politico.com/news/2020/06/23/eu-digital-tax
-united-states-336496.
14. Paul Miller, “Make the Free World Free Again: It’s Time for a Smaller, Deeper Liberal
Order,” Dispatch, June 9, 2020, https://thedispatch.com/p/make-the-free-world-free-again.

TOC

92

Parameters 51(1) Spring 2021

Washington also needs to refresh its thinking on political economy
and improve the capacity of US government agencies to address the
interplay of politics and economics. The United States will never be able
to integrate its economic policies and political strategies as China does.
But Washington should invest more in economic intelligence and make
it easier to share such information across departments and agencies by
establishing a national center for economic intelligence, perhaps modeled
on the National Counterterrorism Center, as the scholar Anthony Vinci
has advocated.15
Moreover, the US government must counter China’s massive
investments in research and development in emerging technologies.
Congress must fund public and private sector research in AI, highperformance computing, synthetic biology, and other strategically
important technology sectors. And the State Department should also
put economics front and center by giving economic officers more
responsibility at embassies and by opening more consulates around the
world to improve business and commercial relationships.
The goals of the liberal international order were laudable—and,
in many cases, they were achieved against daunting odds. The world
is safer, more prosperous, and more just than it once was. But the
unexpected consequences of globalization and the unfulfilled promises
of global governance cannot be overlooked. Liberal internationalists
have a penchant for prioritizing processes, including multilateralism
and globalization, over tangible objectives. In order to fulfill President
Biden’s “build back better” agenda, his administration must resist these
temptations. Pursuing the illusions of liberal internationalism at the
expense of US interests will hasten, not reverse, American decline. In
a world of great power competition, economic inequality, and dazzling
technological capabilities, where ideologies as well as pathogens spread
with viral ferocity, the stakes are too high and the consequences too dire
simply to stick with what worked in the past and hope for the best.

15. Anthony Vinci, “Competitive Climate: America Must Counter China by Investing in
Economic Intelligence,” National Interest, February 4, 2020, https://nationalinterest.org/feature
/competitive-climate-america-must-counter-china-investing-economic-intelligence-120356.
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Managerial Aspects of Command
John S. Kem and James G. Breckenridge

ABSTRACT: Lieutenant Colonel Harold R. Lamp voiced concerns
in 1971 about the inadequacy of the new defense managerial
analytic framework, operations research/systems analysis, to assess
critical intangibles of military readiness. Fifty years later, Lamp’s
concerns speak to the necessity of including data and effects from
all organizational levels in order to ensure the Army can effectively
coordinate complex systems and develop leaders capable of
managing the same.

T

he opening sentence of “Some Managerial Aspects of
Command,” “A farseeing Army needs to digress now and then
in assessing its performances to make certain it is recording the
lessons which have a great impact for the future” still rings true.1 The
US Army and the Joint Force are in a similar position today as each
organization works to forecast into the late 2020s and 2030s. What are
the key insights from 50 years ago that inform these efforts?
Historical context provides essential clues to Lieutenant Colonel
Harold R. Lamp’s perspectives from 1971. A class of 1970 Army War
College graduate, Lamp was writing as the Army was drawing down
force levels, with approximately 250,000 US troops still in Vietnam
in June 1971. In Europe the Army, under-resourced and with mixed
readiness levels, was down to only 215,000 soldiers from a troop strength
of over 277,000 as recently as 1962. The ominous Soviet invasion of
Czechoslovakia had occurred only a few years prior, and Army leadership
was increasingly concerned about Warsaw Pact competition and overall
capability relative to NATO.2 The Army of Lamp’s time had an identity
problem, poised as it was at an intellectual crossroads.
The Vietnam War preoccupied military thinking, and as Lamp
wrote, “the feedback, critique, and assimilation of other important if
less spectacular teachings have been dwarfed.”3 The Army’s identity
problem and intellectual struggle at the time was twofold. The Army
of the 1970s was a constabulary Army deeply enmeshed in a strategic
alliance in the heart of Europe, postured defensively and prepared to
conduct conventional and nuclear operations. That same Army was also

1. Harold R. Lamp, “Some Managerial Aspects of Command,” Parameters 1, no. 1 (Spring 1971):
42, https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol1/iss1/6.
2. Hubert Zimmerman, “The Improbable Permanence of a Commitment: America’s Troop
Presence in Europe during the Cold War,” Journal of Cold War Studies 11, no. 1 (Winter 2009): 3–27,
https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/jcws.2009.11.1.3.
3. Lamp, “Some Managerial Aspects,” 42.
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engaged in conventional and irregular combat in Southeast Asia, with
few allies and diminishing popular and political support at home.
As 1971 unfolded, it seemed certain the United States would maintain
its commitment to NATO defense and withdraw from Vietnam. But
it was far from certain how the Army would train, man, equip, and
organize in a post–Vietnam environment. Who and what the Army
would be and how it would fight remained open, strategic-level questions.
Leadership and management issues flow from any organization with
an identity problem. In the case of the early 1970s Army, these issues
were exacerbated by the uncertainty and challenges posed by defining
the ends, ways, and means needed to balance near-term requirements
and long-term investment prioritization. As American involvement in
the Vietnam War receded—in August of 1972 the last infantry and
artillery units stood down—an ongoing buildup of Soviet conventional
forces continued to pose a serious threat to US and NATO forces.
Thus, the transition out of Vietnam and reorientation toward Europe
activated critical debates about the proper use of military power. If read
through a strictly bureaucratic lens, the pullback from Vietnam, shift to
a one-and-a-half war standard, and emphasis on alliances threatened the
Army’s institutional autonomy and share of budgetary resources. . . . But
that misses the negotiation that took place across the Army. Beyond myopic
bureaucratic struggles, the leaders of the Army accepted a shift in the
international environment and used it as a means of reconceptualizing the
role of land forces at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.4

Fifty years on, the struggle for identity resurfaces. The early twentyfirst-century US Army, emerging from its long wars in southwest Asia,
confronts what is described as a return to great power competition. All
the while, the rapidly evolving global strategic environment is further
complicated by transnational corporations, climate change, cyber and
space operations, pandemics, and extremist ideologies. A new US Army
uniform, brown but called green, signals a cosmetic back-to-the-future
theme. The uncertainty and identity issues that characterized Lamp’s
world remind us of the present.

Lamp on Command and Management

Early in the article, Lamp highlighted part of his purpose—the
mostly tactical lessons from the crucible of combat operations inevitably
“[dominate] military writing,” at the expense of many wider lessons
and opportunities for professional discussion, including the role of
management at all Army levels.5 Lamp emphasized what he saw as a
significant change in the Army and the nation’s approach to a major
conflict. Using the Vietnam buildup to illustrate, he argued the two
precedents of “(a) the expansion of forces without any significant call-up
of the reserve training base, and (b) the costing of manpower along with
4. Benjamin M. Jensen, Forging the Sword: Doctrinal Change in the U.S. Army (Stanford, CA:
Stanford University Press, 2016), 30.
5. Lamp, “Some Managerial Aspects,” 42.
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other resources in determining battlefield means” were “now wedded to
the military” with significant potential impacts.6
In his view the Army’s ability to mobilize for the Vietnam War was
miraculous given its limited resources. Nonetheless this mobilization
required the Army to barter with unknown long-term trade-offs at all
levels, due to the organization’s inability to understand residual effects
far “beyond that recorded numerically in unit readiness reports.” 7 Here
Lamp turned to the identity of the Army and proposed key decision
areas for the coming decade.
Lamp’s personal experiences and frames of reference provide
insight to his perspectives. His service on the Army General Staff, with
the 25th Infantry Division in Vietnam, and as a battalion commander
in Europe drove his focus. Further the US Army War College Lamp
had just graduated from was wrestling with transformative curriculum
changes. The college had embraced management practices; as early
as 1961, “acknowledgement of the McNamara ideas on strategy and
management appeared in the War College curriculum.”8 By the late
1960s and early 1970s, the war in Southeast Asia was creating a crisis
of confidence. “The questions posed so long ago by Tasker Bliss—what
should be taught, to whom, and to how many—fleetingly believed to
have been settled, reappeared in more critical form.”9
Reflecting a major focus on business and analytical approaches, the
War College by 1967 had added a command and management seminar.
“As presented, the course was more concerned with economic analysis,
systems analysis, and automatic data processing than it was with
“command.”10 Systems analysis had expanded from post–Second World
War through the 1960s. It was an integral part of corporate management
and battlefield calculus in the Korean and Vietnam Wars but with mixed
results and viewpoints.11
In February 1970, “the War College initiated a formal review of the
curriculum” that led to sweeping changes focused on the “intellectual
development of the student, specifically the development of his analytical
skills.”12 The 1971–72 resident class program reflected much of the
thinking of the curriculum review. Although international relations
remained a major area of study, the college eliminated The Search
for a National Strategy course and emphasized management skills
through the establishment of the Department of Management and its
revised course, National Defense Decision-Making and Management.13
6. Lamp, “Some Managerial Aspects,” 42–43.
7. Lamp, “Some Managerial Aspects,” 43.
8. Harry P. Ball, Of Responsible Command: A History of the U.S. Army War College, rev. ed. (Carlisle
Barracks, PA: Alumni Association of the United States Army War College, 1994), 355.
9. Ball, Responsible Command, 355.
10. Ball, Responsible Command, 377.
11. See also Charles R. Shrader, History of Operations Research in the United States Army, Volume 1:
1942–62 (Washington, DC: Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of the Army (Operations
Research), Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2006), 13.
12. Ball, Responsible Command, 399.
13. Ball, Responsible Command, 400.
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Clearly influenced by this trend in management practice and education,
Lamp discusses issues such as “Soldier Intangibles,” “Motivation,” and
“Military Professional Judgment.”

“Assaying Soldier Intangibles”
Lamp argued key senior defense officials and policymakers failed to
appreciate results achieved by unit-level commanders in Vietnam in the
late 1960s and very early 1970s. Importantly, he attributed this failure
to the inability of military leaders to think and write professionally. He
acknowledged the centralized decision-making characteristic of the
military’s “evolved management style” and worried many accompanying
decisions were too focused on cost. Further, cost was only part of the
picture; in the process of concentrating on the explicitly measurable,
“modern defense management style” missed key variables.
Using the then-ongoing debate surrounding the establishment of
an all-volunteer force as an example, Lamp argued more measurable
factors—economic and political—would ultimately prove the most
persuasive in defense management budget decisions, rather than the
true costs of training a completely all-volunteer professional force. As
a result, decisions on whether to end the draft and related readiness
policies would be flawed—a lack of refined analysis prevented accurate
assessments of real impacts to the system such as duration, level of
soldier training, and what Lamp referred to as “the acquisition-half of
quality soldier development.”14

“Management of Motivation”
Lamp discussed the importance of motivation in combat but also in
training, especially experiential event training. He drew lessons from his
time in Europe—with leadership and motivation, even an undermanned
and underequipped unit could succeed. The individual training elements
were less important than leadership and the environment in which the
training occurred. The specific examples Lamp used are disjointed and
less relevant today, and his discussion of the training arch was especially
tactical, nevertheless, his conclusion to this section remains relevant
when considering the Army’s current programming and policy with
respect to training. Lamp asked if training policy overly emphasized
management of instructional resources to the detriment of the
motivational aspects of training and answering the important question,
“how much training is enough?”

“Military Professional Judgment”
In this final, less-developed section, Lamp addressed his view on the
“current differences between command and management even while
recognizing the close relationship between the two.”15 Both elements
were essential for future command even though Lamp had a clear bias
for commanders who continued to make good command decisions
14. Lamp, “Some Managerial Aspects,” 45.
15. Lamp, “Some Managerial Aspects,” 48.
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despite a lack of systems analysis skills. He further noted Army schools
were modernizing to help students quickly acquire these early 1970s-era
management skills.

Relevance for Today and Tomorrow

Lamp’s article did not focus on specific solutions to the Army’s
identity crisis. The majority of his article identified the training challenges
of the early 1970s and provided a diagnosis of the management problem
facing Army leaders. But his focus remained far too narrow and tactical.
In 1973, shortly after the publication of Lamp’s article, the Army,
under General Creighton Abrams Jr., implemented Operation Steadfast.
As international relations scholar Benjamin Jensen points out, this
massive internal reorganization plan was designed to streamline
domestic operations and training. “The origins of Steadfast date back to
a series of reviews conducted under chief of staff of the Army William C.
Westmoreland (1968–1972). In particular, William Whipple and John V.
Foley’s ‘Pilot Study on the Department of Army Organization’ and . . .
the follow-up (Charles) Parker Panel outlined the management problems
inherent in the U.S. Army in the late 1960s.”16 Jensen further remarks:
The Parker Panel turned to private industries, including IBM and Xerox, to
see how they dealt with ‘decision making, systems management (horizontal)
vs. functional management (vertical), and the growth of ad hoc committees’.
. . . The post-Vietnam Army would be a smaller professional force operating
in a constrained budgetary environment. More forces would be stationed
at home, thus requiring high levels of unit readiness to facilitate rapid
deployment.17

This effort was the early foundation for the Army that developed
through the 1980s and fought in Iraq and Afghanistan into at least
the early 2000s, a highly capable Army that experienced considerable
tactical and operational success. Moreover as eminent scholar Richard
Betts notes:
Modern conventional military effectiveness has become clearly more a
matter of quality than quantity of forces, and less a matter of pure firepower
than the capacity to coordinate complex systems. The essence of American
superiority is not advanced weapon technology per se. Rather it lies in the
interweaving of capacities in organization, doctrine, training, maintenance,
support systems, integration of surveillance, targeting, and weaponry, and
overall professionalism.18

Yet today as in 1971, the need for more deliberate, in-depth thinking
remains a challenge. Tactical and operational successes are necessary
but insufficient. Like Lamp, senior decisionmakers typically focus too
narrowly, over-emphasizing squad- and platoon-level training, both of
which are foundational critical components of Army basic formations.
16. Jensen, Forging the Sword, 31.
17. Jensen, Forging the Sword, 31.
18. Richard K. Betts, American Force: Dangers, Delusions, and Dilemmas in National Security (New
York: Columbia University Press, 2012), 174.
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Opportunity costs of such company grade-level emphasis by senior
leaders include devoting less resources and thinking to the areas Betts
highlights: coordinating complex systems and building capability at the
strategic-operational nexus. Reinforcing this point, Antulio Echevarria
asserts there is a:
lack of emphasis on the end game, specifically, on the need for systematic
thinking about the processes and capabilities needed to translate military
victories into strategic successes. . . . The new American way of war . . .
appears geared to fight wars as if they were battles and thus confuses the
winning of campaigns or small-scale actions with the winning of wars.19

Furthermore, the Army has devoted too little analysis, emphasis,
and innovative thinking to the role of Landpower in support of US
efforts in global competition.
The “interweaving of capacities” described by Betts points to a
series of management challenges Army leaders face. For example, Lamp
was both intrigued and frustrated by the burgeoning field of operations
research/systems analysis and how this new analytic model would impact
the effort to build and train the Army. He highlighted the potential
negative impact of analyses that failed to incorporate data and effects at
all organizational levels. That tension remains today. Commander and
organizational decision dynamics are complex, and too few commanders
make the effort to remain literate in the current data environment.
And what would Lamp think of the capability of the current Army
programming example—the Program Evaluation Group—to program?
Undoubtedly he would want to see the multilevel data and analysis
and, from an organizational perspective, examine how the Army
measures the accountability of high-priority programs and addresses
potential moral hazard. Are high-priority programs held accountable in
execution, or is poor management indirectly rewarded with unfunded
requirement bailouts because these programs are “top priority?” Does
the Army analyze the return on investment of some of the lower priority
items relative to highly funded programs in order to ascertain the real
implications of such resourcing decisions, or is the Army instead “forced
to make quick decisions” on an annual basis?
Lamp provided an insightful warning that echoes into the twentyfirst century: “For it is this aspect of defense management that the
decisionmaker—the civilian systems analyst—does not now weigh
in his centralized measurements of military command effectiveness
and requirements.”20
The task ahead for Army leadership mirrors the challenge Lamp
attempted to identify in 1971 and what several contemporary authors
have asserted as the “Army’s professional center of gravity, its sense
19. Antulio J. Echevarria II, “Transforming the Army’s Way of Battle: Revising Our Abstract
Knowledge,” in The Future of the Army Profession, ed. Don M. Snider and Lloyd Matthews (Boston:
McGraw-Hill, 2005), 371.
20. Lamp, “Some Managerial Aspects,” 49.
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of self.”21 In his seminal book on leadership, James MacGregor Burns
pointed out, “the essence of leadership in any polity is the recognition
of real need, the uncovering and exploiting of contradictions among
values and between values and practice, the realigning of values, the
reorganization of institutions where necessary, and the governance of
change.”22 In response to this formidable expectation, the Army must
develop effective strategic leaders who can bring personnel together,
lead, and serve on teams with expert knowledge, collaborating to
develop innovative solutions.
The Army War College takes this challenge seriously. Spurred on
by a dynamic strategic environment, fundamental changes in higher
education delivery modalities, and a new Joint Chiefs of Staff vision for
professional military education, the Army War College is in the midst
of an ambitious effort of curricular, organizational, and infrastructure
reform. In line with the Joint Chiefs of Staff vision, the War College
has placed a renewed emphasis on active and experiential learning with
methodologies that “include use of case studies grounded in history to
help students develop judgment, analysis, and problem-solving skills,
which can then be applied to contemporary challenges, including war,
deterrence, and measures short of armed conflict.”23
Lamp closed with the observation, “at the Army level we must
find ways and means of influencing the decisionmakers.”24 He inferred
that in his Army, an appreciation of modern management practice
was insufficient and underdeveloped. Fast forward to today and
much the same could be said of Army leader proficiency in strategic
communication informed by knowledge management and data
literacy skills.
Importantly, just as in Lamp’s day but at a more strategic level,
the Army War College curriculum increasingly emphasizes effective
communication and decision making. The key and essential “managerial
aspects of command” are bounded by problem solving, asking the right
questions, and effectively communicating the results to decisionmakers.
These management skills are further augmented by building the
individual additive skills, knowledge, and behaviors necessary to
enable the development of initiative-oriented and innovation-based
organizational cultures grounded in the moral foundations of the
military profession.
As historian Barbara Tuchman—incidentally, the first female
author featured in Parameters—noted, “to a proper understanding of the
cause and effect . . . it must be written in terms of what was known and
21. George B. Forsythe et al., “Professional Identity Development for 21st Century Army
Officers,” in The Future of the Army Profession, ed. Don M. Snider and Lloyd Matthews (Boston:
McGraw-Hill, 2005), 189.
22. James MacGregor Burns, Leadership (New York: Harper & Row, 1978), 43.
23. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Developing Today’s Officers for Tomorrow’s Ways of War: The Joint
Chiefs of Staff Vision and Guidance for Professional Military Education & Talent Management (Washington,
DC: JCS, 2020), 6.
24. Lamp, “Some Managerial Aspects,” 49.
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believed at the time.”25 What will the reader of Parameters in 2071 think
of the efforts at the Army War College, as part of the Army and the Joint
Force, to forecast and prepare for the challenges of the middle half of
the twenty-first century?

John S. Kem
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of the US Army War College from 2017 to 2020.
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Dr. James Breckenridge is the provost and chief academic officer at the US
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25. Barbara W. Tuchman, Practicing History: Selected Essays (New York: Random House Trade
Paperbacks, 2014), 9.
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The Joint Force and Lessons from 1971
Jonathan P. Klug

ABSTRACT: In 1971 Colonel Duane H. Smith analyzed the unified
command structure, examined an existing proposal for change,
and suggested improvements. He illustrated how this structure
must account for the challenges of the contemporary strategic
environment and balance several tensions, such as effectiveness
versus efficiency, flexibility versus focusing on a specific mission,
and forward-deployed versus home-station forces. Many of Smith’s
insights remain applicable to the unified command structure and
global force management processes today.

S

ince 1946 the Unified Command Plan and its inherent
unified command structure (UCS) have directed how the US
Department of Defense organizes its forces.1 In his 1971
Parameters article, Colonel Duane H. Smith, US Army, evaluated the UCS
by exploring the following questions: “Is the present unified command
structure adequate for ensuring unity of effort of land, sea, and air
forces? Would the peacetime organization require change if the US
went to war? If change is indicated, what should the change be?”2 In his
analysis Smith examined an existing proposal for change and suggested
his own improvements. His approach and many of his recommendations
remain relevant today.
The strategic environment and strategic goals are the basis for each
iteration of the plan, which aims to create an effective and efficient
structure. Additionally this framework provides unity of effort for
cooperation, competition, and armed conflict. Striving for an optimal
organization has resulted in many iterations of the UCS over the decades,
reflecting the dynamic nature of both the strategic environment and
options for advancing national interests. In fact, 10 USC § 161 directs a
review of the Unified Command Plan and its UCS at least every two years.

1971 Analysis

Smith highlighted the US military’s four strategic goals, derived
from then Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird’s military posture
statement to Congress in March 1971, to be executed through the
specified and unified commands:
• “strategic nuclear retaliation against a nuclear attacker”
1. Edward J. Drea et al., History of the Unified Command Plan, 1946–2012 (Washington, DC: Joint
History Office, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), 2013), iii, https://www
.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/History/Institutional/Command_Plan.pdf.
2. Duane H. Smith, “The Unified Command Structure,” Parameters 1, no. 2 (Fall 1971): 14.
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•
•
•

“defense of the United States”
“peacetime participation of US forces in mutual security
arrangements, including deployment in strategic areas
overseas”
“rapid deployment of mobile forces based in the United States
to conduct operations as directed”3

The unified and specified commands of 1971 were as unique as
their geographic areas or functions. United States Pacific Command
(USPACOM) focused on a single geographic area, which contrasted
sharply with command responsibilities on the other side of the globe: the
Atlantic region had two separate commands—United States European
Command (USEUCOM) and United States Atlantic Command
(USLANTCOM). While USEUCOM was a unified command responsible
for the geographic area, USLANTCOM consisted of naval forces oriented
on a maritime mission. United States Strike Command (USSTRICOM)
was responsible for rapid overseas deployments. The primary mission
of United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) was the
defense of the Panama Canal, and United States Alaskan Command
(USALCOM) focused on air defense.
Strategic defensive forces were separate from strategic offensive
forces and resided in United States Continental Air Defense Command
(USCONAD). Three commands controlled strategic offensive forces:
United States Strategic Air Command (USSAC) was a specified
command that contained bombers and land-based missiles, and
USPACOM and USLANTCOM controlled sea-launched missiles. Thus
strategic retaliation to a nuclear attack required the coordination of
three US commands.
After describing the commands Smith examined the 1970 Blue
Ribbon Defense Panel report, which was critical of the UCS. The panel
offered several recommendations, most of which revolved around
creating a layer of three new unified commands. These new commands
would have been functionally oriented and would command the
existing, although reorganized, specified and unified commands.
Strategic Command was the first of the three new unified commands
and would be responsible for all strategic weapons—offensive and
defensive—and strategic targeting. This new organization would have
commanded the Joint Strategic Targeting Planning Staff, USSAC,
USCONAD, and the Navy’s fleet of ballistic missile submarines formerly
belonging to USPACOM and USLANTCOM.
Tactical Command was the second of the recommended new unified
commands and would have required many changes to implement. Tactical
Command would have subsumed the missions of USLANTCOM,
USSTRICOM, and USSOUTHCOM and would have commanded
3. Smith, “Unified Command Structure,” 14.
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the conventional forces of the United States including USEUCOM
and USPACOM. Logistics Command was the third and final unified
command the panel recommended. This organization would have
commanded supply distribution, maintenance, and transportation for
all combat forces. Overall, the panel’s recommendations were sweeping
in nature and met with resistance.
Smith first provided a detailed analysis of the panel’s recommendation
to create a Strategic Command. This recommendation centered on the
ability to retaliate against a strategic attack quickly while maintaining
the readiness of the three legs of the nuclear triad—intercontinental
ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and long-range
bombers. Quick retaliation relied on effective planning and a key
question was: Could the Joint Staff effectively complete centralized
planning for deployment of these weapons?
Similarly the question of readiness focused on whether four separate
unified commands could maintain the readiness of strategic weapons
while effectively executing the Joint Staff’s war plans. Smith argued, “the
concept of a unified command for all strategic forces is sound; that we
have never established one is a consequence of divergent Service views.”4
Smith supported the creation of a new Strategic Command, but
he argued against the proposed Tactical Command. These tactical
forces belonged to six area unified commands, which the Department
of Defense continually rearranged due to new concepts and political
realities. Following an examination of the nature, employment, and
organization of tactical forces, Smith argued, “the panel has gone too
far” with their recommendation for a Tactical Command, as it was
cumbersome and increased the number of headquarters personnel.5
Smith did not investigate the proposal for a Logistics Command due
to the inherent complexities of the organization’s broad and complex
responsibilities, noting that any analysis of such an organization would
be challenging for the same reasons. Furthermore the panel did not
discuss the organization in detail—it only recommended its creation,
which gave Smith little to analyze.
Smith concluded his article with some recommendations. He argued
to disestablish Alaskan Command, disestablish USSOUTHCOM, and
merge USLANTCOM with USEUCOM, with the latter serving as the
former’s naval component commander. Also he proposed USSTRICOM
and United States Middle East/Africa south of the Sahara/South Asia
Command reorganize to become Mobile Command. United States
European Command would have been responsible for the Middle
East, and USPACOM would have been responsible for South Asia.
Thus, Smith’s recommended unified command structure would have
had four commands: Strategic Command, Pacific Command, European
Command, and Mobile Command.
4. Smith, “Unified Command Structure,” 17.
5. Smith, “Unified Command Structure,” 19.
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Still Relevant Today

Smith methodically and fairly evaluated the UCS, analyzed the Blue
Ribbon Panel report, and provided his recommendations. The approach
he used remains relevant today. First, his analysis of strategic goals
captured the essence of long-term US defense objectives, as the 1971
strategic goals detailed above are remarkably like those articulated in the
unclassified description of the 2018 National Military Strateg y:
• “Respond to Threats
• Deter Strategic Attack (and Proliferation of [weapons of mass
destruction])
• Deter Conventional Attack
• Assure Allies and Partners
• Compete Below the Level of Armed Conflict”6
The goals in the 2018 National Military Strateg y explicitly emphasize
deterrence, where Smith’s 1971 strategic goals implicitly included
deterrence—unsurprising given the Cold War era of mutually assured
destruction. Similarly Smith’s strategic goal of “peacetime participation
of US forces in mutual security arrangements, including deployment
in strategic areas overseas” demonstrated the United States needed to
assure allies and partners in peace and war; as indicated above, the 2018
National Military Strateg y also addresses assuring allies and partners.7
And the United States needed access, basing, and overflight in 1971
just as it does today. Notwithstanding differences in national security
vernacular and allowing for implicit aims, Smith began his analysis of
the UCS articulating strategic goals similar to current strategic goals.
Smith identified several important features in creating and
maintaining the UCS including the inherent tensions involved in
designing and operating the commands. Smith effectively captured
the interservice tension between operational-level flexibility and
operational-level effectiveness, noting service interests more than US
national interests drove the UCS and its commands. The Navy preferred
commands based on a geographic area of responsibility, which tended
to preserve flexibility at the expense of the effectiveness of local control.
The Army and the Air Force advocated for commands based on missions
and forces, which were more effective in addressing their particular
function, but such an arrangement diluted the potential combat power
that could respond to an actual crisis.8
6. US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Description of the National Military Strategy 2018 (Washington, DC:
Office of Primary Responsibility: Strategy Development Division, Office of the CJCS, 2019),
https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Publications/UNCLASS_2018_National_Military
_Strategy_Description.pdf.
7. Smith, “Unified Command Structure,” 14.
8. Ronald H. Cole et al., The History of the Unified Command Plan, 1946-1993 (Washington, DC:
Joint History Office, Office of the CJCS, 1995), 11–12, https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2
/a313508.pdf.
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The Navy approach allowed the Pacific Fleet to operate together
more effectively. If the UCS instead called for two or more functional
commands within the Pacific area, each command would have had its
own naval component. Dividing the Pacific Fleet in this manner would
have diminished its combat power and effectiveness, not to mention
exposing the smaller naval elements to defeat in detail. These tensions
remain to some degree as service realities and perspectives are alive
and well.
The ability of the UCS and the specified and unified commands to
smoothly transition between peace and war was a vital concern in 1971.
Likewise, the 2018 NMS calls for quickly and effectively shifting from
peace to war. Contemporary global security challenges demonstrate the
need for a more detailed framework to understand this complex strategic
environment and operate within it. In response, the 2018 Joint Concept
for Integrated Campaigning proposed a competition continuum outlining
how the US military had roles in “cooperation, competition, and armed
conflict.”9 A year later, Joint Doctrine Note 1-19, Competition Continuum,
refined this continuum.10
Although seen through the lens of the bipolar international state
system, Smith’s 1971 analysis reflected an understanding of what was
necessary for success throughout what we would today refer to as
the competition continuum. Major unified commands then and now
continually conduct peacetime cooperation with allies and partners,
compete with other major powers, transition smoothly to and from
armed conflict, and succeed in armed conflict.
The balance between mobile and area commands is another
recurring tension Smith examined that has implications today. Area
commands and their forward-deployed forces are more expensive to
maintain, are exposed to potential attacks, and can lead to international
tension. But the presence of forward-deployed forces can also reassure
allies and have diplomatic and deterrent effects. Keeping military forces
in US territory has advantages as well; maintaining force readiness is
generally more cost effective and is far less likely to create tensions with
potential adversaries.
Smith recommended an approach that used both forward-deployed
forces and forces in the continental United States. A crucial part of
his recommendation was a new Mobile Command responsible for
contingencies occurring outside the USPACOM and USEUCOM areas
of responsibility. (Smith did not mention continually rotating units to
maintain forward-deployed forces, such as in South Korea or Poland.
These heel-to-toe rotations impair unit readiness and require substantial
institutional efforts to prepare, rotate, and recover.)
The Mobile Command Smith envisioned would have had immense
responsibilities, including five major tasks broad in scope and diversity:
9. US Department of Defense (DoD), Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning (Washington, DC:
US Government Printing Office (GPO), March 16, 2018), 12.
10. DoD, Competition Continuum, Joint Doctrine Note 1-19 (Washington, DC: US GPO, 2019).
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deploy forces under a mobile headquarters, defend the United States
from conventional attacks, provide military assistance outside of the areas
of responsibility of USEUCOM and USPACOM, bear responsibility
for Joint training and doctrine, and augment other unified commands
as needed. Additionally, warfighting responsibilities potentially would
have involved an immense span of control. Collectively, these five tasks
would certainly have overwhelmed one headquarters whether during
the Cold War or in a large-scale conflict today.
The tasks Smith proposed for the Mobile Command, comprehensive
then, have only grown in size and scope in the intervening 50 years,
so much so that several organizations are required to address them.
Collectively today’s combatant commands have global responsibility.
They also provide military assistance: several combatant commands,
principally United States Northern Command, defend the United States
from conventional attacks.
Today’s solutions to Joint planning, capability development, force
development, readiness, and doctrine are also much more involved than
Smith could have foreseen. The nature of today’s tasks and the global
and multifunctional nature of contemporary warfighting require today’s
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to act as the global integrator
of these functions using the Joint Strategic Planning System, which
includes the global force management (GFM) process. Smith’s call for
the Mobile Command to support the other unified commands was
an early indicator of the requirements behind the GFM. The GFM
integrates “readiness, assignment, allocation, apportionment, and
assessment.”11 Within GFM, the dynamic force employment process
allows combatant commands to “more flexibly use ready forces to shape
proactively the strategic environment while maintaining readiness to
respond to contingencies and ensure long-term warfighting readiness.”12
Finally, dynamic force employment as a process speaks to the
challenge of expanding requirements and diminishing resources. Two
developments after Smith’s article was published highlighted these
requirements and resources challenges—the establishment of the
all-volunteer force in 1973 and the reduction of forces after the collapse
of the Soviet Union in 1991.
Smith’s recommendations that USPACOM and USEUCOM control
all conventional forces also reflect timeless questions concerning
forward-deployed forces, pre-positioned equipment, and sufficient
airlift and sealift capacities. For example, concerns have recently been
raised regarding the size and state of US airlift and sealift capabilities as

11. “Global Force Management,” The Lightning Press, https://www.thelightningpress.com
/global-force-management-gfm/.
12. James N. Mattis, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America:
Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of
Defense, January 19, 2018).
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the latter has shown to be insufficient and of questionable readiness.13
These capabilities are elements of the broader processes by which the
Department of Defense considers certain activities such as establishing
a forward element of the Army V Corps in Poland.14
Smith’s analysis and recommendations foreshadowed the need for
the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of
1986 and today’s unified command structure. The law restructured the
Department of Defense and the Joint Force, streamlining the chain of
command in an effort to ensure effective Joint operations. Accordingly,
the legislation addressed some of the issues highlighted by the Blue
Ribbon Panel and by Smith. Smith’s recommendations also pointed
toward today’s UCS, which has seven geographic combatant commands,
four functional combatant commands, and the Defense Logistics
Agency. For example, he advocated for the Strategic Command and
what later became the Defense Logistics Agency.
There were several things Smith did not foresee, such as the need for
a unified transportation command and the proliferation of area unified
commands to encompass the entire globe. Perhaps more importantly
Smith did not foresee the immense changes in the space and cyber
domains that would emerge by 2020. Even science fiction of the day,
such as Stanley Kubrick’s 1968 masterpiece 2001: A Space Odyssey and its
antagonist HAL, the spaceship’s computer, only hinted at the challenges
space, cyber, and artificial intelligence would come to present. These
challenges were driving factors for the global integration concept,
intended to win future wars in which belligerents vie for superiority in
the cyber, space, air, sea, and land domains across the globe. Winning
such wars requires maximizing effectiveness across the Joint functions.

Conclusion

For its time, Smith’s article was accurate and insightful,
demonstrating the kind of analysis necessary for periodic reviews of
the unified command structure. He understood such a study had to
balance multiple tensions including effectiveness versus efficiency,
service preferences for flexibility versus a focus on a specific mission,
forward-deployed versus home-station forces and equipment, and the
amount and type of airlift and sealift capabilities needed versus their
cost. Some of Smith’s more extensive recommendations were prescient.
The Department of Defense would later consolidate strategic attack
and defense forces under one unified command and create a unified
command for logistics.
Smith’s article is an exemplar of the importance of reading old
works. His fellow US Army War College faculty member Colonel John
13. David B. Larter, “The US Army Is Preparing to Fight in Europe, but Can It Even Get
There?” Defense News, October 8, 2018, https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2018/10/08/the
-army-is-preparing-to-fight-in-europe-but-can-it-even-get-there/.
14. John Vandiver, “Army’s V Corps, with a Long History in Europe, Is Back in Action,” Stars
and Stripes, October 16, 2020, https://www.stripes.com/news/army-s-v-corps-with-a-long-history
-in-europe-is-back-in-action-1.648804.
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“Jack” McCuen’s 1966 book, The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War, remains
an essential part of any counterinsurgency reading list.15 McCuen’s book
and personal efforts were invaluable in crafting the counterinsurgency
doctrine in Iraq and Afghanistan, which came full circle to the 1960s
challenge of insurgency. Similarly, Smith’s efforts have come full circle
to the broader questions on how to organize US military forces at the
strategic level. Both officers based their writing on Korean War and
Vietnam War experiences. They gained their wisdom through study
and practice—the old-fashioned way; in short, they earned it. Today’s
readers can profit from their efforts.

15. John J. McCuen, The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War (1966; repr., St. Petersburg, FL: Hailer
Publishing, 2005).
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ABSTRACT: Differences between the academic and military
communities and the dysfunction that occurs when these
communities comingle can have disastrous consequences for
foreign policy. Donald Bletz, writing on the subject in 1971, details
this dynamic as it related to the Vietnam War. His observations
can be applied to wars since and suggest the need for a balanced
relationship characterized by independence and mutual respect.

W

riting in the aftermath of the Kent State massacre, Colonel
Donald F. Bletz raised the concern that a dysfunctional
relationship between academia and the military not only
sets the tone for the military’s relationship with American society but
also impacts its warfighting abilities. More to the point, academia and
the military typically function as two separate and often warring worlds.1
Fifty years later Bletz’s observation holds true as the dysfunctional
academia-military relationship that led to the debacle in Vietnam has
repeated itself in the so-called forever wars of the twenty-first century.
Bletz saw the disaster of Vietnam primarily as a function of distrust
between the academic and military communities resulting as much from
their similarities as from their differences. What the intervening 50 years
has shown, however, is that such disasters are more a function of how
these two communities manage this distrust.
Bletz understood the importance of the academia-military
relationship to national security. This relationship, with its associated
functions and dysfunctions, arises where the interests and activities
of academia and the military converge: first, when the military brings
graduates from academia to serve as military professionals, and second,
when academics make their way into senior-level national security
positions. Dysfunctions at those points of convergence, according to
Bletz, give rise to disasters such as the war in Vietnam.
Bletz was also correct in asserting such foreign policy disasters
arise as a function of how each community relates to society as well
as to one another. Both communities see themselves as guardians
while simultaneously regarding the other as a threat to what they seek
to protect. Thus as guardians both feel isolated not only from each
other but from the society they claim to serve. As a result, the military
experiences less access to universities as a commissioning source, and
1. Colonel Donald F. Bletz, “Mutual Misperceptions: The Academic and the Soldier in
Contemporary America,” Parameters 1, no. 2 (1971): 2.

TOC

110

Parameters 51(1) Spring 2021

both communities engage in poor communication with each other and
society over policy matters.
Over the last 50 years, however, the military has translated that
isolation into increased social trust, while academia apparently has not.
That asymmetry in public trust coupled with improved cooperation
between the two communities—often in response to the dysfunctions
experienced during the Vietnam era—has generated dysfunctions of its
own without fully resolving the ones of the past.

Relationships with Society

Bletz argued while the military and academia each see themselves
as the guardian of American democracy, they perceive that role in
fundamentally different ways. Academics, he argued, see themselves as
“critic[s] of contemporary society . . . while the [military] sees [itself] as
the defender.”2 Those different roles attract different kinds of people,
amplifying a sense of estrangement. Academia attracts more liberally
minded individuals while the military attracts more conservative
thinkers.3 Academics thus view themselves as government outsiders
who, due to their broad educational role, are closer to the larger society,
and military professionals see themselves as government insiders who,
due to the cultural as well as physical separation necessary for effective
defense, are distanced from society.4
Bletz certainly played a little fast and loose with these generalities,
something he repeatedly acknowledged. But the hyperbole he employed
captures something important not just about the academic and military
communities themselves, but also about the importance of their
relationship. In claiming the role of social guardian, neither the academic
nor the soldier holds society in high regard, which results in a sense of
social isolation for both communities. For the academic, the isolation
results from living “in a world they never made and for which they [take]
no responsibility.”5 And while the military is eager for responsibility, it
also does not accept responsibility for the character of American society.
In fact, Bletz attributed the military’s disposition not to vote as an effort
to avoid the political taint partisanship would entail.
A sense of isolation from the larger society is further amplified by
these communities’ hierarchical nature and near total institutionalization
of members’ daily lives. Both communities, Bletz observed, employ
hierarchies that determine who is brought in, what achievements they
are recognized for, and whether and to what position or rank they
are promoted. Of course those hierarchies are more decentralized in
academia than in the military; for Bletz, this translated into more local
autonomy for academics on individual campuses.

2.
3.
4.
5.

Bletz, “Mutual Misperceptions,” 6.
Bletz, “Mutual Misperceptions,” 6.
Bletz, “Mutual Misperceptions,” 4–6.
Bletz, “Mutual Misperceptions,” 4.
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Bletz argued it was “the rank structure in both professions which
makes the systems work.”6 While there are certainly similarities, a
closer look suggests these similarities are superficial. Both communities
certainly have formal structures. In the military there are levels
of command within which roles are further differentiated between
command and staff functions. In this structure autonomy, at least as
it is related to the function of the institution, is proportionate to level:
the higher the level of command, the more autonomy one has. The
problem for the military is that this arrangement can often privilege
the desire for stability and control over the demands of the profession,
which values flexibility, discretion, and innovation among other things.7
In academia, however, power and authority are not simply
decentralized, it is diffused. While a hierarchy of presidents, provosts,
and deans oversees the academic enterprise, actual governance is
shared by a number of actors including a board of trustees, a president,
faculty, and to a lesser degree, students. This system is intended to
foster cooperation between these actors by creating a more democratic
decision-making process. But because it diffuses autonomy throughout
the system, the system can be slow and resistant to change and often pits
the faculty, usually in the body of a faculty senate, against the university
leadership. The effect is often gridlock.8 So, while by title, position, and
rank university presidents, provosts, and deans might seem analogous
to military commanders, their functionalities are very different.
In another important difference, academia is comprised of
competing hierarchies in a way the military is not. In addition to the
campus hierarchy, academics are also governed by the fields they work
in, which can provide certification or even curriculum guidance. In the
military this arrangement would be analogous to functional branches
having input into whether a platoon leader, for example, executed a
particular operation correctly. But because of the relationship between
academic reputation and opportunities for promotion, academics can
depend as much if not more on their field of study for that reputation
than the university that would promote them.
Concurrent with this hierarchical structure, both institutions
provide for a variety of personal needs to the point that venturing into
the larger society can feel, if not actually be, optional. Where the military
has “commissaries, post exchanges, [and] service clubs,” academia
has “cooperative shopping facilities, bookstores, student unions, and
faculty clubs.”9 Bletz recognized but did not explore this fact; however,
it is not hard to see the immersive experience of both communities

6. Bletz, “Mutual Misperceptions,” 5.
7. James G. Pierce, The Organizational Culture of the U.S. Army: Is the Organizational Culture of the
Army Congruent with the Professional Development of Its Senior Level Officer Corps? (Carlisle Barracks, PA:
Strategic Studies Institute, 2010), iv, 106–7.
8. Derek Bok, Higher Education in America, rev. ed. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
2013), 44–71.
9. Bletz, “Mutual Misperceptions,” 5.
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makes interaction with and understanding of the larger society, or vice
versa, necessary.
Bletz argued this near total institutionalization, coupled with
society’s ambivalence regarding the utility of each community, isolates
the military and academia from American society. He did acknowledge
this isolation was largely self-imposed and illustrated this dynamic
in an admittedly cartoonish fashion: where academics are “quiet and
intelligent, but apparently unmanly” the soldier is “manly, but not
too intelligent.”10 Where the former emphasizes thinking, the latter
emphasizes doing. They are joined together by a mutual alcohol problem
and are saved from obscurity and irrelevance by “[the] rugged [civilian]
individual, clad in buckskin who somehow compensates for [their]
shortcomings.”11
Interestingly, Bletz wrote when those views were beginning to
change, at least for the military. American society has always had an
aversion to a standing, professional military largely due to the original
colonists’ experience with the military’s role in domestic oppression in
the countries from which they came.12 As a result, the military had to
fight to earn its status as a profession. The Vietnam experience further
soured the military’s relationship with the American people who were no
longer interested in allowing their children to be drafted to fight wars of
dubious necessity. As a result, the military in the 1970s transitioned to an
all-volunteer force. While that change has further exacerbated the sense
of social isolation—less than one-half of 1 percent of the population
now serve—popular confidence in the military as an institution is above
70 percent, reaching a high of 74 percent in 2018, up from a low of 50
percent in 1981.13
In the 50 years since Bletz wrote his article, campus life has changed
dramatically. The massacre at Kent State University marked a shift away
from the politically active campuses of the 1960s and early 1970s.14 Since
then college campuses have become more diverse, more expensive, and
more focused on preprofessional studies and skills development rather
than education for education’s sake.15 Due to the shift in the 1980s from
grant-heavy to loan-heavy financial aid awards, the amount of student
debt has increased to the point where the cost-benefit analysis of a
10. Bletz, “Mutual Misperceptions,” 4.
11. Bletz, “Mutual Misperceptions,” 4.
12. Sam C. Sarkesian and Robert E. Connor Jr., The US Military Profession into the Twenty-First
Century: War, Peace and Politics, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 1999), 60.
13. “Demographics of the U.S. Military,” Council on Foreign Relations, July 13, 2020,
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/demographics-us-military; and Gallup, “Military and National
Defense,” https://news.gallup.com/poll/1666/military-national-defense.aspx.
14. Jerry Lembcke, “The Times, They Changed,” Chronicle of Higher Education, April 25, 2010,
https://www.chronicle.com/article/the-times-they-changed.
15. Imed Bouchrika, “11 Top Trends in Higher Education: 2020/2021 Data, Insights &
Predictions,” Guide2Research, August 24, 2020, https://www.guide2research.com/research
/trends-in-higher-education; and Maura Hohman, “Why is College So Expensive? 4 Reasons for
the Ever-rising Costs,” Today, October 16, 2020, https://www.today.com/tmrw/why-college-so
-expensive-4-reasons-ever-rising-costs-t194972.
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traditional college education raises questions about its overall utility.16
In contrast to the military, public confidence in higher education in 2018
was 48 percent, despite—or because of—36 percent of the population
over 25 attaining bachelor’s degrees.17 Today higher education is in the
midst of a reexamination of its purpose and relevance within the larger
society.18 In many ways, the public perception of both professions has
flipped in the last half century.

Relationship to Each Other

The separation of the academic and military communities would
be sustainable if it were not for two points of convergence. The first
point is the accessions process for military officers. In 1970 the Reserve
Officer Training Corps (ROTC) was the largest source of commissions
for the Army, producing around 12,400 graduates a year.19 From 1968
to 1974, however, ROTC closed 88 detachments, many of which were in
elite universities in the northeast. The reasons for those closures were
complex. The common narrative is that popular opposition to the war
in Vietnam, exacerbated by the shootings at Kent State, encouraged
schools to end their ROTC programs.20
While it is true some ROTC units closed temporarily due to
vandalism—Kent State before the massacre—the reason generally
given by the schools to the Department of Defense was that ROTC
courses did not meet the school’s academic standards and thus were not
eligible for credit. The Department decided to close and relocate those
detachments rather than revise the courses, and it also established 80
new detachments, mostly in schools in the south and west.21
These conditions shaped the quantity, quality, and diversity of the
officer corps and determined the potential for interactions between
future military officers and the future cultural and policy elites in the
United States. Two recent studies have shown that while the percentage
of people who graduate from elite schools and attain the most influential
policy positions may have decreased since mid-century when sociologists
16. Lynn Pasquerella, “The Purpose of Higher Education and Its Future,” Liberal Education 105,
no. 3–4 (Summer/Fall 2019), https://www.aacu.org/liberaleducation/2019/summer-fall/president.
17. Scott Jaschik, “Falling Confidence in Higher Ed: Gallup Finds Unusually Large Drop—
Primarily but Not Exclusively among Republicans—between 2015 and 2018,” Inside Higher Ed,
October 9, 2018, https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2018/10/09/gallup-survey-finds-falling
-confidence-higher-education; and “U.S. Census Bureau Releases New Educational Attainment
Data,” United States Census Bureau, March 30, 2020, https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press
-releases/2020/educational-attainment.html.
18. Pasquerella, “Higher Education.”
19. “Army Is Shortening Active Duty for Half of R. O. T. C. Graduates,” New York Times,
August 8, 1970, https://www.nytimes.com/1970/08/08/archives/army-is-shortening-active-duty
-for-half-of-rotc-graduates.html.
20. Larry Gordon, “Top U.S. Schools Welcoming ROTC Back to Campus,” Chicago Tribune,
July 6, 2011, https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-2011-07-06-ct-met-rotc-national
-20110706-story.html.
21. Diane H. Mazur, “The R.O.T.C. Myth,” New York Times, October 24, 2010,
https://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/25/opinion/25Mazur.html; and Jean Marbella, “ROTC
Resurgent on College Campuses Where Once Scorned,” Baltimore Sun, November 18, 2001,
https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/bs-xpm-2001-11-18-0111180052-story.html.
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developed the theories of elite formation, elite schools count among their
alumni a disproportionate number of business, policy, and cultural elites
relative to the total number of graduates.22 With close to 87 percent of all
college graduates having no military experience, it stands to reason weak
connections and mistrust exist between academics and the military.23
Bletz argued the second point of convergence occurred when
academics crossed over into government. As Bletz noted, academics,
particularly scientists, enthusiastically participated in weapons
development in support of then President Franklin Roosevelt’s New
Deal and the Second World War—a war with broad public support.
In particular, the academic community—contrary to its purpose—kept
criticism to a minimum, especially over matters that would later become
controversial in the 1960s such as unconditional surrender and the
employment of the atomic bomb.24
Despite general opposition to the Vietnam War, some members
of the academic community—or at least persons with academic
backgrounds—moved into government and participated in making war
policy. Bletz specifically mentioned Henry Kissinger, a Harvard faculty
member who was critical of the military’s attrition strategy employed
at the beginning of the war. Bletz could also have mentioned Robert
McNamara, secretary of defense from 1961 to 1968. In what is sometimes
referred to as the “McNamara Revolution,” he brought in a number of
so-called whiz kids from academia and research centers who tried to
impose a single common method for management, acquisitions, and
budgeting for all the services, many elements of which exist to this day.25
While McNamara did solicit the advice of senior military leaders
in implementing his reforms, they offered little constructive input and
were eventually marginalized from much of the budget decision-making
process.26 In fact, the relationship between the Joint Staff and senior
civilian leadership—including President Lyndon Johnson—was frayed
because the options the Joint Staff gave for prosecuting the war were
not viable.27
Related to this point of convergence, academia at the time was
showing a growing interest in military affairs. This interest took two
forms. One form was the development of the field of strategic studies,
best represented by Thomas C. Schelling, that drew on the fields of
22. Steven Brint and Sarah R. K. Yoshikawa, “The Educational Backgrounds of American
Business and Government Leaders: Inter-Industry Variation in Recruitment from Elite Colleges and
Graduate Programs,” Social Forces 96, no. 2 (2017): 561–90, http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/sf/sox059;
and Steven Brint et al., “Where Ivy Matters: The Educational Backgrounds of U.S. Cultural Elites,”
Sociology of Education 93, no. 2 (2020): 153–72, http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0038040719898505.
23. Lynn Milan, “Characteristics of College Graduates, with a Focus on Veterans,” InfoBrief,
National Center for Science and Engineering Statistics, NSF 19-300, National Science Foundation,
October 22, 2018, 7, https://www.nsf.gov/statistics/2019/nsf19300/nsf19300.pdf.
24. Bletz, “Mutual Misperceptions,” 8.
25. Charles A. Stevenson, Warriors and Politicians: US Civil-Military Relations under Stress (New
York: Routledge, 2006), 153.
26. Stevenson, Warriors and Politicians, 154.
27. Steven L. Rearden, Council of War: A History of the Joints Chiefs of Staff 1942–1991
(Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2012), 286.
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economics, political science, and international relations to inform
policies on the employment and use of the military. The other form,
pioneered by scholars such as Samuel P. Huntington and Morris Janowitz,
developed into the field of military sociology, which sought to inform
military organizational policies.28
Both fields have grown considerably, bringing academia and the
military closer together in ways Bletz did not anticipate. These programs
have provided a path for military officers to obtain advanced degrees
in these fields, ensuring such expertise resides within the military. For
example, the Army now sends over 400 officers to advanced civilian
schooling every year.29 And these officers do not just teach at service
academies or at professional military education institutions as Bletz did.
Many others, particularly foreign area officers and strategic planners, go
directly to operational assignments after graduation. The effect, of course,
is the military is better able to participate in, and thus control, many of
the external reforms civilian academics recommend. A good example of
this integration is the development of counterinsurgency strategy during
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, promulgated by military officers
with advanced degrees and members of civilian academia.30
The military is further favored in this dynamic because it is much
easier for an officer to move from the military into academia than it is
for an academic to move into the military. One difference Bletz did not
note was that the military discharges its members much earlier in life
than academia. Many senior officers reach mandatory retirement age
while still in their late forties and early fifties, and some elect to take
their military experience and advanced degrees and seek positions in
academia. According to data collected by George Mason University’s
Schar School of Policy and Government Mapping Shadow Influence
project, since the early 1990s over 200 academic-related positions have
been filled by retired O8-level (major general) officers and above.31
Some very senior retired military officers have gone on to lead
universities, such as Admiral William H. McRaven, the former chancellor
of the University of Texas System, Air Force General Richard B. Myers
who is currently the president of Kansas State University, and Army
Lieutenant General Robert L. Caslen who is now the president of the
University of South Carolina. Of course, as was the case with Caslen,
not all were initially welcomed.32 Nonetheless, the fact they are able to
acquire such senior positions suggests the rift between academia and the
28. Bletz, “Mutual Misperceptions,” 8.
29. United States Army, “Advanced Civil Schooling,” MyArmyBenefits, August 31, 2020,
https://myarmybenefits.us.army.mil/Benefit-Library/Federal-Benefits/Advanced-Civil-Schooling
-(ACS)?serv=122.
30. Sarah Sewall, “Introduction,” in The U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field
Manual No. 3-24, Marine Corps Warfighting Publication No. 3-33.5 (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 2006), xxi–xliii.
31. Janine R.Wedel and Julia L. E. Pfaff, “Mapping Shadow Influence project,” George
Mason Schar School of Public Policy and Government, 2020.
32. Lucas Daprile, “Despite Opposition, Gamecocks Pick Retired General as School’s Next
President,” Military.com, July 20, 2019, https://www.military.com/daily-news/2019/07/20/despite
-opposition-gamecocks-pick-retired-general-schools-next-president.html.
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military, while real, may not be as big as Bletz originally suggested. Bletz
himself became president of Wilson College in nearby Chambersburg,
Pennsylvania, where he became an honorary alumnus for his leadership.33
While it is easier for the military to transition to academia, a growing
number of research partnerships between the Department of Defense
and academic institutions focus not just on hard sciences and technology
but on the humanities as well. The DoD Minerva Research Initiative
grants program supporting social science research has provided $20 to
$22 million in funding, much of which was allocated to social science
research and was both widely accepted and criticized within the social
science community.34 A number of university-based research centers
also receive DoD and private donor funding.35

Policy Implications

What Bletz did get right is that rift, no matter how big, can produce
disastrous results for national security. What should have been a
“brilliant” cooperative enterprise ended up, in the case of Vietnam, in
disaster with academics fleeing policy making to write books to “explain
away” their involvement.36 In the case of Vietnam, Bletz argued from
the military perspective, asserting academics not only created the
policies that led to the war, but their military reforms, especially under
McNamara, alienated senior military leadership from the decision
making. From the academic-turned-policymaker perspective, the fault
lay with an incompetent military that could not figure out how to defeat
a much less technologically advanced enemy, thereby ensuring those
policies would fail.
This dynamic repeated itself in the 1990s and early 2000s. In the
1990s, much of the academic community protested the presence of
ROTC on campuses as well as other engagements with the military
because of opposition to the military’s policies prohibiting lesbian, gay,
bisexual, transgender, and queer (LGBTQ) individuals from joining.37
While perhaps not as impactful as the closings in the 1960s, a number
of top-tier schools, including Stanford, Brown, and Harvard, excluded
ROTC from their campuses until the ban on LGBTQ participation was
lifted in 2011.38 Now that the military has dropped most of its barriers
33. Wilson College, “Alumnae Association of Wilson College Awards,” June 7, 2020,
https://www.wilson.edu/aawc-awards.
34. Elizabeth Redden, “Pentagon Proposes Cuts to Social Science Research,” Inside Higher
Ed, March 5, 2020, https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2020/03/05/pentagons-social-science
-research-program-chopping-block.
35. The Military Family Research Institute at Purdue University (website), https://www.mfri
.purdue.edu/.
36. Bletz, “Mutual Misperceptions,” 9.
37. Devin Dwyer, “Repeal of Gay Ban Opens Door to ROTC Return at Top Schools,” ABC
News, December 21, 2010, https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/dont-repeal-rotc-return-university
-campuses/story?id=12453612; and James Fallows, “DADT and Ivy League ROTC,” Atlantic, May 24,
2010, https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2010/05/dadt-and-ivy-league-rotc/57203/.
38. Karen McVeigh and Paul Harris, “US Military Lifts Ban on Openly Gay Troops,” Guardian,
September 20, 2011, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/sep/20/us-military-lifts-ban-gay
-troops; and Gordon, “Top U.S. Schools.”
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to service by members of the LGBTQ community, it has enjoyed more
access and less opposition on college campuses.
Like Vietnam, the involvement of the academic community in
national security policy in the decision to go to war in Iraq and in
elements of the execution of the war itself produced grim results. One
reason cited for the US decision to invade Iraq was the writings of
political philosopher Leo Strauss suggesting regime change was the only
proper way to deal with a “great anti-modern tyrant” such as Saddam
Hussein.39 Academic influences did not stop there. The military, in
an effort to demonstrate it had learned some lessons from Vietnam,
invited academia to participate in operations. Not only were individual
scholars employed for their political science and democracy-building
expertise, the military tried to purchase academic experience wholesale
by establishing Human Terrain System teams, comprised of experienced
anthropologists and others from relevant fields, to advise commanders
on how to navigate cultural pitfalls in rebuilding Iraq and Afghanistan.40
Perhaps not surprisingly those efforts did not go well. Bletz
complained academics in government in the Vietnam era ran back to
academia to write books absolving them of responsibility. Much the
same happened in Iraq. Whether one wants to impute, malign, or simply
display selfish intent as Bletz did, the fact is a number of high-profile
academics who assisted the military in Iraq did just that. An obvious
case in point is Stanford scholar Larry Diamond and his book Squandered
Victory: The American Occupation and the Bungled Effort to Bring Democracy
to Iraq.41
The damage inflicted by the effort to include academia in the
execution of the war went even deeper. The American Anthropological
Association declared participation in the Human Terrain System
program unethical and discouraged its members from participating.42
While some anthropologists did participate, many positions had to
be filled with inadequately qualified persons. As a result, many teams
without the relevant expertise went to the field, which resulted in
predictable and disastrous results.43
These disasters, however, were less a result of the differences
between the military and academic communities, than they were a
function of academia and the military growing closer together. The
39. Scott Horton, “Leo Strauss and the Iraq War,” Harper’s Magazine, June 3, 2009,
https://harpers.org/2009/06/leo-strauss-and-the-iraq-war/.
40. Scott Jaschik, “Embedded Conflicts,” Inside Higher Ed, July 7, 2015, https://www
.insidehighered.com/news/2015/07/07/army-shuts-down-controversial-human-terrain-systemcriticized-many-anthropologists.
41. Larry Diamond, Squandered Victory: The American Occupation and the Bungled Effort to Bring
Democracy to Iraq (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2005).
42. Jaschik, “Embedded Conflicts”; and “AAA Opposes U.S. Military’s Human Terrain System
Project,” American Anthropological Association, https://www.americananthro.org/ConnectWithAAA
/Content.aspx?ItemNumber=1626, accessed January 14, 2021.
43. Christopher J. Lamb et al., Human Terrain Teams: An Organizational Innovation for Sociocultural
Knowledge in Irregular Warfare (Washington, DC: Institute of World Politics, 2013), 50–55; and
Brian R. Price, “Human Terrain at the Crossroads,” Joint Force Quarterly 87 (4th Quarter/October
2017), https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Publications/Article/1325979/human-terrain-at-the-crossroads/.
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difficulty with such proximity was and continues to be the outsized
influence of the military over the academic national security agenda.
Not only does the military pay for research, it pays tuition that helps
fill classrooms and then cycles its graduates, many of whom are as well
credentialed as their academic counterparts, often either back into
academia or to military institutions that interact with academia.

Conclusion

The result is a “damned if you do, damned if you don’t” dynamic
suggesting a harmonic relationship between academia and the military is
not only impossible, it may also be undesired. When the military controls
too much of the agenda, it risks losing an important critical voice—only
valuable as such when lightly connected. Ties are important; the right
ties are critical.
Unfortunately, Bletz’s—as well as this review’s—anecdotal
approach to the issues raised do not provide much of a basis to form
recommendations. Bletz, however, shed a light, albeit a dim one, on a
civil-military dynamic that given the disastrous outcomes to date, appears
to be poorly understood, at least by the members the communities
themselves. Accordingly, this analysis recommends more attention and
study be focused on the academia-military dynamic in the interest of
seeking balance rather than expanding or improving cooperation and
convergence between the two.
It may be the case that academia and the military can serve society
separately. But the natural synergies as well as the desire to do good will
ensure separation will never be complete. In fact, perhaps Bletz’s most
important insight regarded the dependency each community has on the
other for its status. Due to the points of convergence, the result of the
Vietnam War diminished the prestige of both institutions not only “in
the eyes of each other” but “in the eyes of the nation as a whole.”44 This
point only further underscores the importance of both communities to
national security.
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Soviet Economic Reform—
Surprisingly Prescient
Robert E. Hamilton
ABSTRACT: Writing in 1971, economist Dr. John P. Hardt assessed
the trajectory of the Soviet economy arguing the need for reform
and evaluating the willingness of key actors in the Soviet bureaucracy
to support such policies. Fifty years later, Hardt was remarkably
prescient with regard to structural difficulties such reform posed
and the costs of delay. The pervasive role of internal and external
security concerns in the following decades, however, resulted in
economic decisions that defied traditional economic analysis.

P

redicting the future is hard. Predicting the future of a country
Winston Churchill described as “a riddle wrapped in a mystery
inside an enigma” is notoriously difficult.1 Despite the growth
of an entire class of so-called Sovietologists inside Western academic and
policy circles by the late 1980s, few predicted the Soviet Union would
collapse, and none predicted the precise timing and manner of its demise.
Although many observers of the Soviet Union saw the need for reform
by the 1980s, Dr. John P. Hardt was far ahead of the curve. Writing in
Parameters in 1971, Hardt pointed out the need for reform of the Soviet
economy, explained why such reform would be difficult, and concluded
every year it was delayed the cost of these efforts would increase. To be
sure, Hardt did not get everything right, but he got enough right that his
article deserves re-examination for the lessons it still holds 50 years after
its publication.

View from 1971

Hardt begins his article by noting Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev
had announced in 1969 that improved economic performance was a
“first order agenda item for the Party,” setting off a fierce debate between
proponents of a return to a “Stalinist heavy industry-military priority”
and proponents of economic modernization focused on the civilian
economy.2 The problem was falling productivity. Unless productivity
increased, Hardt believed labor shortages would inhibit fulfillment of
the economic goals outlined in the Five-Year Plan for 1971–75. The
solution was obvious: the release of able-bodied males from the armed
forces. Such a policy would alleviate the labor shortages and buy time for
the Soviet economy to modernize and accrue the accompanying gains in

1. Winston Churchill, “The Russian Enigma” (BBC Broadcast, October 1, 1939, transcribed by
The Churchill Society), http://www.churchill-society-london.org.uk/RusnEnig.html.
2. John P. Hardt, “Brezhnev’s Economic Choice: More Weapons and Control or Economic
Modernization,” Parameters 1, no. 1 (Fall 1971): 43.
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efficiency. While obvious, the solution was a tough sell inside the Soviet
Communist Party due to the “pervasive military influence” there.3
Hardt saw two issues that might shape Soviet economic policy
options moving forward. The first was the familiar “guns versus butter”
debate—the tension between investment in the military and investment
in growth-stimulating consumer goods. Here he thought the power
of the Soviet military-industrial complex would mitigate against the
reallocation of resources toward consumer goods. But Hardt saw another
issue, one that cut across the guns versus butter debate. This issue pitted
the economic professional interested in maximizing efficiency against
the party functionary interested in maximizing control.
Hardt believed the emergence of a de facto alliance of economic
and military professionals might overcome the resistance of party
bureaucrats and allow for economic modernization. Economic and
military professionals would be interested in maximizing both efficiency
and their own ability to make decisions on resource allocation, free from
central party control. As he explained it, “how to formulate economic
plans to implement party policy and how to choose among military
weapons systems to meet requirements of given missions are technical
and professional tasks best performed by the professional institutional
groups rather than the party bureaucrats.”4 In this case, the alliance of
military and economic technocrats might be able to inject rationality and
efficiency into the ideologically hidebound and sclerotic thinking that
dominated Soviet economic planning.
Hardt believed how the guns versus butter and “control versus
efficiency” issues were resolved would frame the economic choices
available to future Soviet planners. He outlined three possible lines of
development for the Soviet Union in the years after 1971. The first line
was a return to the essential features of the Stalinist system of priorities,
control, and administration. Hardt saw such a return as unlikely, mostly
because he thought Stalin’s system could not work without Stalin’s
terror, and Soviet leaders had lost the appetite for unleashing such terror
on their society.
The next path he saw was a continuation of the equivocal, modified
Stalinist system currently in place, in which the economy would still be
focused on military and industrial production, but without the repressive
measures of Stalinism. This outcome would mean “continued strategicmilitary emphasis with institutional stagnation or economic immobilism
[emphasis in original].”5 Hardt saw this path as problematic because it
failed to address the core problem of stagnant economic productivity.
Although he thought the emergence of a new, professionally trained
planning cadre and managerial class might allow for increases in
performance, he noted those increases would be modest without the
3. Hardt, “Brezhnev’s Economic Choice,” 46.
4. Hardt, “Brezhnev’s Economic Choice,” 45.
5. Hardt, “Brezhnev’s Economic Choice,” 51.
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release of resources from the military sector and the delegation of
authority from the party’s center.
Finally, Hardt thought declining economic conditions might force
the hand of party bureaucrats. The third line of development he outlined
envisioned significant changes to the Soviet system. In this case, the
policy-making elite would become more pluralistic and professional, and
management of the economy would become more focused on efficiency
and market stimulation. This transformation would not come about
organically but as a response to an economic crisis.
Economic crisis could force the shift from defense expenditures to growthstimulating ones that would not otherwise be made. In other words, the
shift from defense might be resisted on policy grounds but be taken as
the only viable economic alternative. Economic crisis could likewise
bring about a shift of control to the economic planners and managers in
the quest for recovery.6

Hardt concluded by arguing the longer the Soviet elite delayed
addressing its economic issues, the more difficult these issues would
be to resolve. In perhaps the most prescient sentence of the article, he
concluded “the cost of equivocation is high and rising.” 7

Evaluating Hardt

Hardt was correct on many counts. He understood declining
productivity and the looming labor shortage were serious problems. He
grasped that the pervasive influence of the military over the economy
was going to make reallocation of manpower from the military to the
civilian economy difficult and would complicate the shift from militaryindustrial production to growth-stimulating consumer goods. He also
seemed to perceive that, writing in 1971, he was standing at an inflection
point in history, something difficult to do in the moment.
With the benefit of hindsight, the economist Robert C. Allen says
the Soviet economy grew rapidly from 1928 to around 1970 because it
“accumulated capital and created industrial jobs for people otherwise
inefficiently employed in agriculture.”8 After 1970 the growth rate
dropped abruptly for internal and external reasons—externally the Cold
War diverted resources to the military, cutting the rate of productivity
growth; internally the end of the surplus labor economy choked off
growth. By 1970 “unemployment in agriculture had been eliminated
and the accessible natural resources of the country had been fully
exploited.”9 The fact that Allen, writing in 2001, agreed with the main
conclusions Hardt arrived at 30 years earlier speaks to the prescience of
the latter’s analysis.

6. Hardt, “Brezhnev’s Economic Choice,” 52.
7. Hardt, “Brezhnev’s Economic Choice,” 52.
8. Robert C. Allen, “The Rise and Decline of the Soviet Economy,” Canadian Journal of Economics
34, no. 4 (November 2001): 878.
9. Allen, “Rise and Decline,” 878–79.
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Hardt understood military spending was a drag on Soviet economic
growth, and that the strength of the military in Soviet policy-making
circles would impede the reallocation of resources toward more
productive ends. But he did not think change was impossible, arguing
the emergence of an alliance of military and economic technocrats or an
economic crisis could provide the catalyst for reform. This perspective
turned out to be too optimistic. Had Hardt delved more deeply into
the reasons for the military’s dominance in policy making he would
have been more pessimistic about the ability of the Soviet system to
right itself—the outsized role of the military in Soviet policy making
was itself the effect of the Soviet government’s understanding of the
world and the Soviet Union’s place in it.10 So diverting resources from
security spending to more productive purposes would not just involve
a realignment of policy priorities but a shift in the Soviet government’s
entire worldview.
This worldview saw Soviet security as constantly under threat and
believed superior military force was the only way for the country to
survive. The economist Mark Harrison argues national security
considerations were decisive at every point in Soviet decision making. In
the Bolsheviks’ understanding of the world, they faced dual threats from
an external enemy and an internal enemy, and these enemies colluded
with and reinforced each other. To meet these threats, the economy
was organized to “mobilize against the foreign enemy and suppress the
enemy within.”11
Forced industrialization allowed mass production of military
machinery. Forced collectivization prevented farmers from starving the
towns and the army. And mass killings eliminated “potential enemies,”
those who would “cheer the leaders when it was costless to do so but
would betray them in time of war.”12 Western economists called the
Soviet economy a command economy because it directed efforts to a
few public priorities, imposed rigid quantitative controls on the entire
supply chain, and suppressed private motivation in favor of patriotic
appeals and direct compulsion. But Polish economist Oskar Lange
noted “this was what every society now did in time of war. What called
itself socialism . . . was really a ‘war economy.’ ”13
In an economy on a permanent wartime footing, it is unsurprising
the military played an outsized role in decision making. Historian Chris
Miller gives a revealing account of the military’s role in economic
policy making. Not only could the military claim to be defending the
country from “capitalist aggression,” but it employed some 15 million
people (around 10 percent of the total workforce), conducted 75 percent

10. Mark Harrison, “The Soviet Economy, 1917–1991: Its Life and Afterlife,” Independent Review
22, no. 2 (Fall 2017): 202.
11. Harrison, “Soviet Economy,” 201.
12. Harrison, “Soviet Economy,” 201.
13. Harrison, “Soviet Economy,” 202.
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of the country’s scientific research, and used 60 percent of its steel.14
Even before Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in 1985—14 years
after Hardt warned equivocation would raise the cost of addressing the
USSR’s economic problems—the need for reform was urgent and was
obvious to some in the Communist Party. But according to Gorbachev
the power of the military was such “that even a mention of [cutting the
defense budget] would mean immediate dismissal” from the party.15
The military also resisted attempts to make its budget more
transparent. When Gorbachev finally managed to gain a complete view
of Soviet defense spending in 1987, he expressed his frustration that
“military expenditure was not 16 per cent of the state budget, as we had
been told, but rather 40 per cent.”16
But the military was not the only impediment to reform. Miller
details the rise of two additional bureaucratic-economic interest groups
that together with the military-industrial complex had come to dominate
party policy making by the 1980s. These were the agro-industrial
complex and the fuel-energy complex. Inside these three complexes,
economic bureaucrats and industrial interest groups developed
power bases and patronage networks that allowed them essentially to
implement their own policies, sometimes in opposition to those directed
by the Kremlin.17 Officials often spent their entire careers within the
same sector, creating “interconnected webs of relationships, favors,
and loyalty.”18
Like the military, the agricultural and energy sectors argued they
were critical to the state. The agricultural sector noted it employed
millions of citizens and highlighted the Soviet propaganda that
portrayed collectivization as “one of the great successes of socialism.”19
The energy complex proclaimed it provided the bulk of the country’s
export revenue.20 As Miller concludes, Gorbachev’s basic dilemma was
the economic sectors that most needed reform to balance the budget had
the power to prevent that reform.21
The fact Hardt failed to understand the power of the three
bureaucratic-economic interest groups that foiled attempts to reform
the Soviet economy is not surprising for two reasons. First, when Hardt
was writing in 1971 the power of the military-industrial and agroindustrial complexes was already significant, but neither had yet gained
the ability essentially to capture the state budgeting process. The fuelenergy complex only gained prominence after the 1973 oil price spike.

14. Chris Miller, The Struggle to Save the Soviet Economy: Mikhail Gorbachev and the Collapse of the
USSR (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2016), 59.
15. Miller, Struggle to Save, 59.
16. Miller, Struggle to Save, 60.
17. Miller, Struggle to Save, 57.
18. Miller, Struggle to Save, 58.
19. Miller, Struggle to Save, 59.
20. Miller, Struggle to Save, 59.
21. Miller, Struggle to Save, 180.
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Figure 1. Soviet Union and Russa Military Spending
Source of data: US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1966-1975 (Washington, DC: US Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency, Department of State, 1976), https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/185668.pdf; and Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), “SIPRI Military Expenditure Database,” SIPRI (website), https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex.
(Map by Pete McPhail)
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Predicting these three groups would together gain enough power to
strangle attempts at reform would have taken a special gift for prophecy.
Next, as an economist Hardt would presumably have expected
the Soviet government to make a value-maximizing decision. He
said as much when he wrote, “the Soviet economy is likely . . . to
find economic performance a factor influencing sharp revisions in
resource allocation—especially from defense to investment—and
a significant increase in the permissive environment for economic
reform.”22 But plenty of research in political science, such as the work
of Graham Allison, Philip Zelikow, and David Houghton, explains
why governments often make non-value-maximizing choices.23 One of
these explanations focuses on the role of government bureaucracies and
their tendency to equate their own interest with the national interest—a
phenomenon clearly visible in Miller’s discussion of the role of the three
bureaucratic-economic interest groups in preventing reform.
Hardt got one final observation right, and it is substantial. He
correctly predicted a return to the Stalinist system of priorities, control,
and administration was unlikely because it would require a return to
Stalin’s tactics of terror, something the Soviet Union was not ready to
relive. In Hardt’s words, “the author does not believe that the Stalinist
terror could be reinstated again, nor that the leaders of a complex, more
modern Soviet state could or would pay the price of depriving their
society of its professionals and thinkers.”24
Miller agrees, observing that the political class, which had suffered
through Stalinism and the Second World War, welcomed Brezhnev’s
policy of stability at the top level of the party as a respite from the fear and
violence of Stalinism. But what neither Hardt nor Brezhnev could have
foreseen was the effect this policy would have on the Soviet economy.
As Miller writes, “in Stalin’s state socialist economy, violence played the
same role that market incentives play in a capitalist economy—a means
of ensuring that workers and managers work hard and effectively.”25
When the threat of violence faded, so did the incentive to meet the
increasingly ambitious economic targets in the Soviet Five-Year Plans.
Soviet economic performance suffered as a result.

Conclusions and Lessons

Any author writing in Parameters today would be gratified to have
his or her work stand the test of time as well as Hardt’s article has. He
saw the need for reform of the Soviet economy before most Western
observers did. He also understood the role of the military would
complicate that reform, and each year of delay would raise the cost
and lower the chances of success in modernizing the Soviet economy.
22. Hardt, “Brezhnev’s Economic Choice,” 45.
23. Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 2nd
ed. (New York: Longman, 1999); and David Patrick Houghton, The Decision Point: Six Cases in U.S.
Foreign Policy Decision Making (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2012).
24. Hardt, “Brezhnev’s Economic Choice,” 51.
25. Miller, Struggle to Save, 56.
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Perhaps most impressively, he seemed to understand he was writing at
an inflection point: from 1928 until 1970 the Soviet economy had grown
rapidly but began to decline in the 1970s. That decline accelerated in
the 1980s, ending with the economic and political collapse of the Soviet
Union in 1991.
Writing in 1971 when many analysts—including Nobel Prize winner
Paul Samuelson—expected the Soviet economy eventually to overtake
that of the United States, Hardt was much less sanguine.26 He correctly
identified the serious structural issues Soviet planners would need to
address and the challenges to doing so.
Hardt did not get everything right. Although he identified the
influence of the military as an impediment to reform, he failed to
understand how strong an impediment it was. He also failed to address
the reason for the military’s outsized influence—the pervasive fear
of external and internal enemies colluding to bring down the Soviet
Union. This fear injected national security considerations into normally
mundane issues like industrial and agricultural policy, seriously
distorting Soviet economic decision making. Finally, as an economist
Hardt would have been trained to expect the Soviet government to
select policy options that maximized economic performance. But time
after time the Kremlin was unwilling or unable to do so until it was too
late. As Hardt had predicted, the cost of equivocation was indeed high.
Modern Russia is not the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, some of
Hardt’s insights are valuable today. Like the Soviet Union of the 1970s,
Russia of 2021 is faced with declining economic performance. After
rising rapidly from 2000–7, Russian GDP per capita flattened due to the
combined impacts of the financial crisis that began in 2008 and Western
sanctions imposed in 2014. In 2019 Russians were essentially no richer in
real terms than they were in 2008: Russian per capita GDP in 2008 was
$11,088, and in 2019 it was $12,012.27
Also like the Soviet Union, Russia’s economic problems are
structural. In the 1970s, the problem was a labor shortage; in 2020 the
problem is Russia’s hydrocarbon-dependent economy, which provides
rents that stifle investment in other sectors and leaves Russia vulnerable
to oil price fluctuations it cannot control. Finally, as it was in the Cold
War, today’s Kremlin is fixated on the idea of collusion between external
and internal enemies. The ceaseless fight against these phantom threats
gives the Russian military and security services outsized roles in Kremlin
budgeting and policy making, leaving fewer resources for addressing
Russia’s real economic and social problems.

26. Ian Harvey, “The Nobel Economist Who Predicted the Soviet Economy Would Overtake
the U.S.,” Vintage News, August 23, 2018, https://www.thevintagenews.com/2018/08/23/soviet
-gnp/, last accessed November 11, 2020.
27. Trading Economics (website), “Russia GDP per capita,” https://tradingeconomics.com
/russia/gdp-per-capita, last accessed November 11, 2020.
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Moscow in the Middle East
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ABSTRACT: In 1971 Dr. John R. Thomas documented the
involvement of the Soviet Union in the Middle East from the start
of the Cold War. Like its name and borders, the motivations for
that country’s involvement in the region have changed. Russia today
promulgates relationships with the governments of the Middle
East in a nonideological, more limited manner primarily through
economic relationships, in energy and arms sales in particular, and
in efforts to mitigate terror threats to the homeland.

F

ifty years ago Dr. John R. Thomas produced an interesting and
valuable article discussing the high point of Soviet involvement
in the Middle East. This article was written during a bipolar
international era defined by a Cold War between two competing
superpowers. In this global environment, the United States led one
power bloc, and the Soviet Union dominated the other. Some countries
sought to remain outside the conflict, but virtually all of them adjusted
their foreign policies to the realities presented by the Cold War. China at
this time was a regional power with little involvement in the Middle East.
Thomas noted the rise of China as an emerging Soviet problem, which
he identified as mostly a complication for Moscow’s strategic planning
outside the Middle East.1
Serious Soviet involvement in the Middle East began with a 1955
Soviet-approved sale of advanced weapons by Czechoslovakia to
Egypt, thinly disguised as an independent agreement between the two
countries.2 In contrast to this cover story, the extent and volume of the
weapons supply strongly suggested the bulk of them came directly from
the Soviets.3 This process helped establish support for Egypt, under
the leadership of then President Gamal Abdel Nasser, as the centerpiece
of Soviet involvement in the Middle East. Thomas maintained not all
members of the Soviet leadership supported the idea of providing aid to
Egypt, which was noncommunist and not formally aligned with either
superpower, but these doubters were overruled.

1. John R. Thomas, “The Dilemmas of Soviet Policy in the Middle East,” Parameters 1, no. 2
(1971): 35, 40.
2. William Taubman, Khrushchev: The Man and His Era (New York: W. W. Norton & Company,
2003), 359; and Kennett Love, Suez, the Twice-Fought War: A History (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1969),
247–59.
3. Love, Twice-Fought War, 244; Kenneth M. Pollack, Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948–
1991, Studies in War, Society, and the Military (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2002), 29–30.
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Still, Moscow’s decision to seek a role in the Middle East was
problematic, a situation soon exacerbated by Israel’s comprehensive
defeat of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria in the June 1967 Six-Day War. The
Moscow leadership could either escalate their involvement with Egypt
and other left-leaning states of Syria and Iraq or they could back away
from the Middle East.4 Accepting a diminished role in the region
would have risked Arab acquiescence to Western regional dominance
and possibly led to Egyptian efforts to work diplomatically with the
United States to recover territory captured by Israel in the war. To avoid
this outcome, the Soviets chose to continue supporting friendly Arab
regimes with arms and other aid despite their disillusionment with the
fighting capabilities of these countries.
Thomas noted the Soviets found themselves unable to use the
same levers of power they could wield in Eastern Europe, causing
some Arab states to become demanding clients, especially regarding
military assistance. Some Soviet leaders were also concerned rebuilding
the defeated Egyptian and Syrian militaries would not only expend
resources but could also draw the Soviet Union more deeply into a
Middle East confrontation eventually involving the United States.
The first trend was well under way when Thomas wrote the article. At
this time, the Soviets had stationed around 15,000 military advisers in
Egypt and about 800 in Syria.5 Moscow provided military assistance to
both countries and transferred more weapons and military equipment
to Egypt than to any other nation at the time, including North Vietnam,
which was then at war with the United States.6
There were, however, some limits to the Soviet military support of
Egypt, including the provision of Scud missiles and long-range military
aircraft that could be used against the Israeli heartland in a strategic role.
Leaders in Cairo believed such weapons were essential in any effort to
recapture the land Israel seized in the Six-Day War.7 At this point it was
widely known Israel had a nuclear reactor near the city of Dimona large
enough to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons.8 The Egyptians
wanted to make certain any Arab tactical victories did not lead to a
process of uncontrolled escalation in which the Israelis felt they could
employ tactical nuclear weapons without cost.9

4. Mohamed Heikal, The Sphinx and the Commissar: The Rise and Fall of Soviet Influence in the Middle
East (New York: Harper & Row, 1978), 190–95.
5. Abraham Rabinovich, The Yom Kippur War: The Epic Encounter that Transformed the Middle East
(New York: Schocken Books, 2004), 14; and US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), “Memorandum:
Soviet Activities in Syria,” CIA-RDP79B01737A002000010065-8, October 5, 1972, declassified
and approved for public release January 31, 2005, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA
-RDP79B01737A002000010065-8.pdf.
6. Jon D. Glassman, Arms for the Arabs: The Soviet Union and the War in the Middle East (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975), 68, 186, 197–98.
7. Mohamed Abdel Ghani El-Gamasy, The October War: Memoirs of Field Marshal El-Gamasy of
Egypt (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 1993), 144–46.
8. Avner Cohen, Israel and the Bomb (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), chaps. 7, 17.
9. W. Andrew Terrill, Escalation and Intrawar Deterrence During Limited Wars in the Middle East
(Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2009), 8–43.
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The Egyptians did not have tactical nuclear warheads for the Scuds,
but claimed vaguely to have chemical and biological warheads.10 Israel,
always wary of Moscow, did not rule out the possibility Egypt could
obtain nuclear warheads for the Scuds from the Soviet Union in the
event of a crisis.
Throughout the early 1970s, Egypt’s new president Anwar Sadat
was actively planning to fight a limited war against Israel to recapture
territory lost in the June 1967 war. Concurrently the Soviets, as Thomas
states, were trying to prevent a new Arab-Israeli war, which they
expected the Arab states to lose. These divergent goals were a source of
considerable tension between the two sides. Soviet-Egyptian relations
also declined further as a result of a failed May 1971 coup attempt by
Egyptian leftist leader Ali Sabry against Sadat.11 If such a coup had been
successful, it would certainly have been viewed favorably by the Soviets,
and the Egyptian president suspected complicity.
Even with these intensifying problems, the Soviets refused to
transfer the advanced offensive weapons the Egyptians were demanding.
Sadat, furious over the deadlock, took dramatic action and ordered the
Soviet Union to remove almost all of its military advisers from Egypt,
which they did.12 In this difficult environment, the Soviet Union finally
relented and supplied nonnuclear Scuds and extended-range fighterbombers to Egypt.13
Convinced he had enough of a strategic deterrent to maintain the
planned war at a nonnuclear level, Sadat struck into the Sinai Peninsula
in October 1973, while Syria simultaneously attacked into the Golan
Heights as planned. The war raged for approximately three weeks.
While the Egyptian forces achieved some brilliant tactical victories at
the beginning of the war, they were in trouble by the time the lines
stabilized before a second cease-fire. When the Soviets appeared to hint
at unilateral military action—if joint action with the United States was
impossible—the Nixon administration declared a global military alert.14
The Soviet government, never fully committed to this option, quickly
disregarded any consideration of such intervention in accordance with
fears of a wider war, which Thomas discussed.
Thomas also suggested conditions might emerge under which the
Soviets would ultimately become a secondary external power in the
Middle East. This forecast was accurate and occurred after the 1973
Arab-Israeli War, when President Sadat decisively realigned his country
with the United States in the belief that Washington, not Moscow, could
deliver a diplomatic solution to the conflict with Israel. Sadat was correct
about this choice, but no other Arab country would follow his lead for
some time.
10. Terrill, Escalation, 20–21.
11. Heikal, Sphinx, 227–28.
12. Heikal, Sphinx, 241.
13. Rabinovich, Yom Kippur War, 43; and Victor Israelyan, Inside the Kremlin during the Yom Kippur
War (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), 60.
14. Rabinovich, Yom Kippur War, 482–85.
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The Egyptians concluded a separate peace treaty with Israel in March
1979 with US sponsorship. This treaty created the conditions under
which Israel withdrew from most and then all of the Sinai Peninsula
captured during the Six-Day War. Egypt has remained an important ally
of the United States since that time and in 1987 received the formal US
designation of being a major non-NATO ally.15 Syria remained aligned
with the Soviet Union, and other Arab countries including Iraq, South
Yemen (then an independent country), and Libya continued to purchase
Soviet weapons.16
Throughout the Cold War the Soviet Union was encouraged
by the existence of communist parties in the Middle East, but none
of these organizations were able to seize power. During the Cold
War era, communist parties were sometimes important in Syria, Iraq,
Iran, and Sudan and as part of the Palestine movement. Yet even
leftist governments were wary of them and in most cases engaged in
outright persecution.
President Nasser moved to counter a takeover of the Syrian
government by the powerful Syrian communist party by agreeing to
form an Egyptian-Syrian United Arab Republic in 1958.17 In July 1971
President Sadat also provided important diplomatic and eventually
military support to the Sudanese government when it was challenged
by a communist-led and Soviet-supported coup that managed to take
power for a few days before government forces defeated the rebels.18
After the ousting of Iran’s last shah in 1979, the Soviets hoped the
communist Tūdeh (Masses) party would play a major role in the country’s
future. But these hopes turned to ashes when the Islamic government
outlawed that organization and imprisoned its leaders as subversives and
Soviet spies.19 Some Tūdeh leaders were forced to confess their supposed
crimes on television, and a few were executed.20 A number of Soviet
diplomats/intelligence operatives were simultaneously expelled from
Iran for their ties to the Tūdeh party.21 In sum, while their prospects
were promising at times, communist parties in the Middle East were
never able to establish a communist regime. Rather, their activities
created further suspicions between Moscow and even the most leftist
Middle Eastern governments.22
15. See US Department of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (website), “Major NonNATO Ally Status: Fact Sheet,” January 30, 2020, www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status.
16. Dmitri Trenin, What Is Russia Up To in the Middle East? (Medford, MA: Polity Press, 2018),
21–23.
17. Guy Laron, The Six Day War: The Breaking of the Middle East (New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press, 2017), 19.
18. David A. Korn, Assassination in Khartoum: An Institute for the Study of Diplomacy Book
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), 86–90.
19. Abbas Amanat, Iran: A Modern History (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2017), 804–5.
20. Michael Axworthy, A History of Iran: Empire of the Mind, paperback ed. (New York: Basic
Books, 2010), 267.
21. Michael Axworthy, Revolutionary Iran: A History of the Islamic Republic (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2013), 234–35.
22. See Laron, Yom Kippur War, 240.
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Thomas displayed considerable foresight but could only go so far in
accurately predicting the evolution of Middle Eastern politics 50 years
hence. This notoriously volatile region changes quickly, and the global
environment has evolved as well. The Cold War is over for now, and
the Soviet Union has been replaced by a noncommunist, though still
autocratic, regime in Russia.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russians in the early
1990s removed themselves almost entirely from an active role in the
Middle East and instead focused on retaining influence with newly
independent neighbors that had been part of the Soviet Union before its
collapse.23 These changes were not inevitable, and it would have been a
reckless long shot to predict them in the 1970s.
Moscow showed a renewed interest in playing an important role
in the Middle East in 2011 when Russian leaders felt they had been
marginalized on questions surrounding the future of Libya. At that
point, the Russians believed Western powers had used a UN Security
Council resolution creating a no-fly zone over Benghazi to justify a
much larger effort to implement regime change in Libya. They believed
these actions went well beyond the scope of the resolution.
Today Moscow seeks regional influence in the Middle East. It
has expanded diplomatic and economic relations with a number
of Middle Eastern states, and the nature of these interactions has
evolved significantly in recent years.24 Russia no longer has an
ideological component to its regional agenda. It does not seek the
establishment of communist regimes in the region nor does Russia
have a network of communist parties it can call upon to support its
objectives. Rather, its concerns are pragmatic. Russia’s emergence as
a world oil supplier has made coordination with Gulf oil producers
important to regulate competition.
Additionally, Russia seeks to be a significant arms supplier to a wide
array of Arab states and Iran.25 Russia has also become much closer to
Turkey despite different policies regarding the Syrian Civil War. In a
2019 move unthinkable during the Cold War, Turkey made an agreement
with Russia to purchase the S-400 Triumf air defense missile system.26
As during the Cold War, Russia remains close to the Syrian
regime though for different reasons than the Soviet Union. Moscow
views the Syrian regime as a bulwark against militant Islamic activities
and terrorism, which might eventually spread into the former Soviet
Republics and perhaps Russia itself. Russia sent military units to Syria
to support the Assad regime in 2015.27 These forces, especially the air
23. Trenin, What Is Russia Up To, 34, 35.
24. Gilles Kepel, Away from Chaos: The Middle East and the Challenge to the West (New York:
Columbia University Press, 2020), 294–98.
25. Kepel, Away from Chaos, 298–99.
26. “Weapons of Choice: Turkey Is Soon Due to Take Delivery of Its Russian Missiles,”
Economist, March 16, 2019, 45.
27. W. Andrew Terrill, “Strategic Insights: Will the Russians Escalate in Syria?” (Carlisle, PA:
Strategic Studies Institute, November 6, 2015).
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units, provided significant aid to Assad. But they represented a relatively
limited intervention. Assad’s most notable other allies include Iran
and the Lebanese radical Shiite group Hezbollah, which are not likely
to support Sunni Muslim insurgencies and terrorism in the former
Soviet Republics.
After the debacle of the Soviet war in Afghanistan, the Russians
have chosen to avoid or limit the use of ground troops in Middle Eastern
conflicts. In Libya and Syria, the Russians sent hundreds of mercenaries
from the Wagner Group, an organization with close ties to the Russian
government.28 While this group is clearly a tool of Moscow, its use
avoids the need to send significant numbers of conscripts to Middle
East battlegrounds. Such actions thereby avoid domestic fallout such as
the Soviet government experienced over the war in Afghanistan.
In sum, Thomas’s consideration of the Soviet role presents a useful
overview and analysis of ways in which Soviet involvement in the Middle
East occurred during the Cold War. Since that time, Moscow’s role has
evolved in ways no one could have anticipated in 1971. Yet the Cold
War remains an important chapter in Soviet and then Russian history.
Clearly Russian President Vladimir Putin looks with nostalgia at the
power and global role of the Soviet Union.29 For the present, however,
Russian goals are commensurate with their diminished power from the
Soviet era. Currently Russia has a GDP that is only 10 to 20 percent
of China’s GDP, and China rather than Russia may eventually become
something of a peer rival of the United States in the region if it chooses
to make that one of its goals.30 Russia will have influence in the Middle
East, but this influence will remain limited.

28. “Libya: The Spoiler,” Economist, January 25, 2020, 39.
29. See H. R. McMaster, Battlegrounds: The Fight to Defend the Free World (New York: HarperCollins
Publishers, 2020), 36–37.
30. See CIA, “The World Factbook,” https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/, accessed
January 7, 2021.
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US Army Reforms in the Progressive Era
J. P. Clark
©2021 J. P. Clark

ABSTRACT: A look back at F. Gunther Eyck’s assessment of
reforms enacted under US Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson may
reveal as much about the historiography of the early 1970s as it does
about Stimson’s reform efforts themselves. Eyck’s 1971 evaluation,
among the first in a decade of scholarship examining successes and
failures of Progressive Era Army reforms, raises important issues
but avoids broader considerations of the sociopolitical realities of
the United States at the turn of the twentieth century.

D

uring the 1970–71 academic year at the US Army War College,
Professor F. Gunther Eyck served as the Henry L. Stimson
Chair of Political Science. Presumably the connection with
his position’s namesake led Eyck to write a short assessment of Henry L.
Stimson’s first tenure as US secretary of war for the inaugural issue of
Parameters. While these circumstances suggest Eyck might have come to
his subject more by incident than by design, the article is worth revisiting.
In fact, Eyck’s factually sound narrative of events is relevant to military
professionals today. The article, however, can also be examined as a
product of the early 1970s—a period of institutional tumult not unlike
our own.
Scholars and professionals are inevitably products of their times; as
such, interest in particular topics ebbs and flows. Eyck’s article presaged a
wave of scholarship examining military developments and reform in the
Progressive Era (1896–1916) that would last for about a decade and then
recede, leaving the period largely neglected as a topic of research since.
The article is also emblematic of the extent to which authors depend
on the availability of conceptual tools. As historian Daniel T. Rodgers
observes, the majority of individuals are “users rather than shapers
of ideas” and depend on “the constellation of live, accessible ways of
looking at society within which they [work].”1 Eyck wrote his article just
before the advent of the so-called new military history that emphasized
the interchange between society and military institutions. Accordingly,
even though the early 1970s was a period of intense civilian scrutiny of
military affairs, the article’s analysis remained confined, in retrospect, to
a surprisingly narrow technocratic focus.
Eyck concentrated on the three most important events related to
the effectiveness and efficiency of the US Army during Stimson’s first
tenure as secretary of war: the bureaucratic and legislative battle over
the size and powers of the War Department General Staff (established
1. Daniel T. Rodgers, “In Search of Progressivism,” Reviews in American History 10, no. 4
(December 1982): 127.
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just a few years earlier in 1903), the creation of an Army Reserve, and
the reorganization of the peacetime army from a system of regional
administrative units into one of tactical divisions. The article concludes
with a brief summation of several lesser reforms instituted by Stimson
and his failure to create a cross-departmental body similar to our present
National Security Council.
In its basic portrayal of events, Eyck’s analysis withstands the test of
time. While subsequent scholarship has added some details to the events
described—particularly the circumstances surrounding Stimson’s relief
of the main opponent of a strong General Staff, Adjutant General
Frederick Ainsworth—the basic narrative given in the Parameters article
has remained largely unaltered.
Eyck’s interpretation of those events also still falls within the
bounds of scholarly conventional wisdom, albeit toward a less popular
margin of that band. Eyck concluded Stimson was an effective reformer
who successfully continued the work of his friend, mentor, and law
partner Elihu Root—a transformative secretary of war from 1899 to
1903. Russell F. Weigley, a leading US Army historian, came to a similar
conclusion in his magisterial institutional history first published in
1967. Weigley deemed Stimson one of the greatest secretaries of war of
all time.2
Other accounts, however, cast Stimson mainly as a supportive
adjunct to then Chief of Staff of the US Army Leonard Wood rather
than a major reformer in his own right.3 Some historians contend
because Stimson lacked Root’s political savvy and willingness to
compromise, he not only fell far short of his ambitions, he triggered
a congressional backlash that set the Army back in some respects.4
While these differences are not trivial, they are matters of emphasis and
comfortably situate Stimson within a broader reform movement set in
motion by Root after the Spanish-American War. Readers interested in
the institutional history of the US Army or the topic of military reform
would still profit from reading the article.
In retrospect, the timing of Eyck’s article might be more intriguing
than his findings. As noted above, there was a surge of interest in the
Progressive Era military throughout the 1970s.5 This trend does not
seem to have been due to Eyck; a search of the most relevant works
did not yield any citations of the article. Thus it appears Eyck was a
2. Russell F. Weigley, History of the United States Army, enl. ed. (Bloomington: University of
Indiana Press, 1984), 333.
3. Daniel R. Beaver, Modernizing the American War Department: Change and Continuity in a Turbulent
Era, 1885–1920 (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 2006), 34.
4. Jack C. Lane, Armed Progressive: General Leonard Wood (San Rafael, CA: Presidio Press, 1978),
158, 171–75; and J. P. Clark, Preparing for War: The Emergence of the Modern U.S. Army, 1815–1917
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2017), 246–48.
5. See also Lane, Armed Progressive; Allan R. Millett, The General: Robert L. Bullard and Officership in
the United States Army, 1881–1925 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1975); John Patrick Finnegan,
Against the Specter of a Dragon: The Campaign for American Military Preparedness, 1914-1917 (Westport,
CT: Greenwood Press, 1974); and I. B. Holley Jr., General John M. Palmer, Citizen Soldiers, and the Army
of a Democracy (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1982).
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bellwether rather than a trendsetter. Nonetheless the question remains:
What drove this decade-long surge of interest in the Progressive Era
Army before the subject once again fell into relative neglect?
A confluence of factors within the historical profession likely played
some role. While Weigley’s institutional history of the Army surveyed
the Progressive Era in just two of the volume’s 22 chapters, his brief
summary might have been enough to expose the subject to a generation
of graduate students selecting their dissertation topics. At the time,
the field of military history was undergoing a shift away from battle
and operational history to the new military history focus on war and
society—on events and trends occurring outside of armed conflict, such
as the efforts of Root and Stimson.
This explanation, however, does not account for the subsequent
waning academic interest in Progressive Era research. The answer may
lie in the identity of the historians taking up the subject. The topic
of Progressive Era military reform was popular with military officers
serving in the late stages and immediate aftermath of the Vietnam War.6
The same sense of looking to the past for answers to questions of
how to improve an ailing organization might have motivated Eyck. He
arrived at Carlisle just a few months after the US Army War College
published a report on the state of the military profession, commissioned
by Army Chief of Staff William Westmoreland, on the suspicion the
war had eroded both the competence and the ethics of the officer corps.
The study gave compelling evidence he was correct.7 Whether Eyck
simply wanted to study the namesake of his position or was motivated
by an interest in organizational renewal, it is nonetheless suggestive that
the post–Vietnam War nadir coincided with an increase in the study of
military reform.
If Eyck was motivated by the problems of his time, he was also
limited by his contemporary intellectual tools. Though his study was
factually sound, in retrospect it is striking just how narrowly Eyck
focused on military factors. The feud with Ainsworth is described
primarily as a disagreement over methods of military administration—
albeit one with wider implications for which offices would wield the
most power within the War Department—that was ultimately resolved
based on the merits of the case.
To be fair Eyck did note the complicating role of politics in that
resolution. For instance, he described how the bitter internecine fight
within the Republican Party between then President William Taft and
6. James L. Abrahamson, America Arms for a New Century: The Making of a Great Military Power
(New York: Free Press, 1981); Vardell E. Nesmith Jr., “The Quiet Paradigm Change: The Evolution
of the Field Artillery Doctrine of the United States Army, 1861–1905” (PhD diss., Duke University,
1977); Charles D. McKenna, “The Forgotten Reform: Field Maneuvers in the Development of the
United States Army, 1902–1920” (PhD diss., Duke University, 1981); and Andrew J. Bacevich Jr.,
“Family Matters: American Civilian and Military Elites in the Progressive Era,” Armed Forces and
Society 8, no. 3 (Spring 1982): 405–18.
7. US Army War College, Study on Military Professionalism (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College,
1970).
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Theodore Roosevelt—Taft’s predecessor and friend-turned-rival—was
the source of Taft’s reluctance to expend political capital in support of
Stimson and Wood against Ainsworth. Eyck also noted the manner
in which congressional allies of Ainsworth were able to exact revenge
through opposition to some of Stimson’s later initiatives.
Nonetheless Eyck made no attempt to place those intersections
between the Army and the civilian sphere in a larger context. They are
cast as discrete instances in which the internal battles of two distinct
groups—the military and the political class—happen to interact because
of the confluence of personalities with ties to both groups: Stimson
as a political appointee at the head of the Army, Wood as a friend of
Roosevelt, and Ainsworth as an officer with political connections due
to the nature of his position.
In this respect, Eyck’s article is written in the spirit of Samuel P.
Huntington’s influential The Soldier and the State, published in 1957, that
viewed military professionalism as best when it was an isolated activity
kept apart from civilian society. Indeed, Huntington hailed both Root
and Stimson as unusually enlightened civilians who enabled military
reform by a deferential shielding of military ideas from corrupting
civilian society.8 Eyck’s article fits easily within this interpretive tradition.
In the five decades since Eyck’s article, the historical consensus
regarding the source of Progressive Era military reform has markedly
shifted. In the 1980s and 1990s historians conclusively demonstrated
the state of military isolation portrayed by Huntington was factually
incorrect. The evidence showed the military and American society
engaged in considerable intellectual interaction in the decades leading
up to the Root reforms Stimson reinforced.9
The documentation of those civil-military links led historians to a
conclusion far more reasonable than that of Huntington: military reform
was not an isolated development but was a product of engagement with
civilian society. After all, the Progressive Era was arguably the most
intense period of reform in American history. Huntington’s contention
that military reform during that period had completely different origins
than those of civilian society strains credulity. The aggressive drive for
change in society influenced what occurred within the military realm.
Revisiting Eyck’s article with this insight in mind, it is clear he
missed some opportunities to make connections among events linked
by deeper forces. For instance, the Roosevelt-Taft rift in the Republican
Party was not purely incidental to the struggles within the Army. Though
personal ambitions and style played a role, the political struggle reflected
a fundamental split between the progressive and conservative wings of
8. Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations
(Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1957), 251–53, 326, 453.
9. John M. Gates, “The Alleged Isolation of US Army Officers in the Late 19th Century,”
Parameters 10, no. 1 (Spring 1980): 32–45; Bacevich, “Family Matters”; Edward M. Coffman, “The
Long Shadow of the Soldier and the State,” Journal of Military History 55, no. 1 (January 1991): 69–82;
and William B. Skelton, “Samuel P. Huntington and the Roots of the American Military Tradition,”
Journal of Military History 60, no. 2 (April 1996): 325–38.
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the party caused by the same tensions between change and status quo
that underlay the Wood-Ainsworth feud. In the political battle, Root,
Stimson, and Wood all were forced to choose whether they stood with
the Roosevelt faction or the Taft faction.10
The existence of a similar divide within the Democratic Party is
further evidence deeper tensions were straining both civilian and military
institutions. Stimson’s tenure in the War Department would come to an
end with the election of Woodrow Wilson, a progressive whose southern
heritage made him acceptable enough to members of the party’s
conservative wing, like Virginia’s James Hay, to win the nomination.
Not coincidentally, Hay was Ainsworth’s primary congressional ally
and a leading opponent of the General Staff. Conservative Democrats
like Hay were ardent proponents of states’ rights, a stance that led to
support for the National Guard, antipathy for the regular Army, and
a desire for a divided War Department administration susceptible to
political influence.11
Hay’s central role in supporting Ainsworth and in nearly fatally
weakening Stimson’s reserve plan seems to lead naturally to a
consideration of the National Guard and the long history of federal
versus state power. Yet Eyck limited his discussion to the narrow
question of length of enlistment as if this were the central issue rather
than part of a larger question of whether the balance of power should
reside in federal or state governments. The term of enlistment was
simply the means by which Hay hoped to sabotage the larger plan, not
because he had strong opinions about how long a soldier should serve as
one might conclude from Eyck’s account.12
Ultimately our understanding of the past is a collective, cumulative
process. Eyck did his part by writing a well-researched, reasonable
interpretation of the past. The purpose of pointing out these missed
analytical opportunities is not to criticize Eyck for failing to anticipate
later scholarship but to remind readers of the extent to which we are
all products of our contemporary milieu. For though Eyck might have
lacked the conceptual resources to draw upon, the raw material for
recognition of the interplay between the military and civilian spheres
was all around him. He wrote just a few years after Secretary of Defense
Robert S. McNamara, a former head of the Ford Motor Company,
revolutionized Department of Defense policies with a set of reforms
explicitly drawn from corporate practices.
More generally the country was debating questions such as who
should serve and who was responsible for military accountability. Yet
10. Stephen Skowronek, Building a New American State: The Expansion of National Administrative
Capacities, 1877–1920 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 223–25; and Ronald J. Barr,
The Progressive Army: US Army Command and Administration, 1870–1914 (New York: St. Martin’s Press,
1998), 177–89.
11. George C. Herring Jr., “James Hay and the Preparedness Controversy, 1915-1916,” Journal
of Southern History 30, no. 4 (November 1964): 384–86.
12. Leonard Wood, diary, December 7, 8, 15, 17, and 19, 1911, box 6, Wood Papers, Manuscript
Division, Library of Congress.
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Eyck chose to describe the military as a separate sphere. In doing so,
perhaps he had a different contemporary problem in mind. Eyck’s article
concluded with a passage reminiscent of Huntington’s famous epilogue
contrasting West Point with the outlying town of Highland Falls but
even more pointed within the context of 1971. For Eyck, Stimson’s tenure
was notable for having “convincingly demonstrated in his conduct and
actions alike that a man could be deeply rooted in a traditional value
system yet not cut himself off from the winds of change and the light
of progress.”
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Coalition Warfare—Echoes from the Past
Michael Neiberg
ABSTRACT: The dilemmas posed by coalition warfare were a
subject of academic interest in the inaugural issue of Parameters in
1971. Lieutenant Colonel James B. Agnew examined the unified
command model pursued by the Allies during the First World War.
Agnew’s assessment of the challenges faced by French Marshal
Ferdinand Foch speaks to challenges NATO faces today including
questions of national sovereignty, national security goals, and
developing a joint strategy.

A

t some point in the summer of 1918 (or so the story goes)
French Marshal Ferdinand Foch remarked that since leading
a coalition he had lost some of his admiration for Napoleon.1
By that point Foch had learned how hard it was to keep the interests
and needs of a diverse coalition together in the face of a single enemy.
Fighting against a coalition enabled Napoleon to exploit the differences
and disagreements within it. True to Napoleon’s warning, Foch spent
almost as much time in the final year of the First World War balancing
the competing needs of the French, British, and American coalition
partners as the coalition itself did fighting the Germans.2
In March 1918, with the German Army advancing westward,
the French and British governments at long last agreed to create a
single unified command under Foch’s overall leadership. To Foch’s
mind, however, this one step forward came with two important
steps back. First, the commanders of the French and British armies
(General Henri-Philippe Pétain and Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig,
respectively) retained the right to appeal any of Foch’s decisions to
their own civilian governments. Second, those governments had only
given Foch the authority to coordinate strategy. He could not issue direct
orders. The only real power Foch possessed derived from his authority
to distribute soldiers to threatened sections of the front from a unified
general reserve. Foch would therefore have a great deal of responsibility,
but little real authority. Neither the Americans nor the Italians, moreover,
signed on to what became known as the Doullens Agreement, although
in practice they generally followed the system it established.3
In “Coalition Warfare,” a 1971 Parameters article, Lieutenant Colonel
James B. Agnew highlighted the fundamental problem Foch faced.4
Although the various members of a coalition share a common foe and
1. The remark is first attributed to General Albert Sarrail then later to Foch. See Jean-JulesHenri Mordacq, Le Ministère Clemenceau: Journal d’un Témoin, vol. 1 (Paris: Plon, 1931), 240.
2. See Elizabeth Greenhalgh, Foch in Command: The Forging of a First World War General (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), chap. 16.
3. Greenhalgh, Foch in Command, chap. 12.
4. James B. Agnew, “Coalition Warfare,” Parameters 1, no. 1 (Spring 1971): 50–64.

Dr. Michael Neiberg,
chair of War Studies
at the US Army War
College, is the author of
Dance of the Furies: Europe
and the Outbreak of World
War I (2013).

TOC

140

Parameters 51(1) Spring 2021

many common strategic aims, they often differ in how they wish to
pursue those aims or even how much of their nation’s human capital and
treasure they are prepared to devote to a common effort.
In the First World War case under study here, the coalition
experienced two additional complications. First, the French held the
lion’s share of the power by virtue of having by far the largest Allied
army on the Western Front. They were therefore unlikely to yield on
questions of strategy, especially as the war was being fought to liberate
their own soil. Second, although the Americans were slow to arrive,
their growing presence threatened to unbalance the war termination
aims of the coalition. Should the war continue into 1919, the United
States and its mercurial president, Woodrow Wilson, would surely want
a greater voice in Allied strategy and operations than the French and
British were willing to tolerate.
For the Allies, the Americans presented a special problem. Under any
circumstances, as Agnew argued, adding more countries to an alliance
complicates the strategic algebra, requiring members to accommodate
additional and often divergent interests and strategic cultures.5 In the
American case, however, the problem was even more complex, and
not only because of the enormous economic, military, and industrial
power the Americans could bring to bear. Wilson and the United States
possessed a different vision of what the war entailed.
Wilson had belatedly brought his nation into the war, and even then
he had done so as an “associated power,” not as a formal member of the
alliance. He had steadfastly refused to sign the 1915 Treaty of London
that created the legal basis for the Allied coalition, and he had insisted
American soldiers would not be amalgamated into Allied units. They
would fight as an independent American Army on a dedicated part of the
Western Front or they might not fight at all.6 General John Pershing even
went to France with a General Organization Report to this effect in his
pocket, although in practice Pershing made some temporary exceptions
in order to meet the emergency of spring 1918.7 Wilson also spoke of
an ambiguous “peace without victory” that left his French and British
partners, who had been fighting a total war for four years, confounded.8
Perhaps more concerning, Wilson’s great statement of American
strategy, “The Fourteen Points,” seemed aimed at denying the Allies the
very goals for which they were fighting. The points included a call for
“freedom of the seas,” “a reduction of armaments,” an end to empires,
and unfettered global trade. The Germans rejoiced, seeing in Wilson’s
vision a way to gain much of what they wanted from the war even if
5. Agnew, “Coalition Warfare,” 53.
6. Geoffrey Wawro, Sons of Freedom: The Forgotten American Soldiers Who Defeated Germany in World
War I (New York: Basic Books, 2018), 52.
7. Edward M. Coffman, The War to End All Wars: The American Military Experience in World War I
(Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1968), 168–74.
8. Woodrow Wilson, “Address of the President of the United States to the Senate”
(speech, before the United States Senate, January 22, 1917), http://www-personal.umd.umich
.edu/~ppennock/doc-Wilsonpeace.htm.
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they lost on the battlefield. A peace on Wilson’s terms, they knew, would
leave them in a strong geopolitical position.9 Allied strategists were
appalled by Wilson’s vision of a postwar world, with Haig writing in his
diary on October 21 that “feeling was strong against the president. He
does not seem to realise our requirements.”10 French Premier Georges
Clemenceau famously quipped, “God Almighty has only ten [points]!”11
Nor had the history of coalition operations from 1914 to 1918 given
the British and French much cause for optimism. Agnew reviewed
some of this history, parts of which have become the focus of intensive
scholarly discussion in the years since. Historians continue to debate the
British dilemma in 1914 over how to use their small professional army.
Secretary of State for War Lord Horatio Herbert Kitchener argued a
smaller power like Britain had little choice but to hew to the strategic
vision of its larger partner. As he later remarked, Britain had to make
war as it must not as it would like. That decision made it all too easy
for British leaders in the war’s opening weeks to blame the French for
their setbacks.12
As the British Army on the Western Front grew (though it was never
as large as the French Army), the British naturally sought a larger voice
in overall strategy. The French, maybe just as naturally, resisted. Intense
disagreements over strategy for the Battle of the Somme in 1916 led to
considerable bitter feelings, especially in British circles.13
A 1917 scheme by French generals and the British Prime Minister
David Lloyd George to subordinate Haig to overall French direction led
to one of the war’s most serious civil-military relations scandals. Haig and
many other British generals considered resigning before taking any orders
from a foreign general.14 The crisis led to much mutual recrimination
after the French failed disastrously on the Chemin des Dames, forcing
the British to launch a hurried attack around Arras in order to rescue
the French from an offensive Haig and his colleagues had opposed
from the beginning.15 In the Middle East, meanwhile, the position was
reversed. There the British had the preponderance of strength and
therefore called most of the shots, often to France’s chagrin.16
Agnew was concerned with the various wiring diagrams and
command arrangements the Allies developed to solve this problem.
One solution they developed involved creating a committee of senior
9. Holger H. Herwig, The First World War: Germany and Austria-Hungary, 1914–1918 (London:
Edward Arnold Publishers, 1997), 426.
10. Gary Sheffield and John Bourne, eds., Douglas Haig: War Diaries and Letters, 1914–1918
(London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2005), 477.
11. William Ralph Inge, The End of an Age and Other Essays (New York: Macmillan, 1949), 139.
12. George H. Cassar, Kitchener’s War: British Strategy from 1914 to 1916 (Washington, DC:
Potomac Books, 2004), 219.
13. See, for example, Elizabeth Greenhalgh, “Flames over the Somme: A Retort to William
Philpott,” War in History 10, no. 3 (2003): 335–42.
14. Sheffield and Bourne, Douglas Haig, 270–72.
15. Sheffield and Bourne, Douglas Haig, 276–77.
16. See David Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of
the Modern Middle East (New York: Henry Holt, 1989), part six.
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politicians with high-ranking military officials acting as their technical
advisers. The Supreme War Council (SWC), created at Rapallo, Italy,
in November 1917, met at Versailles throughout 1918. Leaning on the
recollections of the American representative to the SWC, General
Tasker H. Bliss, Agnew saw some promise in the scheme, although just
as contemporaries did, he recognized the near impossibility of genuine
combined command being exercised through a committee led by
politicians and depending on compromise and consensus.
We know a great deal more about the SWC today than Agnew
knew 50 years ago. Historian Elizabeth Greenhalgh largely dismissed
the council as a “talking shop” of political subcommittees that, in
the end, mostly failed to do its primary job of coordinating strategy.17
Whereas another historian Meighen McCrae has recently provided a
more sympathetic treatment. Working with the records of the Supreme
War Council itself and moving away from the civil-military controversies
the SWC often symbolized, she finds much to admire. Although
bureaucratic and ill-suited to making rapid decisions, she argues, the
Supreme War Council did provide a critical forum for thinking through
the complexities of coalition operations on diverse and distant fronts as
well as the potential operational impacts of new technologies like the
tank and the airplane. This council may have been the only way for the
great powers to think through the myriad problems of fighting a global
war while pursuing sometimes conflicting strategies and war aims.18
The Supreme War Council was a political and strategic body, not
a military one. Senior military officials attended the sessions, but their
contributions were normally limited to providing technical expertise.
All major decisions rested in the hands of the politicians. To win the war
on the battlefield, the two sides worked through a variety of coalition
models, several of which Agnew considered. The models are important
not only for what they say about the First World War, but how they
have influenced coalition operations since. Agnew saw them as discrete
phases during the course of the war, but because they overlapped, we
might better see them as iterative models rather than sequential ones.
Agnew spent much of his article discussing the most famous model,
the one that, in the end, won the war. This model was inaugurated in
March 1918 in the town hall of Doullens, France, near the suddenly
mobile Western Front. Today a stained glass window in the room marks
this meeting of the leaders of the French and British governments.19
Ferdinand Foch, who had been arguing for a unified command for
months, came to Doullens with a plan to do just that.
More importantly, Foch was the only senior official at the meeting
who projected not just a confidence but a certainty that the terrifying
17. Elizabeth Greenhalgh, Victory through Coalition: Britain and France during the First World War
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 179.
18. Meighen McCrae, Coalition Strategy and the End of the First World War: The Supreme War Council
and War Planning, 1917–1918 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 1–15.
19. Michael S. Neiberg, Foch: Supreme Allied Commander in the Great War (Washington, DC:
Brassey’s, 2005), 62–65.
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German gains were only temporary. While his colleague Pétain talked
about evacuating Paris, Foch saw that the Allies would be able to stop
the Germans well before they reached the capital if they created a
genuine coalition with one man (himself) in charge.20 When Clemenceau
congratulated Foch on finally getting the unified command he had
always sought, Foch sardonically thanked Clemenceau for the gift. “ ‘It’s
a fine present you’ve made me,’ Foch said to the prime minister. ‘You
give me a lost battle and tell me to win it.’ ”21
If these are the exact words Foch used then he may have been more
prescient than he knew. The French and British governments did indeed
want Foch to win a battle but not necessarily a war. They wanted him
to stop the German offensive and then chase the invaders back across
the Rhine River, but they did not want him making strategic decisions.
As Foch built a coalition and started winning battles, the politicians
grew nervous about some of the decisions he would soon have to make.
Deciding when to end the war, whether Allied troops would cross the
Rhine River, and who would surrender on behalf of the German people
were ultimately political decisions George, Clemenceau, and Wilson
wanted to make themselves.22
This model, minus some of the acrimony, largely shaped the one
the Western allies used to fight and win the Second World War. General
Dwight D. Eisenhower stepped into the role Foch had played in 1918.
Eisenhower’s headquarters were much larger and more international
than Foch’s had been, but Eisenhower shared the same basic approach
of leaving command authority within the national structures as often
as possible. The combined chiefs of staff and the various high-level
conferences during the war acted much as the SWC had. This model
satisfied the need for national sovereignty and was consistent with
western understandings of civilian control of the military.23
Although some readers of this journal in Agnew’s time and our
own might be surprised by the comparison, in a sense, the French in
1944–45 behaved as the Americans did in 1918. In this model, a nation
follows the general strategic guidance of its larger coalition partner,
but jealously guards as much of its own sovereignty as possible. In this
case the roles flipped. In the First World War, the United States needed
French weapons, communications technology, training, staff work,
and much more. Thus although Pershing and Wilson had repeatedly
expressed their unwillingness to follow French strategic guidance, in
fact they had little choice but to do so when it came to Foch’s most
important decisions. Pershing and Bliss had little voice in most of those

20. Neiberg, Foch, 63.
21. Quoted in B. H. Liddell Hart, Foch: The Man of Orleans (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company,
1932), 278.
22. Greenhalgh, Foch in Command, chap. 17.
23. Niall Barr, Eisenhower’s Armies: The American-British Alliance during World War II (New York:
Pegasus, 2015), chap. 13.
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Figure 1. Economic and human costs of the First World War
Source of data: “Killed, Wounded, and Missing,” in “World War I,” Britannica online, https://www.britannica.com/eventWorld-War-I/Killed-wounded
-and-missing; and “Financial Cost of the First World War,” Spartacus Educational, (amounts calculated in 2020 USD), https://spartacus-educational
.com/FWWcosts.htm.
(Map by Pete McPhail)
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decisions.24 The United States was not even represented at the French-led
armistice negotiations at Compiègne in November.
Similarly, when the United States recognized Charles de Gaulle’s
Free France in 1944, it was the French, now the junior partner, who
relied on their senior partner. Now the weapons, uniforms, and fuel were
American. Consequently, even though de Gaulle had a starkly different
postwar vision than that of his American partners, he had little choice
but to do (mostly) as the Americans wanted.25 Just as the Americans had
had no representative at Compiègne, the French had no representative at
the conferences at Yalta and Potsdam in 1945.
The Germans, whom Agnew did not consider, chose a different
model. Beginning as early as their great victories at Tannenberg and the
Masurian Lakes in 1914, the Germans believed they would have to rescue
their Austro-Hungarian ally from its own incompetence. Even before
the war, General Erich Ludendorff had described Austria-Hungary
as an albatross hung around his neck.26 Germany’s discovery in 1913
that the Austrian head of counterintelligence, Colonel Alfred Redl, had
been selling critical military secrets to Russia further underscored the
German perception of the Habsburgs as, in the famous quip, always
one army, one year, and one idea behind. Austria-Hungary’s string of
defeats early in the war did nothing to change that assessment.27
As a result, the Germans began increasingly to take direct control
over the strategic direction of their Austro-Hungarian allies. Starting
with the massive Gorlice-Tarnów Offensive in the spring of 1915,
German officers even assumed direct command of Austro-Hungarian
units. Thereafter, Germany dominated the strategy of the Central
Powers.28 Thus after the war, the Allies largely treated Austria better
than they did Germany. After all, they reasoned, despite Austria being
largely responsible for the outbreak of the war, most of the critical
decisions thereafter were German. As to the Germans, they solved this
problem for the next war by aggressively pursuing Anschluss, or union
with Austria, in large part so they would have the dominant voice in
strategy from the start.29
In Agnew’s time these same debates influenced the coalition effort
of NATO. Although theoretically an alliance of political equals, in
terms of military power the United States dominated the alliance.
After France left the integrated NATO command structure in 1966,
only the United States and United Kingdom had nuclear weapons.
The Americans, moreover, brought a disproportionate amount of the
24. See Mark E. Grotelueschen, The AEF Way of War: The American Army and Combat in World
War I (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
25. Julian Jackson, De Gaulle (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press,
2018), chap. 13.
26. Herwig, First World War, 96.
27. John R. Schindler, “Redl—Spy of the Century?” International Journal of Intelligence and
Counterintelligence 18, no. 3 (2005), 483–507.
28. See Herwig, First World War, 141–45.
29. Margaret MacMillan, Paris 1919: Six Months That Changed the World (New York: Random
House, 2007), chap. 19.
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money, the weapons, and the senior military leaders. So too did they
drive NATO strategy.
The problem for NATO commanders, therefore, remained the
same one Foch had faced in 1918. How could a military coalition
properly pursue the various and diverse political interests of its member
states without becoming so divided that it lost the ability to fight as a
single, unified force? France’s departure from the integrated command
structure proved NATO had not yet solved the problem. Perhaps NATO
was fortunate its adversary, the Warsaw Pact, suffered from many of the
same dilemmas. Still it faced occasional political problems, such as the
uprising in Hungary in 1956 and in Czechoslovakia in 1968, just three
years before Agnew wrote his article.30
We can thus read Agnew’s article in two ways. In one sense, he was
trying to understand the problem of coalition operations by looking
backward more than 50 years in order to assess the First World War
model that led to Allied victory in 1918. Much as the Germans of 1918
did, the two Cold War coalitions looked for ways to exploit the divisions
in the enemy’s coalition. In another sense, however, Agnew was trying
to solve a major problem in his own day: how to keep one’s own coalition
intact while simultaneously putting as much pressure as possible on
the enemy’s coalition. In doing so he reinforced the power of Winston
Churchill’s observation that the only thing worse than fighting with
allies is fighting without them.31

30. Odd Arne Westad, The Cold War: A World History (New York: Basic Books, 2017), 201–6,
374–75.
31. David Reynolds, In Command of History: Churchill Fighting and Writing the Second World War
(London: Bloomsbury, 2004), 324.
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Defense Management Reform: How to Make
the Pentagon Work Better and Cost Less
By Peter Levine
Reviewed by Robert D. Bradford III, assistant professor of defense and Joint
processes, Department of Command, Leadership, and Management, US Army
War College

W

ith over three million people on the payroll and spending of
almost $700 billion each year, the US Department of Defense
(DoD) is a huge bureaucracy. The Department’s massive scale and vast
and impenetrable processes make it a challenging organization to lead. As
a public sector organization consuming taxpayer resources and spending
more than half of the US discretionary budget each year, the Department
of Defense necessarily comes under constant scrutiny. Examiners of such
a large and diverse organization inevitably find evidence of wastefulness,
and the DoD’s inefficiencies draw public attention. New secretaries of
defense, service secretaries, chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and
service chiefs consistently include reform among their top priorities. New
leaders want to reduce inefficiencies, reassure the public, and reallocate
dollars, personnel, and equipment toward their strategic priorities. These
leaders would do well to consider the work of Peter Levine.
In Defense Management Reform: How to Make the Pentagon Work Better and
Cost Less, Levine provides a well-researched analysis of 40 years of DoD
reform efforts. He describes successes and failures through primary
source documents and personal interviews with key participants from
the executive and legislative branches and senior members from both
major US political parties. His case studies demonstrate the three
important factors that impact the success or failure of defense reforms.
Leaders must clearly frame the problem they need to solve, they need to
gain approval from key stakeholders, and they must provide consistent
and long-term attention to the implementation of their reforms.
Levine brings a wealth of experience and knowledge gained inside
the defense enterprise. He served 28 years as a professional staff member
to Senator Levin and the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee and
the Senate Armed Services Committee. There he reviewed and helped
craft legislation for many defense reform initiatives. After leaving the
congressional staff, Levine served one year as the DoD deputy chief
Management Officer and one year as Acting Undersecretary of Defense
for personnel and readiness in the Obama administration. More than a
spectator, Levine has been a key player in many of the defense reform
efforts he examines.
The book’s three sections are organized around changes to civilian
personnel management, defense acquisition reform, and ongoing actions

Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press, 2020
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$35.00
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to make the Pentagon budget auditable. Levine provides examples to show
the value of clear problem definition. He lauds the Goldwater-Nichols
Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 as a case where a
solution was developed to a clearly defined problem in Joint planning and
mission execution. On the other hand, he shows how Senator McCain’s
2014 acquisition reform efforts lacked a similar focus and addressed a
large collection of problems within the Department of Defense. These
examples also clearly demonstrate the impact of stakeholder buy-in.
Levine also highlights the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of
2009 as a case where key stakeholders agreed on the problem and the
solution and the National Security Personnel System reforms of the early
2000s as a case that failed because it did not accommodate Congress or
labor unions.
The case studies also point to the final factor, consistent
implementation. In successful reform efforts like Secretary Perry’s
attempt to increase the use of commercial specifications in acquisition,
DoD leadership remained focused on the issue through to successful
completion. The quest for a clean Pentagon audit is an example where
department leaders frequently lost attention and reforms floundered.
By describing these specific reform efforts in detail and tracking
them through success and failure, Levine posits four reasons why reform
within the defense enterprise is difficult. First, he notes the Department
of Defense cannot go to a single budget line titled “WASTE.”
Inefficiencies are spread across the department in multiple budget lines
and based on a multitude of processes. Quick fixes are illusory and do
not deliver on their promises.
Second, most good ideas have already been tried. A wise leader will
survey past actions and be cognizant of people who oversell quick and
easy solutions. Third, any DoD reform will face resistance. As in any
large organization, new actions will have both supporters and detractors.
The department has multiple power centers, and the status quo holds
strong. Unless addressed directly, resistors can stop most department
change efforts.
Finally, overcoming inefficiencies requires an investment in time
and resources. Leader focus is finite, and consistent focus is often hard
to maintain. Additionally, to save money, the department must allocate
resources upfront. Being more efficient will save funds in the longer
term, but will almost always require more resources in the near term
when the competition for resources is most brutal.
To address these challenges, Levine provides three guidelines related
to successful reforms. First, department leaders require tailored solutions
to the right problems. The department should prioritize reform efforts
against the most important issues that will yield the highest rewards and
then the department must develop specific solutions to address each
of these problems.
Second, the initiative must be enacted or approved. Major initiatives
are more successful when they are based on a shared understanding
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between the executive and legislative branches of government and have
support from both major US political parties.
Finally, a consistent focus on resources is required through to full
implementation. Successful execution depends on strong leadership and
consistent engagement with all stakeholders through completion. While
these three dictums seem simple, Levine’s book is full of examples where
they were not followed, and he provides plenty of evidence showing the
simplest ideas can be challenging to implement.
Defense reform will continue to be a priority for new Pentagon
leaders who arrive with a mandate to make the department work better.
Defense Management contains powerful examples of success and failure,
and its three tenets are valuable signposts for reform practitioners.

Conspiring with the Enemy: The Ethic
of Cooperation in Warfare
By Yvonne Chiu
Reviewed by C. Anthony Pfaff, research professor for strategy, the military
profession and ethics, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College

W

riting in the 1930s, German philosopher Carl Schmitt famously
opined that war’s real aim is the existential negation of that enemy,
a relationship which represents the “utmost degree of intensity” of
separation (Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, 26). It is easy to understand
why Schmitt would see war that way given the experience of the First
World War. The experience of the Second World War, of course, simply
reinforced the view that war is a zero sum game and anything that
benefits an enemy hurts a friend. In such a view, it is difficult to see
how cooperation is possible, much less useful. Yvonne Chiu challenges
this canon in the provocative, and sometimes surreal, Conspiring with the
Enemy. She argues cooperation among enemies in war is often the norm
rather than the exception and that cooperation, as currently manifested
in the international system, often works at cross purposes to limit the
destructive effects of war.
Chiu breaks down cooperation in war to three broad norms:
“cooperation for a fair fight, cooperation to minimize damage to a
particular class of people, and cooperation to end war quickly” (36, 90,
135). Examples illustrate the range from the obvious, to the interesting,
to the genuinely insightful, and include observation of the international
law of armed conflict, which bans certain weapons, requires wearing
of uniforms, and prohibits the direct targeting of noncombatants,
among other things. More interesting examples include timed artillery
bombardments in the First World War, which allowed both sides to
anticipate attacks and minimize casualties, and British and German
units delivering newspapers to each other. A more insightful example
is the arrangement between the Indian and Pakistani air forces during
the 1965 Indo-Pakistani War, where both sides agreed for a time not
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to attack the other’s ground forces, who were mobilizing in flat, open
territory. As one Pakistani officer put it, killing soldiers out in the open
seemed “none too sporting” (50).
It is easy to see how Chiu’s discussion can get surreal. The last thing
most soldiers will tell you they want is a fair fight, or perhaps more
accurately, in choosing between a fair fight and one they are more likely
to survive, soldiers will generally choose the latter over the former. This
choice is as much a matter of policy as it is of individual preference.
In 2016 General Joseph Dunford, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, explicitly rejected the value of a fair fight in testimony to the
Senate Appropriations Defense Subcommittee (Garamone, “US Troops
Should Not,” DOD News, April 27, 2016). Thus it can sometimes be
difficult to reconcile Chiu’s putative motivation for cooperation with
the actual experience of not only participating in war, but in preparing
for it as well.
It is equally clear, however, that Chiu makes a good point. While
soldiers certainly want to surprise, overwhelm, or otherwise kill their
enemy without getting killed themselves, Chiu argues persuasively that
they also want to differentiate the killing they do from murder. So for
this reason they sometimes refrain from killing the individual enemy
who gets caught defenseless while not thinking twice about killing
others by the thousands.
At the policy level, soldiers also cooperate to avoid harm to
noncombatants. This cooperation requires taking risks and foregoing
advantages that absent that intention—and reciprocity—would not
make sense. Thus, soldiers wear uniforms to differentiate themselves
from civilians, which also makes them easier to target. They do not use
certain weapons, like chemical munitions, even if using these weapons
would be decisive in a particular battle, in part because of the potential
harms to civilians and also in part because they would prefer such
weapons not be used against them.
Chiu also notes that observing norms of cooperation in war does
not necessarily make war more humane. Remotely operated precision
weapons, for example, undermine the idea of a fair fight since remote
operators are not taking risks and ensuring the protection of civilians
because the use of these weapons creates unreasonable expectations
regarding the number of civilian casualties. Since the aim of war is
the rapid defeat of the enemy, norms that require restraint can impede
military operations and lengthen a war, which simply increases over time
the number of persons killed and buildings destroyed.
Chiu’s remedy is to invigorate cooperation for ending war quickly.
This norm, which she argues has been a feature of war since Greek
hoplites fought pitched battles to settle limited disputes, has been largely
ignored in more modern wars. She attributes this fact largely to the
mobilization of mass armies in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries
to fight wars over ideologies. When wars were between monarchs who
were more or less moral equals, it not only made sense to fight over
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limited objectives it also did not make sense to those fighting to take
a great deal of risk. Here ends and means aligned: armies simply were
not going to be capable, as a general rule, to realize someone’s excessive
ambitions. That changed, in the West at least, when French armies under
Napoleon fought for liberte, egalite, fraternite instead.
Chiu believes that international law has largely ceded questions
of jus ad bellum to the relevant actors’ ethical sensibilities and political
demands. As a result, there is more space for aggressive wars and little
space for cooperation to end them quickly. This seems an odd point to
make. She is right that international law only permits defensive wars
and certain kinds of humanitarian interventions; however, she does not
take up the argument that the same system tried to create nonviolent
alternatives to settling disputes that might otherwise lead to aggressive
wars. So one could argue that rather than ceding questions of jus ad bellum,
international law instead has answered it in the negative. By rejecting
aggressive wars and providing alternatives to fighting, international law
seeks to eliminate war as a practice.
Again Chiu has a point. Eliminating war, while a noble objective,
is elusive if not impossible. There is a gap between what the law says
and the ability of the international community to enforce it. Strong
countries still resort to war to realize their interests when they see fit,
even when doing so does not conform neatly to the letter or the spirit
of the law. Chiu also argues that by limiting just wars to only defensive
ones, international law reinforces the status quo and limits the means to
address injustices associated with it, whether that be domestic oppression
of a minority or boundaries drawn as a result of previous invasion.
This is an interesting concept and raises a number of questions
regarding to whom war rights should be given. Over what, besides
territory and sovereignty, should wars be fought, and at what point
should a party to a conflict concede defeat. To the last point the current
answer is “never,” if one’s cause is just and “immediately,” if one’s cause
is not. A quick survey of the current geopolitical landscape provides
ample evidence that this norm is inadequate. Whether the right answer
is to make room for more fighting, albeit limited, is the right direction
is an important question Conspiring with the Enemy encourages readers to
take up—especially in today’s globally competitive environment where
technology has enabled a range of actors to threaten the vital interests
of others in ways that risk escalating into war. It is a question worth
addressing before it is settled by those who prefer war.
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Has China Won? The Chinese Challenge to American Primacy
By Kishore Mahbubani
Reviewed by Colonel Gerald Krieger, Near East South Asia Center faculty,
National Defense University

K

ishore Mahbubani’s Has China Won? The Chinese Challenge to American
Primacy addresses the geopolitical contest between the United States
and China, highlighting key strategic mistakes while offering lessons and
insights he hopes will better inform future policies in both countries.
Mahbubani is a prolific writer on eastern and western geopolitics, global
governance, and policy and is a distinguished fellow at the Asia Research
Institute at the National University of Singapore.
This book is based on his personal experiences as a senior diplomat
working with leaders in Beijing and Washington, DC. With a foot in both
the occidental and oriental cultures, Mahbubani—an insightful critic of
the west—is well positioned to review key policies and help America
reflect on itself to find a better approach to face China’s emergence as
a world leader. Mahbubani’s vast political experience in Asia serves as
a lens, deepening an understanding of the motivations and reasoning
behind the veil of Chinese politics. His sagacious insights must be kept
in perspective. He does treat China gingerly, which is uncommon in the
American press and academia. A more critical lens would have balanced
his thorough analysis.
There are nine chapters in the book, with an overview of the current
state of affairs between China and America and key strategic mistakes
of each country in the chapters that follow. The fourth chapter, “Is
China Expansionist?,” is crucial to dispelling media manipulations and
misunderstandings of Chinese policy and informs readers of the oriental
perspective (79). Other chapters uncover America’s bias of democracy,
along with mistaken underlying American assumptions about the global
order. Mahbubani adopts an advisory tone in the book, even going so
far as to write a fictional letter advising Xi Jinping on the best way to
deal with America. The letter is insightful capturing Chinese leader’s
views of America in the contest for global influence—Mahbubani’s
interactions with key leaders of the Communist Party of China (CCP)
shapes his depiction. The letter also acknowledges areas where China
will struggle to exert global influence, such as American dominance in
universities, and creativity promoted through a focus on the individual
which is foreign in Chinese culture.
The great power competition between China and America does
suggest a comparison to the Cold War between America and the former
Soviet Union, though Mahbubani persuasively argues that much thought
and planning went into the latter and is remarkably absent from the
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former. The biggest challenge to the west is due to closed mindedness;
“to most Americans, the idea that a free and open society like America,
the world’s strongest democracy, could lose a contest against a closed
communist society like China is inconceivable,” Mahbubani opines (9).
Contrary to what many Americans think, there is not a deep
ideological divide between the United States and the CCP over
communism and democracy, Mahbubani convincingly argues. Years
ago, China made a conscious decision to not promote communism
internationally—unlike the Soviet Union. China is different because,
much like America, its goal is to promote Chinese expansionism and
influence through the global economy. His book is meant to provide
support for a major US course correction for America centered around
improving the lives of its citizens, while returning to a strategy focused
on garnering international support with its most potent weapon, the US
dollar rather than the military.
Mahbubani’s perspective provides a sharp contrast to China’s
critics such as Stein Ringen who highlights China’s two million Internet
opinion analysts who troll the Web to remove undesirable content while
shaping the stories into the CCP’s framework. Ringen labels China as
a kleptocracy, and his sharp criticisms serve to balance Mahbubani’s
flowery perceptions of the CCP. Contrary to Mahbubani’s suggestion,
the great power competition between China and the United States will
dominate the headlines for the foreseeable future. We all need to hope
that both countries remain cognizant of the other 191 countries on
the planet.
Perhaps Mahbubani is correct, and America views China’s rapid
success on an unconscious level, to present, what he labels a great
“yellow peril” that threatens western supremacy and democracy(7, 258).
That another system of government might be a viable alternative to
democracy and more economically efficient—despite the drawbacks of
individual freedom—could be disturbing. The tug ultimately might be
between occidental reason and a subconscious aversion to the oriental
culture which ultimately might replace western global domination.
As mentioned earlier, Mahbubani’s participation in Singapore’s elite
political system more closely mirrors China’s and shapes his perceptions,
though Singapore maintains strong ties to the west. Mahbubani’s
work will provide greater insight for military practitioners and should
be required reading for senior leaders. His criticisms of American
policy are thought provoking, while his lucid observations of Chinese
motivations and perspective serve to illustrate why analysts continually
misunderstand Chinese intentions. Mahbubani reminds us that for too
long, the United States focused on the “M” or military element of soft
power in DIME—Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economy—
to influence national policy objectives. It is time to modify our approach
to meet the new emerging global threat, which will not be a military
threat but an economic and diplomatic influence around the world. The
military needs to be America’s tool of last resort, not the first. America
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needs to make decisions to encourage global cooperation, while also
being mindful of the objectives of other countries and how their
objectives might not mirror our own.
It is time for America to break the fetters of the Cold War and the
associated commitment to build and maintain the military infrastructure
which has long since taken a back seat to economic and technological
growth and innovation. China’s leaders certainly understand and will
gladly stand by as America enters costly wars, diverting crucial resources
from economic development to the military machine. Has China Won?
provides a wake-up call. Let us hope the leaders in Washington can
be open minded enough to at least consider another perspective, a
redefinition of America’s role in a multipolar world.
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Irregular Warfare
Road Warriors: Foreign Fighters in the Armies of Jihad
By Daniel Byman
Reviewed by Dr. José de Arimatéia da Cruz, adjunct research professor, Strategic
Studies Institute, US Army War College, and professor of comparative politics
and international relations, Georgia Southern University

W

e live in a globalized and interconnected world. The high-tech
explosion of the twenty-first century has made communications
between friends and foe easier—but also harder to detect—and has
allowed foreign fighters to create networks, travel with ease, and expand
their technological reach. Daniel Byman’s Road Warriors: Foreign Fighters
in the Armies of Jihad provides readers with an analytical history of the
contemporary foreign fighter phenomenon in light of the democratization
of technology.
Byman, a professor at Georgetown University’s School of
Foreign Service, a senior fellow at the Center for Middle East Policy
at the Brookings Institution, and a former staff member of the 9/11
Commission, argues that the potential threat posed by foreign jihadists
is large and growing. In addition to conducting international terrorist
attacks, they radicalize indigenous fighters in civil wars and regionalize
conflicts (8). He defines a foreign fighter as an “individual who travels
to a state other than their own to join an illicit group and perpetrate
or assist in terrorist attacks or armed conflict” (7). He also derives
three sets of observations regarding the foreign fighter based on the
following questions: “(1) Why do individuals leave their homes to go
fight in faraway lands? (2) What impact do foreign fighters have that
makes them of such concern? and (3) How can we [the US Army and
other Western nations] better fight foreign fighters” (9). These are not
rhetorical questions. They guide Byman’s analysis of the foreign fighters
in the jihad armies.
As Byman points out, foreign fighters leave their homes to join
the mujahideen to expel occupiers of Muslim lands or groups fighting
against the so-called apostate governments or for the establishment
of a Caliphate, even if temporarily. They also make a tremendous
impact on conflicts worldwide in terms of duration and brutality. Some
foreign fighters possess considerable combat and/or technical skills
that enhance the conflict’s lethality. Others act as logisticians, travel
facilitators, passport forgers, and recruiters and contribute to the armies
of jihad because they understand the culture where a conflict occurs
and know how to appeal to the community, either with inducements of
a better future or hostility toward citizens for noncooperation, and are
often “better trained, more highly motivated and networked, and tied to
skilled planners back in the war zone” (12).
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An important contribution by Byman is his strategy on how to
combat foreign fighters and his six-stage foreign fighter production
process (13, 252). In stage one, “Radicalize,” a foreign fighter “learns
radical ideas” and “becomes angry” (253). As Byman illustrates, no
single factor explains why someone radicalizes and becomes a foreign
fighter; therefore, the goal of governments during this stage is to identify
and dissuade individuals before they take illegal actions. A government
must cooperate and coordinate its counternarrative with local religious
leaders, community businesses, and neighborhood groups that “promote
their own messages of moderation” (254).
In stage two, “Decision,” a foreign fighter becomes motivated
to fight and the individual undergoes change such as growing a
beard in solidarity to the other mujahideen (253). “As terrorism
expert Clinton Watts points out, ‘The call for jihad may be global,
but recruitment is extremely local’ ”; therefore, developing peaceful
alternatives while also integrating the mujahideen back into the
community is the objective (256, emphasis in original).
In stage three “Traveling,” a foreign fighter “travels to foreign
countries to participate in jihad” (253). Byman believes this is an
important stage since there must be cooperation with a foreign country
in order to obtain passports, money, and travel access. Foreign fighters
will usually bribe border control agents to facilitate their comings and
goings through a region or country. Border control agents, usually
underpaid, see the bribe as an important supplement to their incomes.
For example, Venezuelans have been able to travel to Iran without
having to stamp their passports. Another example, illustrated by Byman,
is the Mauritanian government. According to Byman, “the Mauritanian
government paid Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb ten to twenty million
Euros a year and promised that it would not interfere with jihadist travel
if, in exchange, the group agreed not to kidnap tourists or otherwise
attack in Mauritania” (257).
Stage four “Training and Fighting in the War Zone,” is, perhaps,
the most important stage (253). Here the foreign fighter “gains skills
and experience, connects to global jihadi networks, and adopts more
extreme views” (253).
In stage five “Return,” the foreign fighter returns home by means that
“avoid law enforcement and security services” (253). Byman contends
“the return stage entails the greatest number of competing agendas,
requiring a state to adopt an array of policy options” (265). While some
governments have taken a mano dura (firm hand) approach when dealing
with foreign fighters who return home, the overall evidence indicates it
does not prevent or dissuade an individual from continuing nefarious
activities. Byman discusses the examples of France and Denmark
and their approach to returnees. France systematically prosecutes its
returnees on terrorism charges while Denmark has carefully reevaluated
its approach to reintegrate the individual into society upon his return
rather than criminalize him. As the Danish pointed out, “being more
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coercive might strengthen ‘the victim’s discourse’ within the Muslim
community and thereby exacerbate the social conditions that can lead
some individuals to participate in jihad” (265). In stage six “Plot,” the
foreign fighter plans a terrorist act and recruits potential ideological
sympathizers to join the mujahideen movement (253).
In conclusion, Road Warriors provides a history and assessment of
the modern jihadist foreign fighter movement. Furthermore, Byman’s
foreign fighter’s life cycle, provides practitioners and scholars of terrorism
with an approach for dealing with a topic unlikely to go away any time
soon. Terrorism, a pandemic of the twenty-first century, can only be
mitigated, never completely eradicated. While terrorist organizations are
often fragmented and highly divided along ideology, religious beliefs, and
leadership personalities, Byman’s long-term hope is that “transnational
jihadism, like international anarchism and communism before it, will
burn itself out or at least move from center stage to a sideshow” (267).
However, terrorism and jihadists are not simple issues policymakers
and law enforcement agencies can easily handle. As Byman suggests
“because of this resilience, the foreign fighter problem will endure even
with the Caliphate being forced underground at the end of 2018” (250).
Byman further explains that “[f]or now, governments must assume
the movement will endure, try to counter it, and limit the damage that
can be done by foreign fighters and the terrorists they inspire” (268). I
recommend Road Warriors to anyone interested in international studies,
terrorism, and international relations. But, most importantly to future
Army leaders in a “world in disarray.”

ISIS Propaganda: A Full-Spectrum Extremist Message
Edited by Stephane J. Baele, Katharine A. Boyd, and Travis G. Coan
Reviewed by Dr. Robert J. Bunker, instructor at the Safe Communities Institute
at the University of Southern California

T

he edited volume ISIS Propaganda, pertaining to the Islamic State
of Iraq and al-Sham (or Syria), is the second work in the Causes
and Consequences of Terrorism Series, a partnership between Oxford
University Press and the National Consortium for the Study of
Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism at the University of Maryland.
Its editors, all at the University of Exeter, are Stephane J. Baele, senior
lecturer in international relations and security; Katharine A. Boyd,
senior lecturer in criminology; and Travis G. Coan, senior lecturer in
quantitative politics. Inclusive of the editors, 16 contributors also
participated in the volume, including well-known terrorism specialists
Thomas Hegghammer, Norwegian Defence Research Establishment
(FFI); Haroro J. Ingram, George Washington University; and Charlie
Winter, King’s College London.
ISIS Propaganda provides the “first comprehensive overview and
detailed analysis of this (ISIS) propaganda effort, which, we argue
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here and throughout the book, constitutes an outstanding instance of
‘full-spectrum propaganda’” (2). This is quite a feat given no prior book
has attempted to arrange the mosaic pieces related to ISIS propaganda
activities in order to create a more encompassing picture that can be
better understood and analyzed in its totality.
ISIS Propaganda is composed of front and back sections, an
introduction, eight chapters, and an afterword. The front sections
consist of the contributor listing and a glossary of frequent Arabic
terms—including terms in English, their original Arabic spelling, and
the ISIS translation in English—and individual and group names in
English and their original Arabic spelling. The introduction provides
an overview to the work and explains how ISIS is utilizing a fullspectrum propaganda approach within the context of the “IS moment
of prodigious plagiarism” (8). The impact of the use of propaganda by
ISIS and the “thorny question of the propagandists’ and propagandees’
respective agencies,” however, is not addressed (11).
The first chapter provides two key tables. The first table—related to
the “Islamic State’s ‘Hedging’ Approach”—identifies themes prioritized
during bust and boom cycles (32). The second table, “Multiple Formats
Mobilized in Islamic State Propaganda,” highlights the messaging
mediums analyzed in the follow-on chapters (36). This important chapter
recognizes “IS seeks to synchronize the actions of its ‘competitive system
of control’ with the messages at the heart of its ‘competitive system of
meaning’ ” (44).
The second chapter is organized into three parts focused on ISIS’s
ideological genealogy, the context in which its message developed, and
speculation concerning its futures messaging (51). The next four chapters
provide the messaging case studies related to the mediums utilized
for Salafi-Jihadi—that is Wahhabi derived—propaganda purposes,
principally in Arabic and English but other languages are also touched
upon. The third chapter addresses magazines, highlights the importance
of the Arabic language magazine al-Naba and the better-known Dabiq
and Rumiyah, English language magazines, and utilizes network linking
and in- and out-group and quantitative analysis.
The fourth chapter provides an in-depth analysis of the propaganda
videos utilized by the Caliphate, focusing on “province” (Wilāyāt)
produced content and trends, “script” content analysis related to ISIS
narratives, and the “Selected 10” featured video placement found in
magazines such as Dabiq. Chapter five reviews Islamic State online
propaganda use with an emphasis on its active engagement with the target
audience as opposed to more passive interactions. The successful use of
social media such as Twitter and Telegram is then explored. The sixth
chapter concerns the lesser propaganda media utilized by ISIS in terms
of their “religious chants . . . photo galleries/reports, infographics, books,
and news communiqués,” with the a cappella Islamic chants (anashīd)—
perhaps the most fascinating element (189). The seventh chapter focuses
on counter-ISIS propaganda activities including shutting down their safe
TOC

Book Reviews: Irregular Warfare

161

online spaces, limiting legitimate media amplification and exploitation
for intelligence-gathering purposes, and counter-narrative strategies.
The final chapter discusses terrorist propaganda futures through its
answering of specific questions to guide the analysis related to imitative
and creative behavior on the part of ISIS and its successors (243). Each
chapter contains a reference listing at its conclusion.
The afterword by Hegghammer credits the book for helping the field
overcome a five-year struggle to better understand the “scale and nature
of the IS full-spectrum propaganda machine” by fusing the talents of
“propaganda specialists and ‘in-the-weeds’ jihadism observers” (266).
This afterword is followed by an anashīd appendix, excerpts from a
provincial news report from Al-Bayan Radio appendix, and an index.
The book has one slight demerit. Some of the chapter content
appears to have been completed in 2018 with later sporadic contributions
refreshing it into 2020, giving the information a lessons-learned rather
than a cutting-edge feel given how quickly the ISIS jihadi propaganda
spaces evolve. This problem, unfortunately, is part and parcel of
academic book publishing with its industrial-era production cycles and
is not a critique of the book itself.
Ultimately, any critique would be quibbling. ISIS Propaganda is an
extremely high-quality book with good use of tabling, figures, and
imagery. It is very informative and does an excellent integrative analysis
of seemingly disparate forms of ISIS propaganda material. It will be of
specific interest to military officers and governmental personnel tasked
with the US global response to ISIS social media use for propaganda,
radicalization, and recruitment purposes. Much of this concern today
ties into the current emergence of ISIS cells in new parts of the globe
and the foreign fighters phenomenon—with its battlefield shifting
potentials—that still has not been fully resolved.
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Strategic Leadership
From Quills to Tweets: How America
Communicates about War and Revolution
Edited by Andrea J. Dew, Marc A. Genest, and S. C. M. Paine
Reviewed by Ross Harrison, senior fellow at the Middle East Institute in
Washington, DC

C

arl von Clausewitz, the famous nineteenth-century Prussian
war strategist, said, “War is the continuation of politics by other
means” (Carl von Clausewitz, On War, 87). Part of the politics of war for
Clausewitz is the interaction between the government, the people, and
the military. From Quills to Tweets embodies this insight to its fullest.
For the authors of this new and fresh contribution to the study of
war, the successful prosecution of military campaigns often depends
on adept communication strategies. Even successful military campaigns
not accompanied by an adeptly waged “war of words” risk political
objectives not being met, resulting in the most profound kind of
strategic failure (44).
Dew, Genest, and Paine fuse an elegant, simple-to-follow conceptual
framework with a sweeping historical treatment of war that yields a
rich understanding of how war and revolution are inherently political
enterprises. Readers come away with the insight that communication
can be as important a part of military strategy as the fighting itself,
even though the authors do not explicitly say this. Without effective
communication strategies, political and military leaders risk rendering
even successful military campaigns unsuccessful in meeting their
political objectives.
The book uses the insight about the inextricable connection between
warfare and communication, not as an endpoint but rather as a jumpingoff point. The authors drill down deeper than previous treatments of the
same subject, providing readers with a wonderfully innovative analysis
of how the United States has, at times, framed the political dimensions
of war to its advantage, and how at other times, political leaders have
used messaging to provide a soft political landing for military failures
like Vietnam.
The book grabs readers from the first page with the crisp treatment
of the Revolutionary War against the British and the importance of
messaging as a determinant of its success. Almost every major US
military campaign is examined—from the War of 1812, the SpanishAmerican War, the two World Wars, Korea, Vietnam, and the more
recent military campaigns in the Middle East.
The authors are as adroit in getting their message across as they
are in providing readers with an understanding of the importance of
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messaging in war. Readers will see that while time and technology have
changed the communication side of war, the fundamentals have remained
largely unchanged since the American Revolution. For sure, military
campaigns have become more geographically expansive and complex,
and the technology of messaging has become more sophisticated. But
like in earlier times, the ability for government leaders to translate
military success into the political wins discussed by Clausewitz depends
heavily on adept management of the message.
This book gets good stylistic grades as well. For an edited volume, it is
remarkably cohesive. All contributing authors used the tight framework
of the messages of war, the messengers who propagate those messages,
and the media by which the messages are propagated. Readers will forget
this book is a compilation of contributions by many authors—unlike
many edited volumes.
From Quills to Tweets is an incredibly timely contribution at a time
when US foreign policy seems to lack clearly stated objectives and
strategies, and when effective communication to the American public,
to allies, and to adversaries remains elusive and flatfooted. This tightly
written volume will provide a wakeup call for a more coherent strategy
that communicates both military and political objectives to the American
public and the world. It will be a conversation starter for renewed
discourse on how war is, in fact, a quest to achieve clear political and
strategic objectives by other means.

Organisational Learning and the Modern Army: A
New Model for Lessons-Learned Processes
By Tom Dyson
Reviewed by Seth A. Johnston, fellow at the Belfer Center for Science
and International Affairs at Harvard University, and lieutenant colonel in the
US Army
New York: Routledge, 2020
262 pages
$155.00

T

om Dyson’s Organisational Learning and the Modern Army evokes the
old admonition not to judge a book by its cover. This slim hardback
makes good on its title proposition for army lessons learned. It also
surveys British and German experiences in Afghanistan, synthesizes
literature on military change, contemplates NATO, accounts for the
United States among many other factors, and offers policy advice for
related topics, including officer education and civil-military relations. Its
density is less like a sabot round than canister: though covering a large
area, each fléchette of insight still stings.
The book concentrates on how armies institutionalize learning.
Dyson views lessons learned processes as an important “transmission
belt” for moving hard-won lessons from the field into enduring changes
in training, doctrine, and other aspects of the institutional army (1).
Contrasted with other authors on the subject, Dyson is especially
bullish on the value of formal lessons learned institutions—which he
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abbreviates “LL” (3). His model identifies organizational activities—
especially operational design, basic and predeployment training, and
education—that support such formal lessons learned. On the question
of sources for military learning, Dyson considers the full range of
options but concludes factors external to the military are decisive and
that civilian leadership is especially important (246).
The book features an introductory cluster of theory chapters, two
case studies from the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)
in Afghanistan, and closing reflections on military learning mainly
aimed at practitioners and “Practice Turn” scholars (10). In his review
of theoretical literature, Dyson pulls few punches in criticizing the
“limited analysis” of Richard Downie, John Nagl, and other authors on
organizational learning (5). To be sure, other authors, including Sergio
Catignani and Theo Farrell, enjoy multiple complimentary citations,
though perhaps as much for their shared empirical focus on the British
army in Afghanistan. Dyson embraces theoretical eclecticism and draws
explicitly from organization theory, process models like bureaucratic
politics, and strategic and other cultural approaches, all before embracing
neoclassical realism—itself a broad tent. The result is a detailed chart of
theoretical propositions on military learning, focused on the tactical and
operational levels of war.
Although the book is titled and organized as a theory-proposing
work supported by two case studies, it could be equally well read the other
way around. An examination of the two biggest European participants
in the ISAF mission—and among the most important armies in NATO
generally—is empirically valuable. Military and civilian practitioners will
find the summary takeaways from the British and German experiences
illuminating applied reading and a superb complement to the Parameters’
special issues on Afghanistan lessons learned published during the
last year (158–63, 232–42).
Dyson assesses that while British and German armies began their
Afghanistan campaigns with decent learning potential, both failed to
realize enduring lessons. The detailed reasons why reveal unexpected
gems, such as a fascinating historical and generational account of the
“three visions of military professionalism” in the Bundeswehr (221–23).
Beyond the main tactical and operational focus, Dyson reflects on
“unrealistic” British and German political expectations of their armies,
with some good sense of civil and military recommendations to close the
gap (248–49). With so much else written on the American experience, this
book offers a rare perspective. It is not merely a documentation of past
campaigns, but a work of forward-looking clarity. Dyson convincingly
argues the relevance of these cases for an army’s modernization and
readiness for newer challenges such as hybrid warfare (31, 88, 158, 247).
Organisational Learning and the Modern Army is serious reading, and a
more ruthless editor might have demanded cuts. Not all theories do equal
work in the analysis, for example, and there are some hints that still other
conceptual approaches were indeed cut from earlier drafts—mainly
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historical institutionalism and associated terms like “path-dependence”
that remain sprinkled through individual sections (58). Empirically,
the book offers useful information about the multinational NATO
lessons learned institutions, but these are not central to the British or
German cases.
Stylistically, I admit to a momentary sense of déjà vu before realizing
the first paragraph of chapter two is a verbatim facsimile of the preceding
paragraph. In word choice, spelling, and other conventions, the book
exemplifies the old saying that the United Kingdom and the United
States are two nations divided by a common language. Yet the application
of so many theoretical traditions and their associated technical terms
(e.g., “Potential Absorptive Capacity ‘PACAP’,” “Realized Absorptive
Capacity ‘RACAP’,” “‘single-loop’ and ‘double-loop’ learning,” etc.)
present a steep learning curve to anyone (2, 12). American political
scientists might also quibble about the research design, including the
reliance on qualitative methods and interview sources, or using only two
case studies to advance such an exhaustive new model. But Dyson’s clear
command of the material, the richness of the information conveyed
from interviews, and the uncommonly helpful and explicit practical
implications of the analysis outweigh these concerns.
Dyson’s book contributes to a renaissance in transatlantic scholarly
interest in military learning, often motivated by and focused on the
American and European experience in Afghanistan. It follows works
“such as “Learning the Hard Way” (2016) by Jörg Noll and Sebastiaan
Rietjens and NATO’s Lessons in Crisis (2018) by Heidi Hardt. Hardt and
Dyson pair together exceptionally well. While both authors undertake
a qualitative case study analysis of NATO in Afghanistan, Hardt
emphasizes the international rather than national structures, the strategic
rather than tactical and operational, and the informal methods of learning
rather than formal “LL” (3). Together the books set up a great debate on
the future of this subject—or perhaps the beginning of a new synthesis.
Either way, Dyson makes an important addition to contemporary
conflict viewed from an allied but non-US perspective, comprehensive
thinking about military learning, and practical considerations for army
institutional leadership and civil-military relations. I highly recommend
Organisational Learning and the Modern Army.
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Military History
Phoenix Rising: From the Ashes of Desert One
to the Rebirth of U.S. Special Operations
By Col Keith M. Nightingale (Ret)
Reviewed by David Fivecoat, leadership consultant and retired US Army colonel

O

peration Eagle Claw, the US military operation to rescue the 52
American hostages being held at the US Embassy in Tehran, Iran,
ended in failure at Desert One on the night of April 24–25, 1980, when
a RH-53D helicopter collided with an EC-130 tanker during refueling
operations. In 1979, Keith Nightingale—then a major working on
the Department of the Army staff in the Pentagon—was assigned to
the Joint Task Force Headquarters for the operation. Phoenix Rising is
Nightingale’s fast paced, extremely well-written account of his perspective
on the operation and the subsequent creation of US Special Operations
Command (USSOCOM).
Nightingale’s detailed perspective on the planning, rehearsals, and
execution of the raid are the strongest aspect of the book. Early on he
lays out the challenges of Operation Eagle Claw:
• “Fly 15,000 miles around the world, the last 850 miles in hostile
airspace, and arrive undetected.
• Enter a sprawling metropolitan city of 2,000,000.
• Close with and breach the walls of a heavily guarded, 27-acre
compound.
• Free, without injury, 60+ American citizens from their guards without
injuring any civilians” (15).
Additional conditions included planning, rehearsing, and
executing the operation in complete secrecy within 10 days of
notification; no funding for the operation; and extraction of the
assault force and hostages. These parameters made the hostage rescue
plan extremely complex. With no standing organization trained for the
mission, the Army created an ad hoc Joint Task Force with a headquarters
of 32 people on the Joint Staff in the Pentagon under the command of
Major General James Vaught. The task force included a Delta Force
element, a US Army Rangers element, US Navy RH-53D helicopters,
US Marine Corps helicopter pilots, US Air Force EC-130 and MC-130s
to transport the assault force, US Navy fighter aircraft operating from
the USS Nimitz and USS Coral Sea, as well as US Air Force AC-130
gunships for air support and US Air Force C-141s to extract the force.
The entire Eagle Claw team worked tirelessly to provide a viable
military option to then US President Jimmy Carter. Although the lowestranking person in the Joint Task Force Headquarters, Nightingale
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successfully captures the personalities and series of decisions that
increased the complexity and ad hoc nature of the operation. Vaught
and the team overcame obstacle after obstacle to plan, rehearse, and
execute the operation—especially maintaining secrecy and operating
without a budget.
Although Nightingale concludes the mission failed for mechanical,
organizational, and political reasons, he highlights the US Navy’s failure
to fly the eight RH-53Ds on flight profiles that would have replicated
the distances of the raid—despite being ordered three times to do so.
He also asserts that flying the rehearsal flights, as directed, would have
stressed the aircraft and might have prevented the mechanical loss of
three helicopters prior to Desert One. This omission by the Navy was
not brought up in the post-operation inquiry.
The second-best element of Phoenix Rising is Nightingale’s
perspective on working in the Pentagon. The 1979–81 Pentagon was
very similar to my experience working in the basement of the Pentagon
from 2012–14. I agree with Nightingale’s assessment that for the
military “significant change must come from outside the bureaucracy.
Bureaucracies are very good at fighting that which they don’t want
to do” (208). The stories of resistance from the services, briefings in
the tank, bad meals in the food court, and daily crises will resonate
with readers assigned to the Pentagon, especially those working in the
Joint Staff.
Nightingale provides a unique perspective on the creation of
USSOCOM. From the book, I learned more about programs still used
today (Honey Badger, ELT, Yellow Fruit, and DARISSA) that helped
develop special operations capabilities in the 1980s. Nightingale also
provides a detailed play-by-play of the bureaucratic and political fight
behind the creation of the four-star headquarters that would oversee all
Special Operations Forces and have a line item in the budget to fund the
organization. It is clear, without the failure at Desert One, USSOCOM
would not exist.
While reading the book, I wished Nightingale had used his unique
viewpoint and friendship with the key players to write the definitive
history of Operation Eagle Claw. Charlie Beckwith, Eric Haney, James
Kyle, Mark Bowden, and now Keith Nightingale have all tackled the raid
from different perspectives. It has been more than 40 years since the
operation and not one published book covers all facets of the mission.
Maybe Sean Naylor, Seth Jones, or Eric Schmitt will take on this task.
In short, Phoenix Rising is superb. The book was a pleasure to read
and added another piece to the Operation Eagle Claw puzzle. It should
be read by personnel at all levels in the special operations community
who will draw lessons on planning complex operations, grasp the
challenges of creating ad hoc organizations under pressure, and develop
a deeper understanding of USSOCOM history. It is also a valuable read
for anyone assigned to the Pentagon who will walk away with a better
comprehension of how the bureaucracy works.
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Covert Regime Change: America’s Secret Cold War
By Lindsey A. O’Rourke
Reviewed by Dr. Richard H. Immerman, Emeritus Marvin Wachman Director,
Center for the Study of Force and Diplomacy, Temple University

A

book title that strings together the words covert and regime
change is certain to attract potential readers from the academic,
public, and policy-making communities. Add the subtitle “America’s
Secret Cold War,” impressive research, and methodological rigor, and
the book will be eagerly sought after by top-tier press acquisition editors
and top-tier journal book review editors and provide a gateway to a
tenure track position. Lindsay O’Rourke’s revised dissertation is evidence
of that.
It is surprising, then, that O’Rourke’s contribution to the history of
US foreign relations, intelligence history, and international relations
theory is not just valuable but also original. After all, especially since
the failed Bay of Pigs operation in 1961, US-orchestrated covert actions
aimed at influencing, destabilizing, or overthrowing foreign governments
often made headlines. Even before that, clandestine operations in
Albania, Iran, Guatemala, Indonesia, Congo, and elsewhere were hardly
well-kept secrets. O’Rourke’s dataset identifies more than 60 covert
efforts to bring about regime change, some 10 times the number of overt
efforts, pursued by the United States between 1947 and 1989. Scholars
and journalists have been aware of each of these efforts. Yet because of
the continued classification of documents and attendant impediments
to research, few authors have sought to chronicle and analyze them
as comprehensively and systematically as O’Rourke, and no one has
succeeded as she has. We owe her a great debt.
Yet O’Rourke’s goal in Covert Regime Change is not so much
to uncover what but to explain why and assess the results and
consequences. Bolstering the salience of the questions she explores is
the continued appeal of covert regime changes after the end of the Cold
War when, at least until 2001, the United States appeared to have less
reason to fear global antagonists. O’Rourke explains this phenomenon
by formulating a typology to categorize the drivers of US policymakers’
decisions to seek regime changes. She begins with offensive operations,
conventionally associated with rollback or liberation, designed to
overthrow a perceived security threat and/or its allies. These operations,
most which targeted Eastern Europe or Soviet nationalities during the
Cold War, were the least effective. The second category is preventive
operations, which aimed to stop a state from developing a weapon or
weapons system or deter it from joining a hostile alliance. Iran and other
Middle Eastern states are exemplars.
Finally, O’Rourke identifies hegemonic operations as those
intended to establish or maintain US dominance. Caribbean and Latin
American nations such as Guatemala, Brazil, or Chile fit this template.

Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 2019
330 pages
$39.95
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All told, O’Rourke classifies 23 covert operations in the first category
as covert, 25 in the second category, and 18 in the third category. The
sum of the overt operations that spanned the categories is six, half of
which were hegemonic. She also formulates typologies for the covert
actions themselves.
As a historian I am uncomfortable with typologies. Our discipline
stresses contingency, dissimilarity, and change. In my judgment,
the distinctions O’Rourke draws among the missions are somewhat
artificial, and the boundaries that separate them are porous. One can
identify the 1954 Guatemalan coup d’état—code name Operation
PBSuccess—as offensive or preventive as easily as hegemonic.
Nevertheless, because the United States sought to effect so many regime
changes during the Cold War—revealingly the term regime change did
not become popular until the post–Cold War era when applied publicly
to such states as Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Syria—there is value to
establishing patterns and commonalities. Chief among these, O’Rourke
argues persuasively, is the perception that regime change will advance
US interests more fundamentally than any alternative (negotiations, for
example), that the problem the United States confronts is intractable,
and, perhaps most problematically, that the United States can replace
the offending regime with one more sympathetic to American aims if
not necessarily its values.
Another pattern O’Rourke detects, and perhaps the one on which
the others hinge, is that although covert operations are more likely to fail
than overt ones, policymakers find them all but irresistible because they
appraise the potential risks and costs as lower than overt operations.
They presume a failure will remain hidden or at least the United States
will be able plausibly to deny its culpability. Further, the operation is
unlikely to provoke a great power response. Hence, regardless of the
dismal success rate, covert operations have continued and will almost
surely continue to be high on the menu of policymakers’ options and
instruments. The processes administrations across the board use to
decide on an operation, moreover, are unlikely to serve as a deterrent.
O’Rourke thus joins the chorus of critics who argue that covert
actions are ineffective instruments of US foreign policy and national
security. Even when the operations succeeded in the short run, she
writes, the “covert regime changes seldom worked out as intended,”
and the costs to America’s reputation, image, global relations, and more
far exceeded the rewards (83). But she goes a step beyond by estimating
that notwithstanding the validity of this assessment, policy makers will
be unable to resist the temptation to approve them. This contribution
to the literature is more constructive than her typology, her articulation
of a theory that explains covert regime changes in terms of realism and
security, or even her exhaustive catalog of operations.
Without minimizing the historiographical value of Covert Regime
Change—O’Rourke does intervene in some debates, perhaps most
notably by arguing that John F. Kennedy was “intimately involved” in
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the decision to support a coup against Ngo Dinh Diem—O’Rourke’s
objective is primarily theoretical (179). That will affect readers’ reception
of, if not the book, several of its chapters. All will applaud her research,
however, especially her archival research. In this regard, even though she
fails occasionally to acknowledge adequately that some of her secondary
sources are more reliable and authoritative than others, she has carefully
reconstructed the history of the numerous case studies she presents.
The takeaways from this book will differ among political scientists,
historians, and practitioners, and some will lament the absence of a
bibliography. They all should read it nevertheless.

Civilizing Torture: An American Tradition
By W. Fitzhugh Brundage
Reviewed by Dr. Larry D. Miller, professor of communicative arts, US Army
War College

A

uthor W. Fitzhugh Brundage, the William B. Umstead
Distinguished Professor of History at the University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill, has crafted a perceptive and rather unsettling
contribution to the understanding of torture. Civilizing Torture: An
American Tradition presents eight wide-ranging and articulate chapters
that constitute an admittedly fractured yet remarkably informative history
of torture.
Brundage’s contribution is necessarily imperfect: torturers prefer to
work in the shadows, seldom maintain detailed records, and portray
their activities as favorably as possible when challenged or called to
account. Victims are often reluctant to speak, and an unknown number
of victims never have the opportunity to speak. In addition, what
qualifies as torture in an expansive historical context is as malleable as
it is disturbing. As Brundage aptly observes, “There is no unambiguous
threshold that separates cruelty from torture” (5). Nevertheless, some
constants apply. Invariably inflicted by the powerful on the powerless,
torture involves physical, mental, and often life-threatening pain.
The basic theme throughout this volume is the torture record
demonstrates that American exceptionalism is, and has always been, far
more aspirational than real. By and large Americans have historically
accepted and tacitly embraced brutality and torture while steadfastly
posturing under a presumption of innocence. Torture, Americans believe
and believe with little doubt, is something others do, not the United
States. Alas, Brundage demonstrates the conflict between belief and
action: despite lofty values and assurances to the contrary, Americans
have historically employed torture as a viable means to an end, so much
so that torture, as he argues convincingly, is something of an ongoing
American tradition.
Brundage challenges readers to discern whether a fair, just, and
democratic society can legitimately engage in torture while proudly

Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 2018
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clinging to the foundational values, principles, and perspectives of a
liberal democratic republic that rejects torture as unacceptable and
uncivilized. By documenting the use of torture across multiple historic
contexts and issues, and detailing the ways in which torture has been
enacted, Brundage directs attention to the sustained and compelling
conflict between means and ends—an exceptionally important
contribution, though one that leaves the text disjointed at times.
The Brundage torture tour moves in a hopscotch fashion beginning
in the early 1500s in America, England, and Europe and eventually
landing in the modern era. In each extended and well-developed
instance, Brundage demonstrates the powerful have authority to act,
although torture itself is often, but not always, hidden from view. He
begins by documenting a wealth of torturous acts and brutality well
understood, respected, and practiced by warring tribal groups and
adopted in part by European colonists intent on securing land and
establishing a new republic.
Brundage shows that, over time, torture came to be gently
civilized in the public mind. Torture for the most part was relegated
to and associated with savagery, unregulated frontier conduct, fading
recollections of monarchial tyranny, and often simply ignored or
dismissed as a distressing aberration from the societal norm. Thus,
because torture is antithetical to civility in a liberal democratic republic, the
developing state opted for humane approaches for formal rehabilitation
of individuals whose conduct warranted incarceration and punishment.
Throughout the book, Brundage presents exemplars to demonstrate
the resulting divide between the imagined civil state and the enacted
brutal state characteristic of prison life, police conduct, and military
engagements—all of which are regrettably relevant to contemporary
audiences. Prison life in nineteenth-century America, for example, was
rife with cruelties sanctioned by the state and routinely administered
by institutional authority. Indeed, the shower-bath—a forerunner
of waterboarding—and hooding were common practices in some
northern penitentiaries in the 1800s. The emergence of the modern
police force gave rise to “the third degree,” forced confessions, and
an array of often brutal extralegal practices. The book also examines
torture during the Cold War, the Vietnam experience, the post 9/11
War on Terror, events at Abu Ghraib, and efforts by senior government
officials to authorize “enhanced interrogation” as a legal and acceptable
technique for securing information from suspected terrorists and
unwilling informants (309).
With the publication of Civilizing Torture: An American Tradition,
Brundage effectively augments the literature on torture in the American
experience and its relationship to justice, human rights, dignity, and
democracy. Military strategists, policymakers, and historians will benefit
from his insights, as will readers interested in the strained relationship
between civility and security. Brundage’s unique contribution is to
place, for today’s readers, the reality of torture as a practice conducted
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simultaneously in support of and in direct opposition to American lives
and values. He reminds us the extreme polarization so often identified as
unique to this historical moment is, in fact, rooted in our founding and
made visible through the structures and abuses of power represented at
home and abroad by the specter of American torture.

TOC

TOC

Contributor’s Guidelines
Article Submissions
Content Requirements
Scope

Audience
Clearance

Concurrent
Submissions

Submissions to the US Army War College Press must address
strategic issues regarding US defense policy or the theory and
practice of land warfare while exhibiting the highest standards
of research and scholarship. Actionable strategic, policy, or
instructional recommendations must be included. For more
information, visit https://press.armywarcollege.edu.
US Army War College graduates, other senior military
officers, policymakers, and members of academia concerned with
national security affairs.
Members of the US military and employees of the US
Department of Defense must provide a memo from the local
Public Affairs Office stating a submission is appropriate for
public release (see AR 360-1, ch. 6).
Submissions must not be available on the Internet or be under
consideration with other publishers until the author receives
notification the submission will not be published or until the
work is published through the US Army War College Press.

Formatting Requirements
Length

File Type
Visual Aids

Citations

• Monographs (accepted from USAWC faculty and staff only):
20,000 words (15,000-word main text, 5,000 words in the
foreword and executive summary).
• Articles: 5,000 words or less.
• Commentaries: 2,500–3,000 words.
• Book reviews: 800–1,000 words.
Text must be provided in a single MS Word Document (.doc).
Charts, graphs, and photographs may be provided to clarify or
amplify the text. Tables must be presented in the body of the
Word document. Microsoft-generated charts and graphs must be
submitted in Excel. And photos must be provided as .jpg images
of not more than 9MB (at 300 dpi). If any table, chart, graph, or
photograph has been previously published, written permission
from the copyright holder to republish the content must be
included with the submission.
Use the Chicago Manual of Style format to document sources.
Indicate all quoted material by quotation marks or indentation.
Reduce the number of footnotes to the minimum consistent with
honest acknowledgement of indebtedness, consolidating notes
where possible. Lengthy explanatory footnotes are discouraged
and will be edited.

TOC

176

Parameters 51(1) Spring 2021

Submission Requirements
Address
Include

usarmy.carlisle.awc.mbx.parameters@mail.mil
1. For each contributor, provide the following information: full
name, mailing address, phone number, email address, areas of
expertise, and a brief biography or curriculum vitae.
2. Attach all files, including graphics.
3. For book reviews, include the author, editor, or translator’s
name, the book’s title, the publisher, and the publication date.
4. Abstract requirements, approximately 200 words, including
the following information:
a. What is the thesis/main argument of the piece in
one sentence?
b. How does this piece differ from what has already been
published on the topic?
c. What methodology and sources are/will be used?
d. Why will this piece be of interest or useful to the
readers of the USAWC Press, who are mainly policy
and military practitioners?

Timelines
Receipt
Review

Please allow 1 business day for confirmation of receipt.
Articles: 4–6 weeks.
Monographs (accepted from USAWC faculty and staff only): 10–12 weeks.

TOC

Photo Credits
Page 14
1.

Reprinted from Specialist 5 Robert C. Lafoon, Department of the Army Special Photo Office, Airborne Soldier M16
Recon by Fire Operation Cook, 1967 (National Archives, 1967).

2.

Reprinted from Nixon White House Photographs, 1/20/1969 – 8/9/1974, President Richard Nixon and Premier Chou
En-Lai Shake Hands at the Nixons’ Arrival in Peking, China (Image: WHPO 8498-02A, White House Photo Office
Collection, Nixon Administration, 1972).

3.

Photograph courtesy of the US Army War College Press, US Marines in Vietnam Honor Comrades Killed in Action
with Battlefield Crosses.

4.

Reprinted from Frank Aleksandrowicz, Signs of the Energy Crisis (ARC 550088, National Archives, 1973).

5.

Reprinted from Wikimedia Commons, Flag of Europe (uploaded 2008).

Page 15
6.

Reprinted from Andrea Piacquadio from Pexels.

7.

Reprinted from Wikipedia, Reverse of the 1776–1976 Bicentennial Quarter Struck in 1975 and 1976. Design by Jack L.
Ahr (1976).

8.

Reprinted from Wikimedia by Rama, CC BY-SA 2.0 fr, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=11276471,
Apple II Computer. On display at the Musée Bolo (EPFL, Lausanne, 2010).

9.

Reprinted from the National Archives, Anwar Sadat and Menachem Begin Greet Each Other for Their First Meeting at
the Camp David Summit as Jimmy Carter and Rosalynn Carter Watch (1978).

10.

Reprinted from Wikimedia, Marches in Beirut in Support of the Islamic Revolution in Iran and Subhi al-Tufayli is
Addressing Them, November 30, 1979 (1979).

Page 16
1.

Photo courtesy of the US Amy War College Press, Afghan Mujahadeen (1988).

2.

Reprinted from Josh Mahler, Air Force Medical Service, The Iranian Hostages Arrive in Wiesbaden, 38 Years Ago
(Defense Visual Information Distribution Service, US Air Force photo, 2019).

3.

Reprinted from Technical Sergeant Mike Creen, http://www.dodmedia.osd.mil/Assets/Still/1984/Air_Force/DF-ST84-09800.JPG, Public Domain, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=2353945 (DODMedia, 1983).

4.

Reprinted from Technical Sergeant M. J. Creen, M102 Howitzers during Operation Urgent Fury (DOD Media, 1983).

5.

Photo courtesy of the US Army War College Press, A Suicide Bomber Destroys the US Embassy in Beirut, Lebanon, on
April 18, 1983, killing 63 people (1983).

Page 17
6.

Photo courtesy of US Army War College Press, Peace Activists Gather outside Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, to
Protest Nuclear Weapons (1986).

7.

Reprinted from the National Archives, Reagan White House Photographs, 1/20/1981 – 1/20/1989, President Ronald
Reagan Meets with Aides on Iran-Contra (1986).

8.

Photo courtesy of US Army War College Press, US President Ronald Reagan and General Secretary of the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union Mikhail Gorbachev (1987).

9.

Photo courtesy of US Army War College Press, Kristin Baker Becomes the First Female Cadet to Serve as First Captain
at the US Military Academy (1989).

10.

Reprinted from Sue Ream, Wikimedia Commons, Berlin Wall-Brandenburg Gate. This file is licensed under the Creative
Commons Attribution 3.0 license (1989).

11.

Photo courtesy of US Army War College Press, US President George H. W. Bush and General Secretary of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union Mikhail Gorbachev Continue Peace Efforts (1989).

12.

Reprinted from DOD Media, Manuel Noriega with Agents from the US DEA (Wikimedia, 1990).

Page 18
1.

Photo courtesy of US Army War College Press, 2nd Brigade, 3rd Armored Division on Saudi-Iraqi Border (1991).

2.

Photo courtesy of US Army War College Press, Patriot Missile (1979).

3.

Photo courtesy of US Army War College Press, 7th Engineer Brigade (1991).

4.

Photo courtesy of US Army War College Press, 7th Engineer Brigade (1991).

5.

Photo courtesy of US Army War College Press, Jerry R. Rutherford, V Corps Commander, Discusses Last-Minute
Details with Lieutenant Colonel Felipe Casso, Executive Officer, 212th Mobile Army Surgical Hospital (1992).

Page 19
6.

Photo courtesy of US Army War College Press, Marines Chat with a Village Elder in Somalia during Operation Restore
Hope (1992).

7.

Photo courtesy of US Army War College Press, Soldier at Attention (1993).

8.

Reprinted from Wikimedia Commons, WTC 1993, ATF Commons (1993).

9.

Reprinted from Stonda, Wikimedia Commons, Pentium 60 Front (2005).

10.

Reprinted from Staff Sergeant Mark A. Moore, Oklahomacitybombing-DF-ST-96-00587.jpg (www.defenselink.mil
/multimedia, 1995).

11.

Reprinted from Air Force News/Library of Congress, Khobar Towers (Library of Congress, 1996).

12.

Reprinted from Specialist Christina Ann Horne, Wikimedia Commons, 990708-A-6207H-015.jpg (Department of
Defense, 1999).

TOC

Parameters 51(1) Spring 2021

178
Page 20
1.

Reprinted from the National Parks Service, Wikimedia Commons, National_Park_Service_9-11_Statue_of_Liberty
_and_WTC_firem, https://web.archive.org/web/20021019052836/http://www.nps.gov/remembrance/statue/index
.html, 2001.

2.

Reprinted from Major Christopher Thomas, 4th Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division, Chinook Landing
(DVIDS, 2012).

3.

Reprinted from Elizabeth Fraser, Military Funeral Honors for US Army Air Forces 1st Lt. Howard Lurcott in Section 3
of Arlington National Cemetery (DVIDS, 2019).

4.

Reprinted from Captain Samuel Otto, MQ-1 Drone (DVIDS, 2020).

5.

Reprinted from martaposemuckel bank-note-209104_1920 (Pixabay).

6.

Reprinted from Wikimedia Commons, Seal of Department of Homeland Security, Public Domain, https://commons.
wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=988960 (Wikimedia).

7.

Reprinted from the National Archives, President Saddam Hussein (2003).

Page 21
8.

Reprinted from Wikimedia Commons, EU Expansion 2004 Map (Wikimedia, 2006).

9.

Reprinted from Mike C. S. on Pexels.

10.

Reprinted from Wikimedia Commons, LinkedIn Logo (Wikimedia).

11.

Reprinted from Wikimedia Commons, Facebook Logo (Wikimedia).

12.

Reprinted from Wikipedia, YouTube Logo (2016).

13.

Photo courtesy of DVIDS, Soldiers Conduct a Dismounted Patrol in Hawija (DVIDS, 2004).

14.

Reprinted from Courtesy Photo, Massachusetts National Guard Public Affairs, 15 Years Later: Massachusetts National
Guard Remembers Activation for Hurricane Katrina Response (DVIDS, 2020).

15.

Reprinted from Courtesy Photo, Massachusetts National Guard Public Affairs, 15 Years Later: Massachusetts National
Guard Remembers Activation for Hurricane Katrina Response (DVIDS, 2020).

16.

Reprinted from VIN JD on Pixabay.

17.

Reprinted from Courtesy Photo, Special Operations Command South, Haiti Relief (DVIDS, 2010).

Page 22
1.

Reprinted from Hamid Mir on Wikimedia, http://centralasiaonline.com/en_GB/articles/caii/features/Pakistan
/main/2011/05/03/feature-02, CC BY-SA 3.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=36716340.

2.

Reprinted from Aaron Tang, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA, Wikimedia-DSC03188, CC BY 2.0, https://commons
.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=25613005.

3.

Reprinted from This Is Engineering on Pixabay.

4.

Reprinted from Pacific Command, INDOPACOM Logo (2020).

5.

Reprinted from Gerd Altmann on Pixabay.

6.

Reprinted from Karolina Grabowska on Pexels.

7.

Reprinted from NASA, Superstorm Sandy on 10-30-2012 (Wikimedia Commons, 2012).

8.

Reprinted from Laura Poitras, Screenshot of a Film by Praxis Films, Edward Snowden, https://commons.wikimedia.org
/wiki/File:Edward_Snowden.jpg, Wikimedia Commons. This file is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution
3.0 license.

Page 23
9.

Reprinted from Airman 1st Class Ashley J. Thum, 51st Fighter Wing Public Affairs, USFK Same-sex Couples Await
Theater-specific Benefits (Pacific Air Forces, 2013).

10.

Reprinted from Staff Sergeant Edward Siguenza, California National Guard, Rapid Trident 2019 (DVIDS, 2019).

11.

Reprinted from The White House, File: President Trump Meets with Chairman Kim Jong Un (4816262874, Wikimedia
Commons, 2019).

12.

Reprinted from M. H. on Pixabay, https://pixabay.com/illustrations/brexit-united-kingdomeu-1478082/.

13.

Reprinted from Pete Linforth on Pixabay.

14.

Photo courtesy of US Army War College Press (2020).

15.

Reprinted from Lance Corporal Juan Carpanzano, 3rd Marine Division Conducts Range 220AMOUT during SLTE
1-21 (DVIDS, 2020).

16.

Reprinted from USACE Facebook post ( January 3, 2021).

TOC

US Army War College Quarterly
Parameters

47 Ashburn Drive | Carlisle PA 17013-5238
717-245-4943
http://press.armywarcollege.edu
e-mail: usarmy.carlisle.awc.mbx.parameters@mail.mil
The US Army War College Quarterly, Parameters, is a refereed forum for contemporary strategy and Landpower issues.
It furthers the education and professional development of senior military officers and members of government and
academia concerned with national security affairs. Parameters is indexed in, inter alia, Air University Library Index to Military
Periodicals, US Government Periodicals Index, LexisNexis Government Periodicals Index, Worldwide Political Science Abstracts, Lancaster Index
to Defence & International Security Literature (UK), and PAIS Bulletin. Book reviews are indexed in Gale Group’s Book Review Index.
Parameters is also available through ProQuest and UMI.
Periodicals postage is paid at Carlisle, Pennsylvania, and additional entry offices. ISSN 0031-1723 | USPS 413530 | Library of
Congress Catalog Card No. 70-612062.
Subscriptions: US Army War College graduates who are actively employed by the government, as well as select
organizations, may receive a gratis subscription. For eligibility requirements, visit the website listed above.
Nongraduates, retired graduates, and the general public may subscribe through the Government Publishing
Office (GPO).
Address Changes: Submit address changes for unpaid subscriptions to the Parameters office by e-mail or phone.
Reprint Requests: For permission to reprint articles, contact the Parameters editorial office by e-mail or phone. Be
prepared to provide the article’s title, author’s name, publication date, intended use, quantity, and means of distribution.
Reviews and Replies: We invite reader commentaries on articles appearing in Parameters. Not all commentaries can
be published. For those that are, the author of the article will be invited to provide a reply. For additional information,
visit the website listed above.

The US Army War College
The US Army War College educates and develops leaders for service at the strategic level while advancing knowledge in the global
application of Landpower.
The purpose of the US Army War College at this time in our nation’s history is to produce graduates who are skilled critical
thinkers and complex problem solvers in the global application of Landpower. Concurrently, it is our duty to the Army to also act
as a “think factory” for commanders and civilian leaders at the strategic level worldwide and routinely engage in discourse and
debate on ground forces’ role in achieving national security objectives.

The School of Strategic Landpower develops strategic
leaders by providing a strong foundation of wisdom
grounded in mastery of the profession of arms, and
by serving as a crucible for educating future leaders in
the analysis, evaluation, and refinement of professional
expertise in war, strategy, operations, national security,
resource management, and responsible command.

The Center for Strategic Leadership develops senior leaders
and supports the strategic needs of the Army by educating
senior military and civilian leaders on Landpower at the
operational and strategic levels, developing expert knowledge
and solutions for the operating and generating force, and
conducting research activities, strategic exercises, and
strategic communication.

The US Army Heritage and Education Center acquires,
conserves, and exhibits historical materials for use to
support the US Army, educate an international audience,
and honor soldiers—past and present.

The Army Strategic Education Program executes General
Officer professional military education for the entire
population of Army General Officers across the total force
and provides assessments to keep senior leaders informed
and to support programmatic change through evidencebased decision making.

The Strategic Studies Institute publishes national security
and strategic research and analysis to influence policy debate
and bridge the gap between military and academia.

TOC

PARAMETERS (USPS 413530)
US Army War College
ATTN: Parameters
47 Ashburn Drive
Carlisle, PA 17013-5238
Periodicals Postage Paid

The US Army War College

The Quarterly

FOR THIS AND OTHER PUBLICATIONS, VISIT US AT
https://press.armywarcollege.edu

TOC

